FRENCH AND GERMAN ARMIES
A COMPARISON
BRITISH OFFICER'S OPINIONS
MEN AND ARMAMENTS
An interesting comparison between the French and German armies was recently made by a British officer-Cap-tain Twiss, of the 9th, Gurkha Rifles, who lias just, returned to India after devoting four .yoars to the study of, JTrench and German military organisation and tactical methods. At a gathering of officers in Sintla he related his experiences. and imprpssions of the two "great armies and their prospects if pitted against each other in war. These, which are summarised below, will be found of great interest at the-present time, explaining as they do the. methods of warfare qo'w being carried on. When tho great comes; he says, almost everything will'deperid on the spirit in which the French enter upon tho campaign. If they believe in their leaders ana are : confident of victory they have an excellent'chance; if'they are: doubtful of success they will certainly Joso. So. far as armament and training are concerned, the. balance is certainly in. favour of-, Germany but moralo_ is of even higher importance than, these. The nation that goes to war in a good cause, anxious-to fight, ■hating the enemy and longing to crush hnn,. starts .with .an'.-enormous advantage. That the French 1 are keen and still want vengeance for; 1870 is indisputable. The Germans, oh tho other hand, have no particular animosity against the. French; the feeling .is rather .one /of/contempt, tlieir hatred being, mainly, directed against: Groat Britain. That the latter would send force of at least 150,000 men is certain, and .their intervention might well decide the issue of the campaign, for .it would have a tremendous influence on.' the French morale.
Both Intend to Attack. The keystone .of both' German and i' rench tactics is the. cult of the offensive, All teaqhing has this object in view; throughout' tho army and the nation this doctrine is preached as the only hope of success. -But the meth,p, £ wo nations are different, the German theory of battle is simple— to advance on a wide front, making uso of all roads, to deploy early, to attack the enemy as soon as he is met, to attack him everywhere, and to seek his flanks. '.These methods require little manoeuvring skill and comparatively slight information, except as to the general area occupied. by the enemy. Their success depends mainly on numbers, vigour, and energy, hard-hitting, • and mutual co-operation. The plan aims at envelopment, since tho Germans' are of opinion that a frontal attack is most difficult and most costly against modern firearms. The Germans also hopo by this method of attack to impose their will upon tho enemy, and so gain tho initiative. All tho Commander-in-Chief can do is to make up his mind from tho information at his disposal where the enemy is, and to sot his army in motion. Having done so, and having no powerful reserves at his disposal, lio is no longer in a position to exercise a complete control over the battle, the initiative soon passing into the hands of his subordinates. Even if fresh and valuablo information be received, lie can do but little to alter his disposition, and is 110 longer able to change his plans once his ' army has been launched against tho enemy.' This plan presents certain serious objections, but. on the other hand, it i* absolutely
simple, and simplicity lias always boon tlio surest road to success in war.
Clear Difference in Tactics. The French theories differ from the German in certain important respects. The main point is that the French wish to bo able to manoeuvre after receipt of valuable information, and to keep control of tho battlo in the. hands of tho Commander-in-Chief as long as possible. With this object in view they avoid premature deployment, maintain a strong general reserve, and keep their forces in a formation that will unablo thorn to ( strike an overwhelming blow at some vulnerablo point in tho, hostilo lino , oi battle. For tho successful execution of this .plan, good and early information is indispensable. Tho cavalry and aircraft are relied upon to supply this information. Tho groat advantago of the Frfencli theory is that if his 111 formation is good;'the Commander-in-Chief, haviug retained control, is in a position to deal a crushing blow • his plans aro in ado with full knowledge, and there should be no chanco of their failing.
Their R-ssueotive Infantry. The infantry of both nations aro fine and efficient, but ill quite different ways. They are trained to' fight against each other ;in such a way. as to make the best possible use of their -national characteristics. The German infantryman is solid-and heavy, but hy 110 means lacks dash and energy. Tho_ Frenchman is more alert and' enterprising, but is also more impulsive. Both are trained for .fighting in large, masses, sololy for European warfare. In the matter of infantry tactics, the Germans favour the use of successive lines in attack, usually with considerable depth. A few years -ago extensions' were very slight, rarely more than two or three paces; now they are soften four, five, or eis paces, and the-general appearance of an ' attack resembles that commonly seen at British manoeuvTee. The attack, however, is rather wooden and mechanical. There is little doubling forward and coyer ;s not well utilised, whilst covering fire is neglected. There appears to be too much desire, for regularity apd good dligimient, not enough dash and initiative. : ; A' French attack is very different. Thero appears to be little cohesion; there are wide gaps between various portions, of the firing line;, the formations are all different- in the early stages —squads and sections dotted about, utilising cover,,and.commanders of units seeming■ to go as they please. These methods' suggest too.much irregularity, almost confusion. • But this is not so, they may fairly acciirately.be compared with thoso of a well-traincd_ football team, combining, well and with perfect understanding , yet adopting no _ fixed rules or regular system. German infantry certainly lack fire as compared with French,,but. in spite of this -a German attack is very imDressive.
In regards to'musketry, the.Germans are probably steadier than the French, as tlio latter are inclined to bccome excited. As a largo proportion of the men in both armies belong to rifle clubs before they join the regulars, the general- standard of marksmanhip is fairly high. There is little firing by.infalitry in either army over 1000 metres, andjudging distance is a fine art with them. Tho Gei-man'rifle is the'better of the two, and its ammunition is superior, bo£h in having an extremely flat trajectory at short ranges, and because the bullot has a most deadly effect, almost liko that of an expanding bullot. Marching discipline is excellent in both armies, ,lbut the French are faster and have greater power of endurance.
' French Natural Horsemen. Both tho French and German . cavalry are well mounted, and the training of their 1 horses is splendid.'. The Frenchman is a finer natural horseman than the German, and, despite. his shorter period of service, always looks better oil tt horso. Both; manoeuvre well in large bodies, the French, if anything, having the advantage.'" In both armies vigorous and energetic methods, are advocated, and the. great maxim is that "cavalry, is made for action and everything is. excusable except inaction, . ivliieh. is unpardonable in a cavalry leader." ' '
. ' Differences in Artillery. In artillery the Germans are superior numerically, but the French claim' superiority in everything elso except r/eight of the guns. Both employ direct fire at the commencement of an action, and both 'believe that the main object of artillery is to enable their own infantry to gain the victory. Both aro likely to come out into the open in tho final stages of. a battle, in order to use direct fire. The French practice is to tell off some of their batteries as infantry, batteries, under the orders of infantry, commanders; some, called coun-ter-batteries,, to deal with the hostile artillery, and a few in reserve to put in where necessary. The French gun at present is the best in existence, am. it is well, handled. French methods are rapid and thoir keynote is simplicity of action. They do not believe in hro at long ranges, firing the normal firing range in European warfaro at from 2000 to 4000 yards. They do not rely on mechanical methods of finding tlia range, nor do they aim at' extreme accuracy of fire. Tliey believe in "raf - ales,'. holding that these sudden, violent; but short outbursts of fire are ' , ? ■post efficient mctnod of destroying the morale of an enemy.' Batteries are very quick at coming into- action, and very, quick at firo. German artillery tactics have improved considerably during the laSt few years, but i are not. up to. French.. The inferiority of . their field-guns, however, 'is to a extent counter-balanced by their superior numberi- and by their -extcn■sive use of howitzers, which-'they use inuch like ordinary 1 field-guns'.,
, Officers and; tlißlr. Men. ■ The Germau General Staff possess great power in tlio army; the members are invariably thoroughly able men, and, ou-'tho whole, are superior to the French. ,In the, field their staff work is: more thorough, although the standard of intelligence iii the French* is ■very high. A wide gulf exists between German officers and their men, the existence of this gulf being considered essential for the maintenance of discipline. With fho French the main difference lies in the fact that they lead the .men where the Germans drive them. This, of course, calls for more intelligence. ' Tile character of the average German recruit is mild and docile. Ho lias ail innate and intense respect for everything in the shape of authority, and fervent. loyalty and devotion to the Fatherland. The hard work and harsh treatment to which he is subjected do not seom to alter his outlook. His physique is good, ho is cheerful and enduring, and an excellent marcher. Ho lias a strong sense of duty and is imbued with a spirit of implicit and unreasoning obedience to orders. Even if he is a social democrat his socialism will not prevent liim from fighting well. Ho is a German first, a socialist afterwards. 110 is a brave and pluckyfighter, and although ho doss not show much uash or individuality, ho is by no moans a machine. Tho French solilicr, on the other hand, is moro' active both in body and mind, is intelligent and energetic, sober and abstemious, a splendid marcher, and a keen fighter. Ho is of indopondent character and critical nature. When ho respects his superiors ho is cnpablo of great things; when lie doubts their military efficiency ho has a tendency to become sullen, oven insubordinate. His physique is not up to that of the German; but French' infantry have in the past performed wonderful feats of endurance, and will do so again, provided they are well fed. At tlio same time they liavo wonderful capacity for doing a hard day's work tin a little food.
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Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2269, 1 October 1914, Page 6
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1,832FRENCH AND GERMAN ARMIES Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2269, 1 October 1914, Page 6
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