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THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER

OPENINGS FOR ATTACK

SOME PROBLEMS OP RACE

Itiscussing the frontier conditions ns between Russia and Germany, a contributor to an Australian newspaper remarks thai; the commercial relations between the two countries are iniportiuit. Between 26 ami 30 per cent, of Russia's foreign trace passes to Berlin and the Baltic ports by.At least live, probably six, lines ,of l'ailwnj. The ironher has few strategical features beyond those which have been created, and they are all in favour of iJcnnany, It is a racial, rather , than a. geographical, lino. The Slav population about the borders has been so completely Germanised that no part of Eastern Prussia is more loyal to the Eohonw>llerus. Tiki people saw upon one. side a. i nation progressive ami active; on thu.otbtri s« 'Government offering them little in tb* des.rablo things of modern civilisation; The material interests were best considered by the Germans.

Money Spent-Llka Water, ..., , Ever since Germany, , by her attitadf'at the Berlin Conference; by her entry into tke Triple Alliance, became openly antagonistic to Russia,, she has spent money like water in creating tho means to march tin army rapidly to and across the Russian border. As against Russia's six railways she has nearly twenty. She could send at least 500 troop trains a day towards the frontier,; concentrate the greater' part of her military forces—ls army corps if necessary, and available—within a few days of tho declaration of war. Her technical resources, of siege parks, light ordnances, and stores, far exceed anything which Russia may command. And while the object in everything has been a speedy assault, defensive considerations have not' been neglected. Her border provinces, especially those of Eastern Prussia, have been strongly, systematically defended by the creation of such fortresses as Thorn, Konigsbeng, Posen, and other citadels. Every year they have been improved. Entrenched camps have been built at vital points of junction, war material in abuudanco lies ready to hand. The forts of the Vistula, as well as sorao of the larger towns, are prepared for defence; and, while Russia, over since the Crimean war has.given much attention to the Warsaw and Vilna areas, Germany's activity across the border- has left her far behind. In 'the event of successful hostilities, itoth of these great areas might be easily annexed, and the offensive strength oi Germany vastly increased. .

Russian Endurance. Russia's power : of endurance—the fighting genius of the Slav—the quality that in soma measure atones i'or her lack of progress, is hor main hope. As a leading Russian strategist (Geneva! Kuropatkin) observes, it is impossible to suppose that 100 million Russians, even though defeat in more than one campaign discouraged them, would ever submit to the total alienation of provinces bound to them by historical ties and vast sacrifices in Russian blood. -Vox if Germany or Austria were-attacked, and any great portion of their armed forces detained on the western side, Poland .gives Russia great advantage in a victorious offei.sive. Bernii is only 200 miles, Vienna 213 miles away. This very fact, however, is of immense advantage to them, at the moment in concentration, boeai'je St. Petersburg-is 533 miles irom the German, and 260 miles from the Austrian frontier, while Moscow is distant 733 and SOO miles lespurtively. As far as the ambitions of tho two .Powers may be realised, Germany would take tho Warsaw area cs the fruits of conquest. Russia would, in a like position, annex Eastern Prussia tip to the Vistula, winch would give her a natural and immensely strengthened t'rontieT. Her moral - weakness would le taking over an absolutely hostile peoplo, while Polish influence \iould make Germany's, conquests both in war aud paiio more easy.

Austria ■ and Russia. A consideration of frontier conditions ,ns between Austria and Kiiewa is almost ns completely in 'avour of the former, as, fiarthcr north, fhoy are for Germany. As soon as the Triple Alliance was formed. Austria coninianced to prepare for the inevitable war with Russia; tin , nation which came so ottsn to its assistance in Napoleonic times, and towards whom some sens-e of gratitude might l>e expected, if that sentiment ivert a vilal consideration in file diplomacy of nations. On the contrary. Austria luis jriven more attention to lira , Kiissiun irontier than to any other avetion of her borders. The natural trontier between 'he two speat countries is the Ciirosilliiaii vrin,;e, yrt (Jaliciti, one of licr territories. lies on the Russian fide of the Corpathi.iiis. Had Austria been as neglectful of, or as frequently diverted from, propnv.ition for frontier defence as Ri!psm, the Carpathians might be n real danger. Naturally they are an impediment to speedy concentration along the frontier, while, in case of defeat, a great river, or a great range, at the back of an army means Hint defeat may speedily become destruction. But the Carpathians arc no longer a natural barrier. Tlio mountains have been pierced by railways nt eight difTcrc.it points at least. Galici'a, which geographically seems so exposed, which onco lay open invitingly to aggres6ion from ,he westward, has become a great nrmed camp,.stocked .with supplies and munitioas, equally available for tho inimediate invasion of Russia or the defence of Austria. By her eight linns of

rail, Austria could, send 2G2 trains a day to the frontier, -.vhile. Russia's transport facilities are limited to four. Within a very short tinio Austria, if not occupied elsewhere—and i international alliances ff.nko that, after all, the vital factor in fho sum—could concentrate a million armed men along the Russian frontier -within a few days. Hirers-such as tho Dniester liave little strategic importance; only four lines of railway, as stated, cross lite frontier, these points being Griinitza, Hadziviloif, Voloohisk, and Novosclitz. '

Hungarian Sentiment.'. . Possibly another lino has recently been added. The Austrian weakness is that Hungarian sentiment is little, if nnything, more favourable to her than, it is to Eussia. The Slav groups of her peoples are nearly half her population; traditional hatred of Kussia lies chiefly with the Polo and tho Hungarians. And, on tho whole, there is in each case good reason for such animosity. Austria hns not tied her border provinces so closely to her as.Germany has done in the caso of Eastern Prussia, by a high civilisation, by industrial enterprise, and development. The part that Russia took in suppressing the insurrection of 1819 is still remembered by the.Hungarians, while tlio greatest of the Slav group, the Poles, is even moro bitterly hostilo to Russia. Still a strong -body of Slavs about the border are at least uoutral in sentiment, because, whilo Russia has not rery sedulously cultivated the tie of blood and origin, these people have a pronounced objection to being absorbed cither by Austrians or Germans. Austria seeks to consolidate in. wai 1 that loyalty which has not been too successfully cultivated in peace. It may be seen that, as far as forethought, preparation for a deliberate purpose, bucked by a heavy and continuous expenditure, dominate the ■ P m - 1 ??! , tlie strategical advdntages «o all with tbo German allies and against Kussia. There has been careful preparaiioa for just such a crisis as that which has now come about, a crisis which might be created at convenience, if it fails to occur more naturally in the cabinet conflicts of nations. It is absurd to suppose that the killing of a Prince, belonging.to a decadent dynasty, has moved the nations to action for which there has been such elaborate anticipation. Russia had no resource but to arm, to take defeat it nrst perhaps for granted, and to trust .to Her traditional endurance for , success in the end.. v.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19140824.2.30

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2236, 24 August 1914, Page 7

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,264

THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2236, 24 August 1914, Page 7

THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2236, 24 August 1914, Page 7

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