THE GERMAN ARMY

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2227, 13 August 1914, Page 7

THE GERMAN ARMY

AN UNSPARING CRITIC • 1 ' : \ ' '• •• -

ITS MANY SERIOUS DEFECTS

IGNORANT OF MODERN FIRE NO WAR EXPERIENCE Tho defects of tho German- Armj, -as *eU as rome of. its-unquestioned merits, were dealt with in an interesting irticle. by. "The -Times", military, correspondent pn the German manoeuvres of 1911. Unfortunately "The Times" correspondent, whoso views are held in considerable roBpeot,- has not; since reviewed manoeuvres of the Kaiser's. Army, -but; ho 'has .'written of tie working oftho.German of ;1912 and 1913, increasinjj :thestrength goes so. far as to say that the changes, great as they have been, have not made for any marked changes in German strategy ', and administration, while they have created many new difficulties: ' In view of this, his] Temarks on the Army of 1911 are interesting, especially as Tecent'events, would seem to prove uis adverse criticism jnstifiod." . . Mistakes in Higher. Leading. "The German- General Staff- is so concerned with the epectaqula? success of Kaisermanover that. it.'alloW9. encouragement of initiative to'sink into the second place," he writes.' "CM the other .hand, it gains what it desires; gfineral actions take place.at the appointed places .and Kotos; tho staff gains-European.credit for the satisfactory 00-ojeration-of all arms; and the German reporters go away happy in the belief- that all is.for the, best in the best of all possible armies. There, was nothing, in tne higher - leading' at the manoeuvres of a distingiiishea character, and mistakes were committed which' tended to shake the confidence of foreign spectators in-the reputation-of the command. The staff work,' though usually, good, was Hot by any means above suspicion. The infantry lacked dash; displayed no knowledge of the uso' of ground, entrenched themselves badly, wero estrefnely slow in their~ movements; offered vulnerable! tar? gets at medium ranges, ignored the service of security, performed the approach marches in an old-time manner, were not trained to .understand,the connection between fire and' movement,'and seemed totally unaware : of.-the effect of modern fire.i The cavalry drilled'well and 6how-< ed~ some; beautifully- 1 trained, horses, while the Gavaliy of the Guard was well handled from the Army point of view, but the arm was, in; many ways, exceedingly qlflfaihioned. tho scouting was bad, and mistakes were made ,of wnich our YeomanTy would be The Artillery,, with Jts out-nf-date materiel and slow and in-, effective methods, of fire, appeared, so inferior that it can have no pretensions to measure itself -against the French on anything'approaching lovelj terms. Finally,, the dirigibles ' and aeroplanes presented the-fourth arm in a relatively unfavotrrnble light.. Tho German Army, apart from its numbers, confidence 'in/itself and' high state of; organisation, does not present .any 'signs of superiority over the best foreign models, and in some ways does not . rise- above the level of the second rate.' .„. Confidence of. the Army. • , "The confidence of the (German Army, in- itself is in one sense l a source of. Btrength and in another of weakness. .It will .doubtless enable the army and the nation' to embark upon a war a firm belief in victory, but all the greater, will be the dissillusionment if victory is; not speedily obtained.' ■ The' methods by which the Germans sedulouslr gate in foreign .oo«intries,-H» idea' that German arms are invincible useful jn . their'-"'.wairr for : ;they,'..snabie diplomacy 1 * tt T>K,peac*Sftl '«ManS; refinlts ; which .would otherwise only be obtained by . great sacrifice in war. • ThereBeams no,reason.to doubt.that the t-ni:■ psxor' himself J .4rmly-:

superiority of German aims, and in the . ability of the German Army to -crush all opposition,. Tho sharpness of the Gorim»nsword and tho weight' of ' the German fist are well-lmown ; figures in Imperial I Bpeeohea. It is possible that Germany I may possess; officers who . recognise that the overweening confidence of the German | Army is not wholly warranted- by the facts of the case, but it 'seeins likely that •up'to a comparatively recent data there were none who cared to risk their careers by uttering unpalatable and inconvenient truths. From highest to lowest the word passes that eveiythig military Germany is superlatively excellent,, and that nothing wfiioh takes place in foreign armies js worth trCubling about. , , -. A Stale Army. "'The' German Army; appears, to the vnriter to have trained .'itself stalk Year • in,-year out, the same .ceaseless round of intensivo training has t.be whole I army to a machine by which individuality,'.initiative,; and freshness ;hus : e been rigorously, crushed out. The effort to l create initiative by regulation has not sue-1 ceeded. The training of the year, always 1 tho pame,' hias b'ecome a'form of *somnambulism. Everybody does' the same thing [ every hour of every day evefy ytar, and! officers who have to wait 16 or 17 years | for their companies are spent and tired ( long before they rise to high command. The majority of senior regimenta.l officers do not possess tho physical Qualifications necessary for effective service during the aidnoU9 strain ofi the infantry fight, and ■until the cadres are rejuvenated these conditions will remain unaltered.' There are Eomo great thinkers and-some hard workers among tie officers, but the impression conveyed is that only a'select few reallv work, that all individuality, has be2n orushed out of the rank and file, and that both absolutely, and still more relatively, the.German Army is.not sc[ good as its fo l ernnnor which achieved tne union ox the German States, "A bloody.war and a sickly season'V-that venerable toast. of our port-drinking ancestors—might ,rewvigorate the army or might destroy it. Failing such oxfcrome measures, the best, thin" to restore new life to the army, woufd be to disband it for a year in order to give eyerybody, from top to, bottom, a'much-needed rest. -The Germany Army is still a great and a formidable machino. No one should entertain any illusion .on this subject. " In numtiers, m cfeaisation, and in the aosorption of all the best elements of' the State for its own end* it,has few if .any equals.-. But it asserts «. claim of superior efficiency and th» proofs which it gave at tno . Kaisernanover of 1911 to substantiate this claim ffero not convincing. - 'Social Considerations, The iron discipline o£; the Gorman Axmy, tjie strong imperialism of the well-

to-do -.'classes, and the submissiveness of the iower orders, prevent the -undermining of military authority by the Socialists tendencies of large blocks of the working people. .But in the nation in arms tho Armv is the microoosm of tho people, r.nil in time of stress, tho results of Socialistic teaching will not be suppressed so vendily ' as; in ..peace, Tho. character of the German peoplO Is greatly changing. The increase of wealth and luxury has | an enervating effect topon all classes, and has Its reflex action tpon the Corps of Officers,Vwhich is less simple in its life and tastes, and . less exclusively professional than it was' a score of . years ago. . Commerce ' begins to attract the class which has hitherto regarded the Army a? the'only careor Open to a gentleman, while in the Army itself there is a steady ■increase of the non-noble element. The nation, which, after all, gives tip little more than half of its able-bodied sons to the service of the Army, is becoming • much less militarist than formerly. A Peace-bred Army. "The German Army ins seen less _ot modern war than'any. other Army which stands in the front rank. It practices and carries on from year to year, witfi far'too. scant regard for modern progress, the methods which were good enough in their day but are no longer praoticablo under the .firo of "modern arms. Theory may recognise, that great and evenfundamental changes are, required in tactics and. in training to meet the new conditions with success, but all'evidence shows that an Army wheh has not been tfied in tho fire ia constitutionally unable to profit' by the experience of others and to adapt itself to the ordeal of modernwar. Most of all is this' true. of the German Army,. which cupposM itsslf to bo the imlitafy' l 6alt of the . earth, and. .fwdjy believes that it will have'no difficulty-In carrying, otft military operations which other people' aid other,armies nave discovered' to'be impracticable. For the cause of trne progress, no attitude could be. more fatal. ; No other modern Army displays such profound contempt for the. effect of modern fire. Were this contempt due to the proved superiority of German troops over others, there would bo.somts thing to be said-for it, but the military 1 histary of Prussia and the Federal States did not 'begin, "nor will it end, with the war of 18/0-71. "Viewing"military history as a whole, wo' do not find that German arms have greater triumphs. to their credit than those of Britain. and of France. The contempt which the German Armv displays for tho effects of mod era fire, and professes to hold for the armies of rivil States with which it may coma In conflict, can' oidy be set down to ignorance and to nothing else. Disregard cf Effect of FiM< "Not by any arm,,.nor by the staff, is .the effect of modern fire ia,ken into accounts : Cavalry scout with -blissful .disregard of it,' and trot about withni closp range of hostle infantry, while fetfiuents bump along a higlr road into hostile entrenchments as if it .were all in the day's work and not the least likely to end in annihilation. Infantry classes are'seen in beautiful but; vulnerable array exposed to the fire bf guns at long and medium ranges, while.; in the closer fire-fight ground is disregarded, firing lines' lie out in {thick swarms upon the open,- machine guns selddm seek cover, and mounted - offioers ride up and down with dignity. .as they , would in the ?hady avenues of. the ..Thiergarten. The artillery, it is true, .has.this year for the first, time betaken itself to cover, but on the first excuse comes up to the forward crest, of . its position,, and slogs away merrily with every gun in view., The huge.military '- escort of Princes, - generals,. and guests which follows the. Emperor sta-r I tions itself conspicuously in , tho. midst ot this gala army, and appears,to cover ttie, whole display ■ with the mantle of J-W----perial.wnsenL-; -y. " ■ In 1913-rNo Change. The same corresjwn'dent'in 1913 writes: •-"Broadly speaking, there,is no evidence of any marked change in the principles which halve 1 ' hitherto guided ; German mil]tary administrators, N nor in-the strategical 1 use of the'great army wkoh has/be^. fashioned with,, such' Splendid continuity. of purpose-" diMiig'"the , '-years. There is still the underlying design; academic though at present it be, to crush Franco' by'a vigorous offensive; before the,.. ) weig^t"<j^BusMa , wn>be'bronght,.tp.;:bear..|

There is still a very-plain, temptation on military grounds ;.to traverse neutral States''m an offensive campaign against. Trance. '.There is still the obvious intention bo fight a defensive campaign at first against Bussia, and this,intention is made more manifest by the plans for improvinn the fortresses in East Prussia. The. determination to wage, offensive war with the utmost ■ energy and ruthlessness> remains to-day as always the central idea of the German strategist, and the m/iin effect of the new naval and military laws is to second offensive policy by placing in the hands of German diplomaoy a weapon fashioned for offensive war." v >' "Russia's Weight," On the question ol whether Germany could hope to ctuSh France before Bus, sia's weight can be : brought to bear, the Paris correspondent of the "Times' wrote in' August of last year:—'"lt has hitherto been supposed that Bussia would, bii nearly. three -weeks behind France ;in completing -her. mobilisation, but in a. telegram-.from St. Petersburg, M. Jules Hedeman informs the "Matin" that the the situation' is now completely altered. r The construction of fresh railways and. the reorganisation of the Russian Army, M;. Hedeman states, haye greatly reduced the. period of mobilisation; and the Russian Army will be able to take the field only a few days, aftor that of France." WHY SUFFER FROM SCIATICA? Yes! Why suffer? Why continuo to .endure the pain and agony? KHEUiMO will' cure- Jou—it his cural thousands of sufferers speedily and effectually. Moreover, it is a rational and a scientific remedy. Excess uric acid in the blood'is the. real caiise of. your trouble. Until that excess uric acid is removed you will still continue"; to suffer. BHEUi.IO acts dircctly through the blood and neutralises and expels, the" excess acid from' the sys.tem.' ,By removing the cause it completes the .cure." 'Read what -Mr. Francis M'Gnire,' c.'o; ;J. Stewart,' Esq.,"Barrack ■Hill, Napier,;.nas to say about RHEUMO: .' '■J'For two years'-1 have been a- martyr to; Sciatica, had a course of electric massage,'.besides going;to Te Aroha for the bat M.. I have now, been in Napier seven weeks, taking hot 'salt water 'baths, but all in vain! I tried almost everj; supposed remedy, until a week ago a friend, and one-time sufferer, persuaded me to try •RHEUMO. I have taken only two bottle'a and the result is simply wonderful; can' now walk and stoop with ease." "When practice thus supports theory, can you-hesitate about RHEUMO? 2s. 6d. and 4s. 6d. bottle.—Advt. .