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TURKEY'S ARMY

PREPARATIONS IN EGYPT INVASION DIFFICULT Reviewing the situation created by Turkey's entry into the war, the military correspondent of the "Morning Post" wrote as follows at the beginning of last monthlt has been fairly evident during the past two months that Turkey's attitude of neutrality, despite repeated assurances, was a purely temporary attitude, designed to gain time for the preparations which her German military advisers considered necessary to fit her forces to fulfil the part allotted to them in the scheme of the' German General Staff. Whether those prepaartions have been fully completd may be open to doubt. It is significant that the casting aside of the mask should synchronise with the reverse sustained by tho Germanic Allies in Poland;, and it may bo that the Germans have been led to bring their worthy ally into the field prematurely with the idea of relieving a situation | which is not free from embarrassment. The scheme is, of course, to attract Russian' and British forces away from the decisive localities where the main armies are fighting out the supreme issue, to pursue tho secondary but verj important object of the defence of the Caucasian' and Persian frontiers, possibly the Black Sea littoral, and Egypt. 'With Turkey's aid Germany hopes to bringabout this dispersion of forces and energies without any diminution of ber own resources except such as is entailed by the loan of some of her officers and reservists.

Tho Turkish Mobilisation, It is now two months since it was reported from Petrograd that General Liman von Sanders and several other German officers were busy in Erzerum directing the fortification of the town and the construction of entrenchments and wire entanglements on the Caucasian frontier. It was also known at, that time that the mobilisation of the Turkish army was proceeding, that all German reservists resident in Turkey had been ordered to join the Ottoman, forces, and that consignments of arms and ammunition were being dispatched from Germany to supply the Turkish deficiencies. A few days later it was reported from Athens that Colonel von Gfick had arrived at Damascus on appointment' as Chief of tlio Staff to tiie army corps .at that place, which was evidently intended to form part of an expeditionary force against Egypt. These military measures were supplemented by the customary German methods of intrigue and espionage. "Agents provocateurs" were active in Egypt as well as in India, and the Balkans, and # the British authorities, tvitli' tho disinclination which characterises British -administration all the world over to take adequate measures when adequacy implies something abnormal in scope or stringency, seem to have let matters drift even in a greater degree _ than thoy have done at Home. For this laxity the/ military authorities in Egypt are not to blame. They have been fully alive for years <to the danger of tho situation in the event of the present crisis arising. The military force with which Turkey will augment the resources of the Germanic allies is a very uncertain quantity _ as regards quality, numbers, organisation, and armament. In the late Balkan War the fighting value of the Turkish Army, as an organised machine, showed a marked deterioration from the standard of last century, although the individual martial qualities of the sol-' diery were doubtless unimpaired. It is unnecessary to go into the causes of tills deterioration. They lay chiefly in recent political influences affecting the higher'ranks and'administration. The appointment of German commandere and the employment of German non-com-missioned officers may effect a marked improvement in the. efficiency of the army. It is stated that 1000 German officers are now employed with the Ottoman Army. ' Numbers. As regards numbers, sis Army Corps aro, according to Russian reports, located in European Turkey, amounting to about 220,000 men. For the Caucasian and Persian frontiers five Army Corps (rill be available, with a total strength of 170,000 to 180,000 men. The Damascus Army Corps, which'is intended to operate against Egypt, is probably about 35,000 strong. In addition to this a .force of Beduin auxiliaries, 6000 strong, consisting largely of camelry, is reported to have been concentrated about Gaza, close to the eastern frontier of Egypt, and a portion of this force is now stated to have crossed the frontier. A smaller force has assembled at Akabah, at the head of the gulf of that name, which is separated from tho Gulf of Suez by the Sinai Peninsula.

Tho ' Turkish Regular cavalry comprises 40 regiments, each, of five squadrons, with, in addition, 24 irregular regiments recruite'd from the Kurds and Arabs of Asia Minor. The Regular cavalry is distributed among the army corps.

Army corps consist in some cases of two, but normally of three, divisions, with a cavalry brigade of three regiments and _ corps artillery comprising six mountain batteries; and three lion" itzer batteries. A division comprises ten battalions and six field batteries. Batteries are of four guns and. six guns each. The total war strength of an army corps of three divisions may therefore, be taken at .35,000 men, including 1000 cavalry and 150' guns. Field batteries are armed with 7.5 c.c. Krupn Q.F.guns. The'heavy field artillory has been undergoing rearmament with 10.5 s.c. Austrian howitzers, and the mountain artillery with Schneider Q.F. guns, but it is not known to what extent the _ rearmament has been completed. The infantry is armed with 7.5 m.m. Mauser magazine rifles, though some outlying divisions have older weapons. There is likely to be some dearth of ammunition should fighting be severe and prolonged, and the variety of typos is calculated to complicate supply and cause confusion in tho field.

The term of military service extends from twenty to forty years of age. Nino years are passed in tho Nizam, or first line (three with the Colours and six in the reserve). The trained soldier then passes to the Redif, or second line, for nine years, and completes his service with two years in the Mustafa,' or third line. Men not required for the annual contingent of the Nizam form the 2nd class of the Redif, and are supposed to train for six months in the first year and one month in succeeding years. The Redif consists entirely of infantry, and would be organised on mobilisation in divisions comprising from seven to twelve battalions. The supply of artillery for these divisions is likely to be precarious. Some 300,000 to 350,000 men are stated to have been organised in Redif divisions, and to be undergoing training. Their fighting value is a very ■ doubtful quantity.

The Russians have not, of course, been blind to tho trend which events were likely to take, and it is not to be supposed that the present situation has found them unprepared. The RussoTurkish frontior of Caucasia is, moreover, naturally strong, and Caucasia is not an ideal scene for a winter campaign. The Desert Frontier. In Egypt, also, we are fully prepared so far as military precautions are concerned. It is an ancient military truism that a desert provides the strongest of all possible land frontiers. It is difficult to traverse, it cannot bo turned, as ma v. p- mountain chain or a

river, and it provides an inhospitable refuge in case of defeat. The eastern frontier of Egypt is covered by 120 miles of barren sand along tlie Mediterranean shore between Rata and Kantara on the Suez Canal, and by 160 miles of rocky wilderness between Akabah and Suez. These are the main caravan routes, and though quite practicable for small forces they would present considerable difficulties in the case of bodies of troops of adequate size to constitute any serious menace to Egypt. Both routes are secure against naval action, except at the extremities, the Mediterranean shore being unapproachable within six or seven miles on account of shallows and lagoons between El Arisli and Port Said. The Suez Canal, and tho freshwater supply of Suez and Port Said, which follows the western bank, could be secured by detachments and by gunboat patrols, as it was during the .Egyptian Expedition of 1882.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19141223.2.40

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2340, 23 December 1914, Page 6

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,340

TURKEY'S ARMY Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2340, 23 December 1914, Page 6

TURKEY'S ARMY Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2340, 23 December 1914, Page 6

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