GERMAN WAR PLANS

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2242, 31 August 1914, Page 7

GERMAN WAR PLANS

ALL STAKED IN THE FIRST STROKE HOW ELABORATE SCHEMES MAY FAIL (By Hilaire Belloo, ia 1911.) "I said in my first axticlb that I would turn in my second from general to particular considerations, and I propose hero to deal with certain particular aspects of the 1 German military effort which do not seem to be sufficiently appreciated in current journalism."—(Author's note.) '

T,hose who have not made a particular study of tho history of armies generally think simply of battles lost and won as being the whole story of war. In reality, a battle or "general action" is an incident, and not even an absolutely necessary incident, of warfare Only in certain cases and under certain conditions does the loss of a general action involve the loss of a campaign; and success in war, which is the imposing of the will of ono nation upon that of another, is achieved by successful campaigns, the actions in which are but a means to an end. The limitation in modern nations turning; their military preparations up to tlieTiighest pitch is a limitation or money; If your expenses, or your national temperament, or your real or supposed national necessities dictate such and such a form of expenditure, there may be nothing over for other things desirable enough, but not so necessary as the things on which you have decided to spend your cash. Now the German Empire has been led to a most momentous decision in the past upon, a similar matter, and it finds itself in a position in which,it is very difficult to go back upon its former plan. This decision was the decision to risk all upon attack. -The sums at the disposal of the nation were to be used for making the army as capable,as-possible for purposes of offence, a most excellent doctrine, but one, unfortunately, involving a certain necessary limitation. They have condemned themselves to a military plan which must collapse altogether—and their political system with it— unless the first onset is immediately and overwhelmingly successful.

A Glance at the Map. Take a map of Europe, and consider upon it the defensive opportunities on the two sides of the German frontier. You have upon the French side—covering a gap not niuoh over a hundred miles, in .length,, and one, mojfeover. of. which only naif ; is open country—four great fortresses, eaoh capable of supporting a.great army for an indefinite, period against assault. The,line is continued in the fortification of Meuse to prevent or delay the en'amping of Belfium. But this is only the first line, ou have beliind it a line running from; Burgundy through. Champagne to thenorthern fortresses of the Belgian frontier,, which forms the second lino of defence. You have, thirdly, the capital, fortified upon a scale and with a complexity superior to that of any other great town in Europe. . ' TJpon the German side you have just two great fortified points, Metz and Strasburg/neither of them fortified with the thoroughness, or at tho expense of, the corresponding Frfenoh points; no i system of lortirnations holding the line of the Rhine, and behind l that line nothing whatsoever that military soience need take into account; "no rationally disposed system, that is, or line of fortrosses, supporting one another and compelling the delay of an advancing army. After the lesson taught by recent •n(ara, if one could give Germany as a present, say, £500,000,000 down, Germany would probably spend that money in a larg_e and well-thought-out plan of fortification: but, as it is , , she 1 is financially tied by her deliberate policy of forty years ago, ivnd two conceptions on which it was based: First, that the army -would always be successful in its | first onset; secondly, that tinder modern conditions fortifioation on a large scalewas a waste of money. We are commonly told, oven by military .experts, that Germany is at least prepared to make this onset in a very efficacious manner. It may be an error to 6take everything upon the chance of an immediate win, but, at any rate, overything has been done —we are told— for preparing a "rush." One knows' that the excellent habit of thinking out every dotail beforehand is.carried in Germany to excess, and one would imagine that a system which rigidly tied the whole machine as does the German system, would make for speed. One further knows by experience that the Japanese, copying the German model, moved with quite extraordinary slowness, and that had fhey moved with greater rapidity in the earlier stages_ of the war they might have won a decisive victory at Liao-Yang instead of coming to the stale-mate wnich prolonged hostilities for nearly two years. Their failure was a failure to converge at the right moment, that was due to slow movement, aad this tardiness in its turn was due to too minute a prepare tion. Finally, and most valuable of all, is the evidence of one's eyes'.

I Three Essential Points. There are three points in connection with this matter which the trained observer speoially notices: — , First, the rapidity, with which. the whole forces of a nation can be mobilised and brought into the field. the observer will note the rapidity with which the reserves can be joined to their units in each particular centre. ■ Thirdly, and this is most important, the observer will note the actual rapidity of physical movement and disposition in the men. Now, under the test of these three points for observation, the Gorman Empire has a distinct • advantage in the first. The disposition of its armed strength, the plan for the gathering of it at various centres, the arrangements' by which, the whole trained manhood of tho nation could be got into uniform, under arms, and subject to its proper framework, aro better than those of any of its rivals. But let it be remembered chat this largest aspect of mobilisation is precisely not the one which .is valuable to a sudden and successful onset. The full mobilisation of all tho national millions is not contemplated by any European nation, and is physically impossible. ' Tho slow feeding of the armies at tho front with now materials as the war proceeds will indeed depend upon tho genoral scheme of mobilisation, but tho first shock will bo between bodies of two or throe hundred thousand men at the most, and probably less,. not more, than ivo expect. In the srrond point, which nw be rilled $e |flfiM pbiljjßttoß, tljero it jmj ap«,

preciable advantage upon either side of tho frontier.. At a distance from the frontier there ia. You would not.mobilise in Brittany as quickly as you would in Poraerania, nor concentrate a force in and near St. Ee.tienne as you could concentrate one iii and near, let us say, Nuremburg. But for the purposes of the first days of a war the facilities of the two rivals are much the same, in this matter.

Now as to the third point. In this the French have a distinct and demonstrablo advantage. They turn out of barracks quicker, they alarm a''town more promptly, and the soldier actually with the colours in at his post in a shorter time than his rival to the east. It is quite as much a moral as a material factor, and it is not a factor which should be exaggerated; but then neither is it a factor that should be forgotten. ■ Germany's Attaok. Lastly, in this discussion ae to whether the Germans are wise to have gambled thus upon a successful offensive, let us consider against what that offensive would bo directed. It would be directed, of course, against a coun-ter-offensive on the part of the enemy, and this counter-offensive might succeed from tho first, in which case the whole German , plan would crumble to the ground. But supposing no such a . thing—supposing that counter-offensive to be unequal to its task, -what has the "onset" in front of it? It can either attempt to pierce the fortified line between Loiigwy and the Jura, or it can, aa wo have been told until -we are tired' it will, violate, treaties and attempt an advance through Belgium. The first of these , points of attack depends upon the value of the modern fortress, to which I will return' in a moment—for the gap between Longwy and the Jura is a chain pf such stronghold"!—but the 6econd issue, continually taken for granted; especialy in the English Press, is. what I would like to examine first. 'Even' if any considerable force could reach •the Meusa in the first few hours after, the outbreak of hostilities, in what way does ourrent journalism (or current politioß for that'matter) imagine that the Meuso would be forced? The journalist , and the politician have talked of the things in general terms; they have not considered it in detail. The Meuse is a serious obstacle, and it is an obstacle fortified absolutely without regard to expense, and in-the most thorough manner possible. Its • fortifioation -was carried through • by the greatest engineer and the greatest au- , thority upon fortification of our time.Let'this point be dearly seized. There is no such thing as a permanent obBtacle in -war. The only object of any. , obstacle, however heavily fortified, is. delay; but here delay- is everything. The passage' of the Meuse involves a groat military operation—an operation, oonduoted under the most difficult, cirsu&istances, an- operation quite impos-' sibleof accomplishment without a check: necessarily exposing the assailant to the loss of some' minimum of time. ■ The vague opinion .whioh taikes the passage of the Meuse for granted , forgets that' the whole military: question'lies not in- : : >_tho- possibility of forcing the river, butin the time that operation would On the far side of ! the obstacle you have a closer network of railways, than is to be found in any district of iCurope, and , though these were not designed for a strategical -purpose, industrial accident hae made all the main,lines lead up to the Meuso from all the principal French military centres upon that frontier. From Sedan to Calais, counting Lille and Valenciennes, Arras, Cambray, Bothune, and back through the; 1 fiocond Army Corps to Amiens, with all its surrounding garrisoiiß, you havo,, as it.-wore, a series of channels of sqmniunication;- J a]J. : . converging upon ,'thtt Hffe oT'tfie , -Jleuse. , Five 7 greats main lines and innumerable feeders could bring menovei; a distance which at. its/nearest. itt.iiot .two.lioTirßy an&,-l at its"? furthest not' six (even under:the'.i conditions of mobilisation)., from, the point of attack. That a German inva-' sion of Belgium is possible ho one.in his senses would deny; that it might be successful, is equally evident; but..to imagine that it necessarily follows an easy and unopposed onset, which could treat the Meuse as. negligible, ia to show ignorance of all the'local military conditions. ' • '■

French and German Forts. It has been a dominating, theory with the Germans, due mainly to their great successes in 18.70, that. the. increased range of modern weapons had made fortification upon a large- scale, for the putting imposing permanent delay upon the offensive, impossible, or, to speak more .accurately,' not worthy the. im- : tnense... expenditure.-it entailed.. The French, on the other, hand, maintained that it was possible at very great expense .to produce a modern fortress that could hold out against attack just .as the older system of fortresses had done. These "entrenched camps" were organised -within great rings of. hill forts, which. 6q the French maintained, would in practice farm as sound a barrier against modern attack as the older and more restricted type of fortification had presented against the attacks of the past. Verdun, Toul, Belfort were the great examples of this new model, which was occasionall ycopied in other parts of the world, notably at Spezia and at Port Arthur.

Here it is extremely important that the reader should remember the qualifications attaohing to what 1 am saying. There was no dogmatic affirmation on the part of the leading German school, that' this new system was valueless. On the contrary, they partially copied (fc in at least two cases on their own eide of the frontier. But there was a general and leading opinion among German experts that too much, was ex : or it by the- French, and that the reduction of such great' rings of distant forts would be a matter of weeks father than of months. : As the siege of Port Arthur continued it' became more and more apparent that French opinion was right and German opinion was wrong.' At Port Arthur Erlungshan was the key-fort. The Japanese,. inspired, by the. German school in this matter, attempted to rush it, and they, were, certainly prepared • for an expenditure of men and for a vigorous assault which no. European army could pretend to surpass. But they failed; The 'siege of Port Arthur beoamCi a matter not of weeks, but of months. It became increasingly apnarent as that siege proceeded that, had time been afforded to complete the full fortification of the ring of hills, they would have afforded cover for an indefinite period to the army' which they defended. '

THE.SALVATION ARMY The Salvation Army has set apart to-day as a : day of. prayer ; and intercession in connection .with tho European war. United pubjic meetings will , Dβ conducted in the Vivian Street Citadel at 10.30 a.m., 2.30 p.m., and 7.30 p.m. by Lieutenant-Colonel Powley, tho chief secretary for New Zealand. Tho colonel will be assisted by the Headquarters, Training College, Field, nnd Social staffs. The.public are invited to attend. • "Down with the 'flu'?" Why don't you try "NAZOL"? A few good inhalations of this sterling remedy for coughs >, nnd colds will 6oon make you fit as a fiddle. ' Get ft Nazol Whaler.—Advt. The Now York Telephone Company is housed in 130 buildings. Woods' Great Peppermint Cure For Coughs and Colda never fails. Is. 6d.* A. sure- spocifio for coughs and colde is "NAZOL." It only costs eighteen-:, pence for sixty doses. ■ Perfectly whole-. 6ome and harmless. Its healing properties penetrate to the trouble and act directly.—Advt. '■•■■■ Vessels of 25,000,000...t0nnage go'round' Chrm Coil ill a your.- " ■..•■•