The Dominion. THURSDAY, JANUARY 14, 1915. "THE WINNING CARDS"

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2358, 14 January 1915, Page 4

The Dominion. THURSDAY, JANUARY 14, 1915. "THE WINNING CARDS"

"THE expected has happened. The submarine has jtaken the place of the destroyer as the torpedoer.'" A cablegram which we publish in another column tells us that this is the opinion of the naval correspondent ,of the London Times. It is not a very startling announcement. Before the war began there was much discussion on the part of experts reI garding the place of the submarine in .modern warfare., Sir Pehcy Scott and others predicted that it would do wonderful things, and these predictions have since been largely verified by actual happenings. The coming of the submarine is the, latest phase in the evolution of torpedo craft. The torpedo boat made its appearance during the war between Russia and Turkey in 1877. Then the destroyer was invented for the purpose of destroying the torpedo boat; out experience showed that it could do the same work as the craft it was specially intended to fight against r and in que course torpedoing became its ■ principal object. Yet in actual warfare it has never fulfilled expectations. Mr. F. T. Jake attributes the ill-success of torpedo-craft, except in attacks on ships in harbour, to the fact that the sea is a- vast place, and when destroyers look for battleships ,f they are somewhat in the, position of a man looking for the needle? in the proverbial bundle of hay. 1 ' The submarine has proved its capacity .for under-water fighting; the fire' effect of its torpedo is far greater and more destructive than that of the destroyer, in that its impact is delivered at the weakest and most vulnerable part of . the unsuspecting ship; and the moral effect of an attack delivered from an unseen enemy, approaching from an unknown quarter, is the crowning mark of the submarine's supremacy over the destroyer. This terribly efficient machine has now become otye of the principal factors in' the 1 great strug: gle._ Submarines were used to a limited extent in the Rijsso-japanese War and also in the war between Turkey and Greece, but their achiever ments were not of outstanding. importance. Mr. Jane states'that the present is "the first -war", in" which submarines ;h'ave taken part \as a regular arm. "When the war started everyone had theories of what they might accomplish,' and these' theories ran' the whols'gamut of 'from noth-' ihg everything.' But nobody actually knew anything whatever. Purr ing the five giqnths' tiiat have passed silice the conflict l}egan, the world has learnt a good deal. The submarine has demonstrated its terrible power,-and all doubts as to its efficiency as an engine of destruction have been amoved. . ■'The loss' of the Formidable," writes the' Times naval correspondent, "proves that, in addition to working by stealth in daylight, tjiq submarine "oa'n boldly sally forth on the surface pf the water _at night, protected by Her comparative invisibility, and search for a target:" But thq'ugn the ha-s achieved a dramatic success, it oannot do eyerytHing, and ipuch that Sir Percy Scott predicted has not been borne out by events. "I can fiep," he said, "no use for a battleship and very little chance of employment for a fast cruiser.'', No one can tell what the future may have in store, but the experience of the present war gives hardly any support to such a sweeping forecast! In an article of great interest in the December numher of the Fortnightly Review, Mr. AkchiBALp Hhrd points 'out thfit gis Ppoy Scott's prophecy that our battleships arid cruisers yronld ha,ye to be kept shut up in our Harbours has not beerii fulfilled. In spite p£ the German submarines over a dozen dreadnoughts and cruisers of the British".Fleet, offering targets varying in length" from 430 feet to 660 feet, penetrated into the territorial waters of the enemy—the . Bight of He)igola.nd—where the enemy's un-der-water oraft Bright hope to operate with' the greatest success. The squadron was actually attacked by tliriee submarines, but the attack was frustrated by rapid manoeuvring. We are told that tho high BPfved of our ships mado tho attack difficult, •and the sfnoothnc™ of tho soa made detection easy. On another occasion numerous British squadrons &pd flotillas madp V complete' sweep of the North Sea up to and into the fieligqlp'd Biyht. unci tho Germans made no'atteinp(i lo inter fprc. Thesq facts are su'flioien't to pvoyo that tho fear of the submarine has not paralysed our fleet, But on tho other hand it would be folly to shut our oves to t!ie plain fact that Gorman submarines havo sent a number of our ships to the |iottom ; and that tho consequent loss of'Jifo h«s been deplorably largo! It would, however, bo a mistake to conclude from this that pho Gprman submarines aro superior to oup own, or that thpir crows are more daring and enterprising thai\ ours. The enemy's success is quo, as Mr. HuitD remarks, to tho fact that the enemy has kept his larger ships hidden from attack, while British ships havo to maintain a constant patrol the North Sea in order to the enemy aqd confine the war tq one main strategical thcatro. We certainlv' havo no cause for despondency! for Britain probably possesses twice, or ovoi} threo times, as many submarines as_ Germany, and their opportunity will come on the day that the German battlo fleet sails out into the North Sea. Our confidence in the isßue of tho naval war, writes Mr. Hi/üb, is "reinforced by tho knowledgo that whether the final issue be determined by gunfire from Dreadnoughts,' as there is good reasonl to anticipate, or by torpedoes from submarines—an unlikely contingency—we hold the winning cards."