The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1914. IS THE FORTRESS DOOMED?

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2292, 28 October 1914, Page 4

The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1914. IS THE FORTRESS DOOMED?

_ For years past military authorities have discussed the effect of modern weapons on the problems of attack and defence without any consensus of opinion being reached! as to whether the wonderful improvements which have been made in the power and effectiveness of favoured the defenders or the attackers of fortresses. This disputed point has had a very important bearing on the policy of fort-building and" in deciding what part fortifications should play in warfare. The present war Las already thrown a great'deal of light on thes3 ; matters. The fort system has not passed through the ordeal very gloriously. The fortresses which nave been put to tho test liavo not, speaking, come up to expectations— not even up to moderate expectations—and many people who have given thought to this phase of the struggle will agree with the statement which appeared in a recent cablegram to the effect that "the day of the fixed fort is gone." Tho history of the war has, we are told, "proved tho utter useiessiiess of forts under present conditions." This judgment may be too sweeping, but with some modification and qualification it will probably receive the endorsement of a largo majority of those qualified to form an opinion. The forts at Liego certainly did very useful work at a critical time in holding the German onrush in check. The delay gave tho Allies time to complete their preparations and to counteract the advantage which the enemy derived by his.greater readiness for the conflict. . The fast, howover, remains that when the Germans brought their big siege guns to bear, tho heroic Belgian garrison soon found that successful resistance was absolutely impossible. The Namur'forts simply crumpled up when tho attack was directed against them, and the fortifications of Antwerp,' which were said to be the strongest in the world, proved of little real value when their day of trial oame. Tho sudden and complete collapse of tho idea that the great Belgian seaport was almost impregnable ' dealt ■_ a severe blow to the reputation of the fort system. Though the fate of Lioge and several of the French fortified towns had warned those who had intelligently followed the progress of the war not, to expect too much, the utter feebleness or tho resistance offered by the fortifications of Antwerp to the German guns came as a surprise to the world. It. is trim they could have held out longer than thoy did, but it was only a question of hours. Owing to the success of the offensive movoment of the Allied armies, which began_ when tho Kaiser's hosts were within striking distance of Paris, the forts which protect tho French' capital were not; called upon to prove their efficiency but it is doubtful whether they could of themselves have held out for any length of time against that tremendous gun power Toy means of which the Germans have battered other fortresses to pieces.

The Berlin correspondent of the United Press (Mr. Karl von Wiegand) made a personal inspection of the Liego forte after they had been captured by the Germans. In a message to tho American newspapers lie states that one uhot fired by the now 16-inch gun went through no less than ten feet of coucrcte. Another shot pierced twelve feet of connretc into a .magazine deep underground, which exploded and obliterated the entire fort. Nothing was left but d viist hole in the ground thirty feet deep, strewn .with hugo

blocks of cement, tho steel turrets beiug broken and twisted like' tin. Thih gives some idea of the terrible desti'uctivcness of modem siege artillery. A leading authority tells uj that practically nothing in Biegccraft was learnt from the FrancoGerman or Eusso-Turkish wars, and that "for the last ten years of the Nineteenth Century military opinion was quite at a loss as to how the sieges of the futuro would work out." Past history has shown that as soon ns artillery became sufficiently effective to destroy masonry from a distance the designers of fortifications had to face the difficult problem of continuously increasing tho strength of masonry defences and improving tho power fortress guns and tho means of employing them to tho "best advantage. All sorts of expedients havo heen resorted to in order to achieve these purposes, but every device has succumbed in, the coursoof time to the ever-increasing dcadliness of tho methods and weapons at the disposal of the attacking party. Still the usefulness of forts in delaying tho adversary's oiißct has_ never been entirely lost. Until quite recent times <iomo authorities have contended that the unending process of perfecting heavy giins and armom would make it possible to construct fortresses that would be wcll : nigh impregnable, but others arc of opinion that nearly every improvement in artillery must in the long run tell in favour of tho attack. The latter school have also argued that modern fortresses are too costly and that rolianco on them is apt to lead to strategic mistakes. Colonel _ Jackson, formerly Assistant-Director of Fortifications and Works (War Office), after remarking that fortresses do not decide the issue of a campaign, but only influence it, goes on to say that it would bo better to use all tho monoy the fortress would have cost, and all tho man-power thatits maintenance implies for tho . increase and equipment of tho active urrny, This is, of course, only a broad statement of principle, for it is recognised that in practice a certain amount of fortification will probably always be required; and the value of fortifications as a moans of protection from attack by sea, must be decided by other considerations which aro not dealt with in this article. It is quite plain that, from the military point of view, the fats of tho fortress must ultimately depend on tho success or failure of the general operations in tho field. We are told that the defeat of France in 1870 wets' in a large measure duo to the policy of trusting too much to the shelter of fortifications. An army that, is not able or willing to keep the field is in constant danger of being starved into submission. Defensivetactics are justified until tho right moment for attack arrives; but decisive victories can never be won by "sitting tight."