FIELD ARTILLERY

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2245, 3 September 1914, Page 7

FIELD ARTILLERY

IN RIVAL ARMIES

fflE PERFECT FRENCH QWCKFIRER

GERMAN LAXITY

Extracts from Some of the articles recently contributed ■ to the "London Magazine ,, by Mr; ttiltoe Belloc, the well-known writer on nrlitary subjects, have already been' published in 'JLhe Dominion. Mr: Belloc showed that a. German attack, oil France would be made on the north-eastern frontier, through Luxemburg. He ventured the opiiiioii, which has beeii borne out by events, that the fortress of Liege, which would be the first to be attacked would be too strong to be carried by an assault, but to bo reduced by regular operations. Uβ showed 'that the check thus inflicted-on the Germans Would 'enable jjhe Belgians to effect.a junction with their allies, the British or the French; and. ho claimed that a,'check of this kijid ("ollld be equivalent to a defeat. Iα another series of articles, Mr. Belloc criticised the German army from various aspects, notably its weakness in fortifications, and its roliau'ce upon the chance of making a success of offensive operations. He continues:—■ "Having said so much for the very important particular point of tho German doctrine of a necessarily successful offensive, let us turn to, another point lequiilly important—tho curious tardiness which modern Germany has ehown in understanding the significance of new things in military science. It

is a point of capital importance in the making of any .judgment upon the position or modern Germany, and yet it is oiie which is very rarely mentioned. "This, way of getting behind with new ideals, inventions, and material is tlio exact opposite of o, spirit which distin guiehed Germany before her great vie.--wries, but it has a strong historical parallel in the effect which a formci series" of victories, those of Frederick . Iho had upon tho Prussian mind, for in that case ten whole years of re. volutionary warfare wore not. enough to teach Prussia the lesson which might have spared her the final leeson of Jqna. Tho Lessons of 1870. "When Ule war of 1870 broke out the opposing armies had the better each of the other in certain particular!) which can be easily described, for they were particulars of material which anyone -can judge for himself. "The French had. upon tha whole,.the> better rifle, The Irench also possessed the first embryonio machine-gun for discharging rapidly ■ a great quantitv of bullocs at short range. Great things were expected from this invention, especially against cavalry, and it was known as the 'mitrailleuse.' The Germans, on the other hand, had ajsuperi <irity in two points altogether mbre important than (he slight advantage which the' French had from their rifle and the purely hypothetical advantage (and that only under rare and peculiar circumstances) of the 'mitrailleuse.' Those two German points of advantage were first an organisation, upon the whole, more thorough, and, secondly, d field artillery altogether superior to that of their, opponents. "Beyond: saying' that the German organisation was, upon the whole', superior; one cannot define this element. It lias been greatly, exaggerated, especially by civilian historians, but it is true, that the study of the country in which the first shock would take place, the arrangomente for bringing up reserves and the completion of the existing units were better on the German side than on the French, as was the plan for the co-ordination of the various armies. "The superiority then possessed by the German artillery Iβ another matter. It is a matter we can measure and define like any qther material thing. ' : fhe Prussian Guns. "Under conditions where ranges are less than normal opportunities of vision, a lohfe-ranged gun will obviously have the.advantage of a shorter-ranged gun r-fchat isj if the weight of the two is approximately equal. To obtain excessive ranges at a oost ,of great weight,, and to aim at ranges for held artillery, greater than thos6 which tor© the normal limits of useful vision iunder tho campaign's conditions of cli-\ mate and country is folly. But, to repuat, ,with equal weight behind the gun-teains, aha in dealing With the old »hbrt ranges of artillery, a longer range has an obvious advantage over a shorter one/ The Prussians entered the ctim-.' paign .of 1870 with a, gun that could always .outrange the French, at short and useful ranges. ... ..... : '-'The second element in the excellence ol field artillery is the rapidity of fire. The third is accuracy of aim; The fourth is smartness in picking up the target and in getting into action. In the foufthof these the Er'eUch had perhaps a slight. superiority, though that is doubtful, but it pas quito valuelese, because they were outranged, in tlie Ihird—accuracy of fire—though, their gunners wore as well trained as those of the enemy, their instrument was far luss perfect than their •'enemy's instrument, and the chances of error due to the gun itself, and apart from the human element, were niuoh greater. "Finally, in the point, which will always .bei'the,-. most'Vimportant'-.'.of, nil where equal]} trained giinnbrs ■. are conoerned—to. wit. the rapidity.of wellainied fire—the German weapon ■ was ;• overwhelmingly. superior..to • that of.;the■ , Frenoh, fbf'.tho Germane had already adopted-the'new system of breeoh-load-. iiig, which : ha,3 revolutionised modern, gunrifiry. .-.'. '"'...■, "Now, with greater range at -useful distances, and with an incomparably greater rapidity of fire, the German arr lillery of-1870 could do what it liked With its opponents, and it. is possible to take the .. first great battles of 1870, which within, the first Bix: weeks decided the whole issue of the war. and to . v - that in every bne artillery. Was the deciding factor. Where the French _barely, held their own; as in the series of actions outside Metz, they did so in spite of that inferiority; wherp .they wel'o crushed, as at Sedan, it wae thb inability of their itrtUlery to reply effectively to its opponents that determined the issue. "In a word, excellent, in a particular point of material—being ahead only by ayeai or two in tho'typo of iustiuiiient u«ed/by the army—decided that great war in favour of the victors. Lost Pre-Bmlnendo, "It is a remarkable tact that riftsr the series .of victories Which established modern Germany, this pre-euiuwiiee in material • has been allowed to slip from German hands.' AVhy, it is no business of mine to discuss here, but the fact is a pefi'edtly plain oiie, which anyone can test for himself by looking up the dates upon Which iidw inventions and hew ideas liavS been taken. up by either of tho great rivals. "\Vithin two years of their defeat the French accepted;—very wisely—a now breech-lOck, that of l)u Bahge, which was fair simpler, and moro rapid in its actions than "the breech-loading system winch had helped th.3 Germans to win the war. This is not the place for a technical description of its excellence; but it pointing out that, lor many years after the I'rendh had rearmed their 'artillery on this new model, the Germans clung to the old wedge eystem which had served them so well against the obsolete giins of the French in 1870, but which ;was already in 1875 out of date. Within ten years the French possessed an artillery already euperior to that of their opponents. But. this was a, small point compared With What Was to follow. "In the early /nineties the French engihoers developed and produced the first practical ■ quick-firing lield-guii which had appeared in any European army: Tho Dllihg was a revolutioiiTif .it should indeed prove of practical utility. The French -claimed that tlieir quick-firing, field-gun, in spite of Ibo complexity of tho new mechanism, was a,perfectly serviceable instrument. They rearmed their artillery with this gun. Frenoh Initiative. "When a great clangs of that sort appears in 'any trade it is n great teinptutiun for people ■ «'ho have been successtul on older lines to ridicule the change, to call it noiv-fangled und unpractical, or at anyrate, to wait for results, but there is such a thing as waiting a little too long. And lor a whole series of years tho French artillery was iirmtfd with a weapon which, had war broken out at ttiat time, would.have given them an overwhelming superiority. Germany ultimately recdffiiised her error. After a groat deal of opposition the obvious merits of the. new <iuicU-lirinß. system were admitted, and tho German quick-firer appeared. But not this important point. Though Germany admitted the principle, and later tried to make up for lost time by. 'greatly increasing tho total number of her. guns, ehe was never able to produce, and has not yet produced, 6. quick-firor of tho perfection of the French j and this, one aay incidentally remark, was in part due to the decay of her espionage system or organisation for discovering foreign secrets. And anyone who csires to attend the manoeuvres of the two armies at the present moment can settlo for himself the relative rapidities of fire. ,, ' The London Fite Brigade is called out on an average 15 tuns , -' » d.iv-