JAPAN'S NAVY

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2236, 24 August 1914, Page 7

JAPAN'S NAVY

ITS RISE AND DEVELOPMENT

THE BATTLE FLEET

LESSONS OF THE RUSSIAN WAR

The" intervention. of Japan as a belligerent in the present war will of • 'course very vitally affect tho situation in' the Far East; Although her' pro-' - g'ress in naval construction has lately been'checked by, tho naval scandal which led incidentally to considerable reductions in the naval'estimates for 1913-14, she has a very line fleet at command against which. anything in tho way of naval strength that Gernmny ■ can puf'fonvard in Far Eastern waters is of very trilling; importance. Besides some twenty-two cruising ships, Japan ■ has sixteen battleships and battlecruisers, about CO destroyers, more thau . . forty torpedo boats, and about a. dozen submarines. In addition, a number of. .'. ■ capital ships aiid smaller craft are iin- ... ■ der^construction... ., v : ; The Battle Fleet ..'.. .The Japanese First and Second Squad- :, rons,'-which were reported the other day to have put U> sea, are organised ',_■ as follows:— : !■ First Squadron.—Battleships- Shikiehima, Kawashi, Settsu, Kashima. Ann-. • •■" oured cruisers: Kiirama, Ibuki; ."'..' Squadron.—Armoured cruiser Idzumo and three light cruisers. ■ , . In addition-to the vessels mentioned;, the fleet 'probably includes the battle- - cruiser Kingo, of 27,500 tons, mounting ■. eight'l4-inch : guhs, which reached Japan ' in November, 1913, and joined the fleet •.. , after successful speed and gun trials; ■■".■ and the Hiyei, a sister ship of the .\' ; Kingo, wliich. was to have Been com- . pleted last month. Another ship which .'- may be available is the battleship Fuso (31,000 tons, twelve I'4-inoh and sixteen 6-inch gtius, also four high-angle twelve* , pounders for repelling aircraft). ■ The Fiiso was floated , out at Kure on Marcli : .28 last, it issaid with engines in. place and guns mconted. ■'''.. : ' The Japanese Admiral'. ~ Admiral Baron Goro Ijuin, wlio commands the Japanese Navy, was born at Satsuma in 1852. He took'part in the • Restoration War while still a minor, and entered the Naval Academy in 1881. : Subsequently Jie spent some years in : England Studying'- naval matters, re-. ■ turning to Japan in 1886. He command'cd the Suikyo Maru in tho Battle of the ■: Yellow Sea in 1894, arid became Vico- , Chief-of Naval Staff in 1898, and was V promoted to WRm-Admiraiin 1899. . 'In; 19d0 ho invented the Ijuin.fuse, arid ; -was duly rewarded. Admiral Ijuin re--s.' presented: Japan, with the Aeama and Takasago,' at the Coronation of the late ; .'King Edward. : Ho was-.made Vice-, ; Admiral in 1903, and was appointed to : command tbo Second Standing Squadron in 1906. In 1903 ho represented Japan .. at the Jamestown (TJ.S.A.) Exhibition, ■: ' with the warships Tsulcuba and Chitose. , For his servicesin the. Rnsso-Japanese •war Adlriiral Ijuin was granted the First Class Golden Kite and Grand Cordon of . . the Rising Sun. . Hβ. was created a baron in 1907.' In 1908 he commanded ' the First Battle Squadron, and in the/ ■•■.-. following year ho was appointed Chief of , the .Naval Staff :Board.

: Tfiß War Against Russia. ; Although, it.ihad-{Previously given a taste of its quality m the war against •■China, ■it was, in the vastly 'more ' im- ■ ■portant conflict , - with Russia that.. the Japanese Navy.,;set-the' seal','upon..its reputation. The origin of that ..wai- and its-naval; operations were interestingly outlined the London ."Times" some time ago in the following terms:; — "The Treaty of Shiwonoseki contained - within it the germ 3 of the subsequent -conflict with Russia. ; By its terms.the /special relations in which Japan desired 'to.,stand towards.Korea were establish-, ed and consolidated, and tho Liau-tung Peninsula, in which Port Arthur |is situnted, was ceded to her. But Russia, France, and Germany, acting in concert, . compelled her to relinquish the ceded '-.. territory. : Thencoforth ■ war between Russia and Japan >as seen by all competent observers to be sooner or later inevitable. Japan persisted steadfastly in her efforts for the further evolution of her Navy, adding a squadron of firstclass battleships to the armoured cruisers with which she had vanquished .Qhina, .though the fact that she still had to rely mainly on European sources for her material was a factor of decisive importance in the strategy of- tho'ensuing struggle. The crisis came at tho beginning of" 1904, when, after protracted negotiations, it became clear that Russia, would yield nothing of her pretensions to a position .in Man'churia- and irl tho • confines of Korea which was regarded as intolerable'by Japan. Negotiations nad•been finally broken, off .and war was ' recognised by both sides as imminent, when Japan, knowing that, her adversary's naval forces were so .'disposed as to place her at extreme disadvantage, bTio resolved to strike the first blow without waiting for. further formalities ■The■ only strategy that couid have .given Russia, the initial advantage ■would have been to seize and hold at once the sea communications of Japan' Thk would- paralyse any attempt- of •Japan to land troops in Manchuria or oven iu Korea, unless Japan was prepared, to risk her all in a'fight to a .finish at-sea; and, even so, if Japan had been successful in bo perilous an enterprise, yet she would'havc to face tho fact that she.could obtain no naval reinforcements of moment durin" tho war, whereas Russia would stiirhave abundant navnl resources in reserve at Tiome. But the strategic conceptions ol- Russia' were not of. this- oceanic character. ■ i . ■;

■ Russia's Divided Forces. ■m"?? 10 JiyWe'l hor forces ■ between' Vladivosfcick and Port Arthur, wbeiV they ought to hgyo been' concentrated and, ready for action in tlie Sea of Japan; she placed.a weak detachment; at Chemulpo; and slie- allowed her fleet at Port Arthur to be caught nappin* outside the harbour, wholly,unprepared for war, unprotected by torpedo craft, and with" many of its" officers on shore On the night of Fobruary 8 this fleet was i vigorously attacked' bv tho torpedo craft: of Admiral Toto's fleet with results very disconcerting" to the Russian arms, though far from completely, fulfilling the expectations and'requirements of Japan. On tho following day tlie* weak detachment at Chpmulpo was destroyed ,hy a 'superior squadron of Japanese cruisers.

Admiral Togo's Tactics. "No attempt can hero be made to present the naval aspects of the war which ensued in any detail. But its essential strategic features may bo briefly indicated. Togo's task was twofold—to immobilise the Russian naval forces in Far Eastern waters for as long as possible, and at the same time to maintain his own fleet in being, and, so far as might intact. He knew' that no decisive battle' Was possible to him at the outset. ' Even if he was completely victorious in such an action

if tho Port Arthur fleet was annihilated, and tho squadron at Vladivostok shut in, yet tho cost of such a victory must be so tremendous to the side which could: obtain no substantial reinforcements during the war that the victorious remnants of his fleet would-fall an easy prey to. the reinforcements which Russia could dispatch from Europe. 'At tho same timo, unless he could mainta : n the sea- communications of Japan with Korea and Manchuria substantially unimpaired, bo -knew that

the military enterprises which, after the first blow had been successfully delivered, Japan had undertaken upon a gigantic scale in Manchuria must end in irretrievable disaster. Tho wholo of tho campaign was dominated by these considerations, and tho way in which the naval dispositions and operations of Japan wore adjusted to them was a masterly exposition of what is known as the higher loading in war. The Hussian fleet in Port Arthur was intimidated, and practically from the outset. It made ono or two ineffective sorties, but s'hrank back again on the prompt appearance of Togo's fleet. The Vladivostok squadron, 'until it was finally dieposed of, made some impression on the. Japanese communications, mercantile and military, but tho latter at any rate wero never seriously interrupted. On August 10 the Port Arthur fleet mado its final attempt to break the bonds that enthralled it, and though Togo dared not risk a close and decisive action, yet he succeeded in frustrating his adversary's purpose, aided, perhaps, ill this case by no small measure of good fortune. - Then followed the prolonged agony of Port Arthur, ending in the capture or destruction of all that remained of the Russian fleet iii tho Far East. This was followed in its turn by the splendid achievement of Bozhdest'vensky in conducting the last naval hope of Russia from the Baltic to tho Straits of Tsu-Shima, and by its utter discomfiture by Togo in the Battle of the Sea of Japan—the greatest and most decisive victory at Bea since Trafalgar was fought just a hundred years before. Togo, ; m tho true spirit of Nelson, had signalled before the battle, "The salvation or the fall of the Empire depend on the result of this' engagement ; do your utmost, every one of you." That is the moral of the wholo campaign, the secret of the sea power of Japan. '