The Dominion. SATURDAY, AUGUST 22, 1914. BRITISH AND GERMAN NAVAL IDEAS

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2235, 22 August 1914, Page 6

The Dominion. SATURDAY, AUGUST 22, 1914. BRITISH AND GERMAN NAVAL IDEAS

Foe some years past an interesting battle of ideas has been proceeding between the warship designers of Britain and Germany with special reference to the size of the- vessels, the thickness of armour plate, and the most useful typo of gun. The present European war will probably put .the rival theories to a most searching test, and sottlo a good many points now in dispute among naval experts/ The survival value of various ideas in warship construction will bo ascertained if the two greatest navies in the world come to grips in actual battle. " Such a gigantic struggle would provide, the supreme- test of fitness, and the theories which succeeded in surviving tho ordeal would thereby have proved their superiority on the principle of the survivaTof the. fittest in the struggle for existence. Until qiiito recently the prevailing idea in German, warship construction was to.rely less upon the size of the ships and guns, and more upon quickness of motion and rapidity of fire. The main object appears to have been to build what might bo willed second-rate ships from the point of view of size; but. to keep them up to tho highest standard. 9J nffirjoocy, finr| yearly to fti'iko at & moment's notice, and to striko

so hard and so suddenly as fco give Germany such a- pronounced advantage at the start of a war that her adversary would never bo able to make up for the lost ground. Tho Germans reckoned that this readiness for prompt and effective action at the outset of the strugglo would more than compensate for any superiority in numbers and power that the enemy might possess. Biit this theory was based on a. state of affairs that no longer exists, and tho change that has taken place is considered .by some, not only to have removed Germany's hope of catching Britain napping, but to have actually placed her at a disadvantage. Tho scheme had possibilities of success whilo the British Navy held to tho old system of peaco training, which consisted mainly of the theoretical study of naval problems and a month or .two of manoeuvring every year. Mr. Hkctoe Bywatek, a well-known naval authority, states that in those days remarkably little was done in tho way of earnest preparation for war. . , Gunnery was Mejated to tho background in the routine of tho fleet and too often tho "best" ship of the squadron was the ship that contrived to keep her paint untarnished and her scroll , work fresh. Mobilisation in the strict sense of the phrase meant a. gigantic upheaval and an affair of weeks. It is to l>e doubted 1 whether 20 per cent, of the full strength of this certain Navy (meaning, of course, the British. Navy) would have been found immediately available on a sudden call to arms. ' " But, as Mr. By/water points out, tho new century brought with it a sweeping ohange in the oi'ganisation of Britain's Navy. "The era of stark efficiency had arrived."- Preparation for actual, battle became the object of all planning and training. Every other consideration was subordinated to this, and the main battle fleets were kepb in a- continual state of readiness for any emergency. "And Germany's opportunity was gone." A smaller navy would have a good chance of success if it were more efficient than its larger adversary, and able to strike a .crippling blow before the enemy was ready for battle; but ivhen two fleets are equal in efficiency and alertness, ■' the chances of victory must always be in favour of the- stronger force. This it is claimed by the writer referred to is the new situation which, the German strategists have had to face during the last few years. Expert German , critics like Captain Persitjs and Captain von Kuhmvetter havo expressed uneasiness at tho superior gun power of the British battleships, and the .fact that Germany is now building ships able to'carry_ larger guns shows fcliafc the authorities realise >tha ; t a change is necessary. The broadside fire, irrespective of minor guns, of British and German ships of approximately;; equal * date, as sho-wn in tho following table, speaks for itself: ''British. lb. , German. " lb. Superb Nassau 5,280 Neptune .... 8,500 Oldenburg 6,880 Orion .....:.. 12,500 Kaiserin ... 8,600 K. George V 14,000 Koenig 8,600 Q. Eliza- , E. Branden- , beth ..:. 15,600 burg 8,600 Gorman experts have hitherto contended that the broadside, method of calculation is'not reliable, as guns of moderate size fire faster than the heavier weapons,- and have equal armour-piercing- capacity. This view,- however, is' not" generally accepted,/ and,the type of battleship provided for in the current programme shows that Germany is abandoning, the opinion, that vessels of moderate dimensions and- cost, carrying many light guns, would bo as good >as the larger' vessels and heavier guns of the British tta-vy.-- Tho armament of one , of the latest Ger- . man Dreadnoughts is said to be almost exactly similar to that of the Queen Elizabeth. This indicates that the Germans are being converted to British ideas regarding the size of ships and g'uhs; but if they are - copying its in this matter it would.seem'that we-can learn a good -deal from them as far-' as armour' protection' is concerned, ior their experiments have been far more thorough than those which have been made by- Britain, and this aspect of naval warfare deserves to receive more attention than has hitherto been" given to it. The present war will no doubt provide some irapressive_ object-lessons in battleship protection as well as in many other phases of sea fighting.