PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2318, 27 November 1914, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

We are promised to-day that if Russian strategy now in process of. development is successful we shall receive the biggest news of the whole war. What this may mean can only be guessed at, but it seems clear-that at two important points the Russians have Deen steadily moving towards a big objective. The first and most apparent of these has been in Austria. We_ pointed out a day or two ago the importance of a recent advance by the Russians which had secured for them possession of the passes of the Carpathians, .which appeared to be the only way open to the retreat of the Austrian forces. Now we learn to-day that the Russians have pressed forward across the Carpathians well'-into Hungary and on the road to Budapest. It is not difficult to picture the effect in Rumania and the other Balkan States of the Russian advance on the capital of Hungary. : It would be big news indeed; but to carry through this scheme would tax even the enormous .strength of the Rus-. sian millions, The second outstanding feature has been the manoeuvring in Poland, which' appears to have culminated in the Germans falling into a trap laid for them, and which may enable the Russians to cut off a large section of their forces between the Vistula and the Warta. Already large captures have been made, but plainly something bigger still is hinted, at. There is good • news too from' France and Belgium. The Germans are reported to have evacuated some of- their positions in North-West Belgium and to have fallen back. This may mean retirement to their new line of defences about which we have heard so much. It will be both difficult and dangerous" for the Allies to set out to take up new positions with the ground frozen hard, and the_ digging of trenches and the. making of earthworks a task of tremendous labour. Tho probability is that the_ Allied commanders will be content in most cases to hold their positions and ! inake their troops «s comfortable as possible. for tho winter months.

The mere hint of tho possibility of a successful attack on tho Kiel Canal would be sufficient to throw tho whole of Germany into a state of aorious alarm, Tho canal is gen-

erally regarded as impregnable against direct attack by sea, imt a cablegram .which wo publish this morning indicates that the Germans do not regard, hostile operations by land as an impossibility. They are said to be feverishly fortifying the Danewerk fortress and entrenchments north of tho canal, fearing that the Allies may land troops in Schleswig-Holstein. It is not at all. likely that this possibility has just dawned upon the German military experts for the first time. It may be taken for granted that the canal has not been left unprotected against a land attack from the north. 'It is, however, probable that something has recently occurred to accentuate the danger from this quarter, arid it is' quite possible that tho action of tho Danish Government in recalling allreservists from Canada (as announc r od in Monday's issue)-partially explains the additional precautions now being taken. It should also bo remembered.that Schleswig and Holstein were stolen from Denmark, and it is not likely that tho Danish section of the inhabitants would be overwhelmed with grief- if the war. should prove disastrous to Germany. The Germans have, moreover, to face tho fact that Britain holds undisputed command of the North. Sea, and the enemy is never quite sure of'tho use the Allies may make of this advantage.

In one of the- Oxford war pamphlets, Mr. C. E. L. Fletcher gives a vivid . description of Prussia s first serious effort "to open a larger window to the sea." The reference is to "the shameless game of grab which 'she played on Denmark in 1«64. Nominally Austria and ,tho other States of Germany were playing on her side;.but they were only dragged into it, and Prussia was really 'centre-forward,' 'half-back.' and 'full-back' also in the game.!' The Duchies of Schleswig and Holsfcein were the two choice bones, so Mr. Fletcher _ tells us, which the Prussian mastiff stole from tho little Danish terrier, who fought gallantly, but-was hopelessly beaten. Theso Duchies had belonged to the Danes ever since tho time of our Kino Canute, eight hundred years a_go. Prussia had not "& shadow of right upon her side, and acted simply as a strong robber. It was a part which for two hundred years she had been well accustomed to play. . . . Naturally enough Denmark has not forgotten or forgiven the theft of her Duchies, whoso population, still largely of Danish blood, is compelled to learn the supremacy of the Kaiser as an_articfe of faith, and even to sing 'patriotic' Gorman songs- to celebrate tho glories of_ Germany." Being well acquainted with this ugly incident in German history the- Kaiser and his advisers are naturally a little uncertain regarding the depth of the/•loyalty of ,the people of Schleswig-Holstein to tho , German Throne.

England is tbe real enemy. That is the opinion of Count Heiitling, President of the Bavarian Ministry. Garman professors and statesmen are- never tired of giving unrestrained expression to their hatred of Britain, and their fury is increased by the knowledge that she is mistress of the situation. If Britain's hand is "guiding the present terrible tragedy," Germany is certainly responsible for the tragedy. The Count is not far wrong when ho-states that Germany must now either vanquish or vanish. She may not bo actually wiped off the map, but Prussian militarism must be completely crushed once and for all. The British Empire fully.. realises that it must either conquer or be conquered. ■It is no time for half-measures.

German , newspapers will not admit that the Kaiser and his advisers have.been touting for peace. We are' - told that they'_ strenuously repudiate the idea. It is quite possible that the Kaiser's people still believe' that "tho political and military , situations is wholly in Germany's -favour,"- for that is the natural conclusion to. be drawn from the garbled and misleading accounts of the fighting published in the German Press. If the series of "great victories" manufactured in Berlin since the beginning of the war actually took place there would certainly be no need for Germany to be touting for peace. But to those who know the real position the reports which have appeared from time to time'that feelers have been thrown out from Berlin regarding terms of settlement are by no means incredible. It is quite certain that peace suggestions have been made at various times, and it is equally certain that they have not emanated from the Allies, who have declared emphatically that the war which Germany has forced upon them is to be a fight to a finish. On the other hand, there are signs that the Kaiser would willingly agree to "a drawn game." The New York Evenling World, recently announced on "the highest diplomatic authority" that the Kaiser would be glad to ,listen to mediation suggestions, but was prohibited by the , attitude of England. Germany was willing to call the war a draw. Such a solution, she maintained, would be the most' conducive to future peace in Europe, and to disarmament, as complete victory on cither side would not lead to stable conditions. That this ■' statement . fairly represented Germany's attitude is proved by the fact that it very closely with remarks made to his friends by Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington. -

T&e above declaration of Germany's attitude can hardly be regarded as an example of direct touting for peace, because it was the outcome of an inquiry from Washington as to whether the German Emperor was willing to discuss. terms of settlement; but it was subsequently, stated that the German Chancellor had been verbally discussing the possibility of terms of peace with the American Ambassador, without indicating whether the Kaiser was aware 'of tho discussion. These indirect overtures were characterised by The Times as "the whine'of a half-chas-tised bully," and met with no, encouragement from the Entente Powers. The declaration of the Allies that they were resolved to act in concert throughout the war and in drawing up the terms of settlement is said to have been brought about by a message from tho Kaiser to the Tsar making suggestions for peace, without reference to Britain and Prance. The Kaiser is also reported to have approached France through intermediaries, making proposals . for a settlement, and other overtures arc stated on good authority to have emanated from, the same source. It may bo quite true, of course, that the German Government has not directly and officially "touted' for peace," but it is almost .certain that ft considerable amount

of indirect touting by means of"feelers" has taken place on its behalf. The Kaiser seems to be very anxious to achieve some definite success in order to secure something tangible to 'bargain with, and this probably accounts in some measure tor his desperate efforts to gain complete mastery of Belgium. It was recently announced that he had gono to the front in order to proclaim tho annexation of Belgium at Ypres, but as things, had once more gone'awry the ceremony had to be postponed sim die.

The statement by President Wilson that the .United States does not consider itself under any obligation or duty to enforce neutrality on the South American republics raises some interesting problems regarding the interpretation of ' the Monhob Doctrine. The Allies have drawn tho attention of the United States Government to the alleged violation of the neutrality of Chile by German warships on the assumption that it was a matter for the United' States to deal with, but if President Wilson declines to accept any responsi-' bility the Allies will be compelled to take independent action. They will have to deal direct with Chile, or any other South American State whose territory may be improperly used by our enemies. The Monroe Doctrine has been interpreted in various ways. President Wilson seems inclined to place great restrictions on its application: The Doctrine has been summed up in the words "hands off America." In its original form it declared that tho interposition of a European Power for tho purpose of oppressing or, controlling in any other manner tho destiny, oi any of tho independent States of the American Continent would be regarded as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. But if the United States is going to pro■tect the South American nations from outside interference she must accept responsibility for their- actions towards other Powers. She must, in other words, play the part of moral policeman for the American Continent. If European Powers cannot get redress through Washington for wrongs done they will Ciid other ways of dealing with ibe wrongdoers. As a matter of international law the broad question rf the right of the United States to dictato to European nations as regards their relations with. South American States has never been definitely settled, nor has the Monroe Doctrine over been directly affirmed either by the Senate or House of Representatives of.tho Unitad States.