SUBMARINE MENACE

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2230, 17 August 1914, Page 8

SUBMARINE MENACE

BATTLESHIPS USELESS

'i SIR PERCY" SCOTT'S VIEWS 1 ■ . OUTSPOKEN LETTER ; , "The whole system of naval , , -architecture and the methods of . . •computing naval- strength are. . brought under review by the ever- ; .growing power, radius, and . sea- . .worthiness'of t-ho submarine, and byJ,ho increasing range and accuracy of its fatal torpedoes.—Mr. Churchill, March 17, 1014. ■ It is interesting at this stage to rcca the .- views recently, put forwai by Admiral Sir Percy Scott in a lon letter in answer to a . eorrospondei published in the '.'Times" as to tli relativo value of battleships and sul marines. ■ 'Admiral Sir Percy Scott is a- navj officer who has not only shown' hiinse: on several occasions able to think ahea of his contemporaries,' but has mad gcod' Ms prophecies. To him t-ho En pire owed the presence of the navi: guns at Ladysinith which saved th situation, if not South Africa. He i was who niade possible the advance i marksmanship with heavy guns whic has been such an important feature i naval efficiency of lato.ycars. Sir Eerc Scott now declares that everything h .has done.to enhance the valuo of th gun is rendored useless by the advent o the submarine. In hisletter, he says:If wo liave battleships wo must hav. thick 'armour on them to keep out tin enemy's shot, and wo must have spcoi to .give a tactical advantage in bring ing our tiro on the'enemy; those ar< axioms among naval officers. For bat tles'hips our nation and all other na tions liave very, properly decided t< have big ships, big guns, "thick armour and high speed. The Real Question. ■The other question is, aro we in 191' to build two or four battleships? Th< Littlo Nayyites say two in order t< save money; the Big Navyites'fcay fow to, as they think, saro tho country If battleships are of use' in. saving tli< country, .the Littlo Navyites are foolisl and unpatriotic. If battleships arc ol no use, then the Big Navyites ate wrong in putting the country to the expenst of building four..more; the. real question to-settle before even talking-aboui building more battleships, is, ''Are thej of use .or aro they not?" For some •thousands of years/ armed-vessels floating on the surface of the water have been used for attack and defence; these vessels'to-day vary in sizo from a canoe containing one maii armed with a spear, to a 32,000-ton battleship armed with 15in. guns, and' theso 'craft, whether largo or small, all float on the water and aro visible. In. this island, we depend upon our food suppiy coming from over seas, hence it has been necessary for us to. have a large number of armed ships, to protect, our commerce and'to safeguard our food supply.-This protecting force or insurance of our country is called the-Royal Navy, and to-day consists of a largo number of ships that swim, on the water and can bo seen, and a few that swim under the water and- cannot be seen. ■ . ' '■ : ' '. - Underwator Warfare. ' The -introduction of the vessels that swim under water ; has, -in my opinion, entirely done away with the utility of the ships that swim on the top of tho water... , ... ' s ' ".[ 'The.fimctioiW'.of, a vessel of' war wero:—. ■ ■■■' • Defensively: ' 1. To attack ships that come to bonibanrd( our ports; • • 2. To a-ttack ships that-come to blockade lis.;. , 3. To attack ships convoying a landing. party. 4. To attack, tho enemy's fleet. v ■ 5. To attack, ships interfering with our commerce. ',-'■■ Offensively.: 1. To bombard an enemy's ports. , 2. To blockade: an enemy. ■' ', 3. To convoy a landing party. > 4. To attack the'enemy s fleet.. 5; To'attack.the enemy's, commerce.. _ The submarine renders 1, 2, and 3 impossible, as no man-of-war will dare I to. come. even within sight of a' coast that is adequately protected by submarines; therefore, the functions of a battleship; as regards 1, 2, and 3, both defensively and offensively, have disappeared. The fourth function of a battleship is to attack an enemy's fleet, but there will be no fleet to attack, as it will not be safe for a fleet to put to sea. This has been demonstrated in all recent manoeuvres both at Home and abroad where submarines have been employed, and the demonstration, should have made us realise, that, now that submarines have come in, battleships are of no use either for defensive or offensive purposes, and, consequently, building any more in 1914 will be a misuse of money subscribed by the citizens for the defence of the Empire Fleets Bottled Up. As regards' the protection of our commerce on the high seas, we must examine who can interfere with. it. . Turkey, Greece, Austria, and Italy must pass through the.narrow Straits of Gibraltar to get at our commerce. Cyprus, Malta, and Gibraltar, well equipped with aeroplanes to observe the enemy's movements, and submarines to attack him, would make egress from the Mediterranean very difficult. . ' Spain and Portugal have ports open to the. Atlantic, and could intertere with our commerce, but war with those countries seems very improbable, and they are not very far from Gibraltar. France from Brest could harass our commerce, but if ■ Homeward-bound ships gavo that port a wide berth and signalled by wireless if- they wero attacked, fast cruisers and submarines from Plymouth could bo very soon on til) spot. ' " Russia and Germany aro very badly placed for interfering with our commerce; to get to the Atlantic, they must cither run the gauntlet of the Channel, or pass to the North of Scot- , laud, and even if tho'y get out they have nowhere to coal. America could attack our commerce, but they would have a long' way to come. > If by submarines we close egress from tlio North Sea and Mediterranean, it is difficult to see how our commerce can bo much interfered with. l It has been suggested to me that submarines and aeroplanes could not stop caress from the Mediterranean, that a fleet would steam through at night. < Willi aeroplanes that would report the approach of a fleet, and thirty or forty : invisible submarines in the" narrow Strait of Gibraltar, trying to pass i through them at night would be a very j risky operation. Submarines and aeroplanes have en- , tircly revolutionised naval warfare, no j fleet can hido itself from tho aeroplane I eye, and the submarine can deliver a 1 deadly attack even in broad daylight. ( An Entire Change. \ Under the .circumstances I can see no 1 use for battleships and very little chance of much employment for fast ' cruisers. The Navy will oe entirely ' changed; naval officers will no longer ' live on the sea, but either above or un- e der it, and tho strain on their system and nor'vos .will bb so great; that a very l lengthy pcrio'd o'f service will not bo ad-' l vifiablo; it will bo a Navy of youth, for ] j

we shall require nothing but boldnci and daring. . , . ■ 11l war time tho scouting aeroplane will always ba high above on tho 100 l out. and tho submarines in coiistan readiness, as are the engines-at a fir< station. If an enemy is sighted, th Kong sounds and the leash of a flotill of submarines will bo Blipped. TVlu they must go out to soarch for thei quarry: if they find her, she is doomed tjior it be night or day, fine or rough and they give no quarter; thcy.caiino board her and take her as a prize, a in the oldon days;'they only wait til she sinks, then return home witliou even knowing the number of humai beings that they have sent to the bot com of tho ocean. Will any battleship expose herself t< such a dead certainty of destruction! I say, No. . Not only is the open sea nnsafe; : battleship is not immune from attael even in a closed harbour, for tho so called protecting boom at, the ciitranm can easily be blown up. With a flotilk of submarines commanded by dashing young officers, of whom we have plenty. I.would undertake to get.through anj boom into any harbour, and sink or materially damage all the ships' in thai harbour. , • : If a battleship is not safe either on tho high seas or in harbour,-what'is the use of a battleship P What Is Required.' It has been argued to rile that if a foreign Power destroys our submarines we aro at the m'ercy of; his Dreadnoughts.- There oan be no doiibt about tlie accuracy of this statement, but. submarines are difficult to destroy, because it is difficult.to attack what yon cannot see. A Power that sends out ships to look for and destroy submarines will be courting disaster; the submarine when in the water must be kept "away from, not looked for. Submarines will be hauled up on land, with arrangements for : instantly launching them when required; ■they can only bo attacked by airships dropping bombs on them. What we require is an .enormous fleet of submarines, airships, and aeroplanes, and a few fast cruisers, provided we can find a place to keep them in safety during war time. ■It has been argued to .me that our enemy will seizo some island ill the Atlantic, get some fast cruiser there, with plenty of coal, and from this island proy on our commerce. '. This is ridiculous ; tho moment ive hear of (it we send a.-flotilla of submarines towed, by an I Atlantic liner, she, drops them just when in sight of the, island, , arid .she brings thorn back to. England when they liavo sunk .everything they found at the l island'. - ■ .- ..... If we .go to war witli a'country tTiat is within the striking' distanco of submarines, I am of opinion' that 'that country will at oncp lock ' up.' their Dreadnoughts in some safe harbour; wo shall do the same; their aeroplanes and airships Will fly'over our country; they will know exactly whore our ships are, and their, submarines will come over and destroy anything and everything that they can get at. .'We shall, of course, do the same, but an island with many harbours and much shipping ia at a great disadvantage, if the'enemy has snbmarilies. I do not. think that the 'importance of submarines has been fully recognised, neither do I think ' that it has been realised how completely their advent has revolutionised iiayal'warfare. In'my opinion, as the motor vehicle has driven tho horse from tho road/so has the submarine driven the battleship from the sea.