GERMAN ATTACK ON FRANCE

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2225, 11 August 1914, Page 7

GERMAN ATTACK ON FRANCE

THE BELGIAN CAMPAIGN

where British aid will tell THE COUNTRY DESCRIBED (By HILAIRE BELLOO.) ' [In the "London Magazine" for Mar, J912, Mr. Hilaire Belloo had a most interesting article following the Agndir crisis, when a German' attack on France appeared imminent. At that time the firm action of England was the factor that turned the scale. Mr. Belloc's theories of tho German line of invasion are as tenable' to-day as then,' and the following digest of the article will* be read with interest.] ■■ .' In the course of last 'summer, and particularly in the first days of September, there vraa grave danger of war be; twcen Franco and Germany. Had war -broken out Great Britain would have dispatohed an army amounting, it is believed, to 150,000 men, and in an;r case well ov,er 100,000, to act in alliance with France and operate against the Oferraan forces. All was ready for conveying,' this great force-, across the Channel.' ' "yVell," where would tWs army have bseh engaged? And what are the conditions necessary to its being used at.all? It'■ is to "try' and', answer those ques-tions-that i. am writing these lines, and I propose to show that that army would have, tome into action in the neighbourhood of'the town of Liege, in Belgium.

Why do I say that the shook between a British Armyr'octing in alliance with Hie Ffenchj and a German Army 'opposing that alliance would have taken place in. the neighbourhood of Liege P ■ In order to understand that one must briefly recapitulate the main elements of the Franco-German frontier, and show the nature of the line which the German Army would have to negotiate if it hoped for success. There is no necessity for studying the other side of the problem, or for describing the line whioh the' French would have to forcebefore they could hope for success; and the reason why there is no such necessity is'very simple. . The line does not exist. The Germans have deliberately ■staked thair policy-'- upon the chance or expectation of very--, early .-and; immediate successes.after the outbreak of, war. : II they, fail in-that they have no defensive line- upon whioh -to fall- back, and Uie 'failurß"to -achieve■■■'- immediate success under such a policy is equivalent to defeat. . - <. ■.'.''■'..-•' What, then, is "the nature of that defensive line which lies between the Ger-

man Amy and a successful campaign against the French? After the. great German victories in the war of 1870-71, a peace foas imposed upon 'the Frenoh called "The Treaty oi Frankfort," and this' Treaty (among other provisions) defined a new frontier between France' and Germany. • The' old frontier had run from the Swiss mountains 1 along the Rhine, for about 120 miles(as the crow flies); and then turned a sharp corner, westward away from the Rhine to the frontier of the little independent country called the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. The frontier between this little' independent conntry and France continued the line, to the neighbourhood of' a, town called Longfry, where the Franco-Belgian frontier began. The hew" frontier 'imposed upon tbr French by the Treaty of Frankfort ran fiom this town of Longwy to the foot-

hills 6f,tho Vosges Mountains, and then ran down the crest of the Vosges Mountains to the great French town and fortress of Belfort; whioh was not annexed by tho Treaty, but left in French possession. Just boyond Belfrirt tho new frontier struck the Swiss M' 'intains, but at some distance from the xihine. All the world'knows that tho territory thus annexed by the how Gorman Empire is generally called Alsace-Lorraine. The only consequence of that annexation which concerns us here is the military nature of the new frontier. All nations with a sound military, tradition fortify. Not to fortify, not to expect.or provide for acting on the defensive, to take.victory for granted and to consider .the offensive only, is the fnli mark of an uhmilitary spirit." TSh'e Fiencb, who havo always believed In fortification, set out after their great defeat to fortify in- the amplest manner the now frontier which had been im> posed upon them. Tho reader must clearly understand irhat fortification is, and why it is undertaken- Yon do not fortify a frontier as a man builds' a fence—in order to keep people out. You fortify with the object of checking, the enemy's offensive and of making time light upon your side. No fortification was ever made with the object'of keeping a'weaker party psrmaI nently safe from the attack of a stronger party. No fortification, is intended to prevent permanently the advance of an assailant. What fortification does is to hold that assailant while you, in turn, attack him; to oheck him while you bring up further resources against him: to' employ three of his men at a sacrifice of biitone. of your own. When,' therefore, people say that the Frenoh proceeded to make their new frontier "impregnable,"'we must not take that word literally. "What it means Is that the French proceeded to place obstacles upon that frontier such that no army could pass without prolonged'fieht- i in», heavy losses, and possible defeat, and that with a comparatively small «x«

pense of numbers on the French side, leaving the' mass of fthe French forces free to take the counter-offensive.. The obstacles thus designed by tho Frenoh consisted in the great ring-for-tress of Belfort at the southern end; then, next in order, tho Vosges Mountains (which are such difficult country that they -need little artificial . strengthening), then the great ring-fortress of Epinal; next the great ring-fortress of Toul; and, finally, at the northern end of the system, the great ring-fortress ol Verdun. ■ Now, this series of obstacles- makes H absolutely certain that the' Germans, Instead of tryin" to get through the line of tbem, would try to get round that line. "Absolutely certain" is a strong phrase, and I do not mean that'opinion is unanimous upon the matter. What I mean i» that- so far as the lessons of the war in Manchuria and the siege of Port Arthur, a kno-.vledge of what a modern great ringfortress is,_ and a general acquaintance with the history of war can bring one to a. conclusion on this matter, that conclusion is as clear as can be that the most

elementary principles of warfare would incline the German staff td attempt .to get round tho line instead of through it. The next thing to appreciate iB that if you 'got round a Jine of any kind in warfare, whether it is a strategio line' of fortification .or a line of men in battle, you have won just as surely as though you had broken that line. Only, of course, you must get round quickly so as to be able to take it in reverse, or roll it up from the end before the men who constitute it (in the case of a line nf battle) or who arc behind the fortifications (in the case of d lipe of- these) oan face about in your direction. /Let us take it for granted, then, that in case of. war the Germans, while attempting to "hold" the French on this great fortified line of theirs (which, from the Swiss Mountains to Verdun, measures 150 miles), would direct their

en principal effort to trying to "turn" n - to the north or to the south. To "hold na in this sense means to occupy tho attei J l ' tion of;, tho defenders, and to provot en their being employed elsewhere; to pi 3 *v them down to the works they garrison. «' They could not hopo to turn tli French line on the south, so tho Ge: ry mans must necessarily try to turn it o re tho north. Now, when you turn to tho problem < :a * turning tho Frdnoh fortresses _ by fli U- north a very cui'ious position is appa; ent. It is this: The natural defensiv ry. line'which oontinues the French lipe < to Frontier Fortresses is the Meuse Rive: le- whose orossings must be and; as we eha »d see, are fortified- (against aggressio i.l i 'where- they aro not protected automat tie cally by "difficult country." But tli In Meuse River is no longer under Freno at control in this northern section. It i er under Belgian control. In other wordi n. the French strategic frontier does n< correspond to their political frontier o j j the north.. . . ' ". n . This would not matter if treaties wei sr held eacred by the Government of Bei lin. In that oase the line would end a 19 Verdun; and if Verdun .was too strorif n . so much: the worse for Prussia. • Si 6 would suffer defeat as the price, of n< ," glecting to fortify and to prepare for a * eventualities. ••' ■ * Tho French frontier to the north t Zl Verdun and its forts does not nin b< ™ twoen France, and Germany at all. . 1 . runs between France and Belgium, One "■ you are- north of Verdun and past th ■• end of the lino of obstacles which th "* French have constructed, the little i: ™ dependent country of Luxemburg aiid th ". larger independent country of Bekium li boiriveen the French'and the German! 19 That it would be an abominably wro'n a " and treasonable act to attack the Be! j e gians, with whom they had no quarrel, an Is to violate their neutrality, need not coi 3 " cern us hero, where we are only concerr lo e-l with the military side of the probleir *• though it is worth reminding those peopl '• who were so shocked at the idea of fiehl '■ mg at «11 last year that Great Britai: is solemnly' pledged to defend Belgiur from treachery of this kind. Anyway, it is rightly taken for grani ed that in oase of war Germany woul disregard her Treaties, and hor pledgei word, and invade Belgium in order t get round the French line of obstacles I havo already said that an immediat success, at tho outset of the war is'necee sary to her whole political plan, and th,a a oneok at the outset would be fatal. _ ■ Now, so thoroughly has European opin ion 1 taken for granted the certainty tha Germany would invade Belgium in cas of war that the part of Belgiuir through whioh German armies would hav ! to come has for many years been forti fiod in precisely the same way as th French Frontier has been. And it is just here that the role o Lieae cohies ii, and that we can see hov a British contingent landed to help th' French, would be boupd to act in th neighbourhood of that town. xhe German attack would have to to made along the line of the Lower Meusi River. You cannot pfet into Belgiun without crossing that river. Now, on tho Lower Meuse River then ■ ■.. stand Vno first-class fortresses, whioh so-far as guns and works go, are as etronj . as Anything in Europe. These two fortresses are Namur ant Liege. ■' ■ 'v ■ Tho Germans cannot oross the Meusl - lower down than Liege and marcl through Belgium, neglecting that for tress, because if they did so their line oi ! » communications—that is, the food of the a. army and- its ammunition, and every thing.by which it exists as a'fightint e force, and an interruption in the suppb - of which would mean defeat—would ther j run between two great fortified garrisons .- Liege and Antwerp,' with a third a littb r further on that line of advance, al - Namur. . f ' It is true that Antwerp ond Liege lie r far v apart, but the former, is Jndefinitelj f supphablo by sea, and, so long as Ger [ muny does not control the sea, can lx made the secure base of an over-increas-t rng-fqrce to ac* against the German com- . munications. 3 They cannot "ross tho Meuse between ,: Namur.and Liege, as for instance ai ,'• Hiiy, because' the' gap is too short foi '■ safety, since' their line' of communiov ,- tions would lie hotween two nnconquered j garrisons which would put tho very life ot the army into constant poril.' I They cannot attack Namur before 3 Liege, or Namur, instead of Liege, be- > cause the French would be in Namur . before them. It is Liege' that stands t near the German frontier,, and Liege that blocks, the way. . . It is certain that.upon that line, and the' German success or failure- there. Germany's success or failure in turning the Frenoh frontier by Belgium and the north would depend. Let us' take it as our starting point, then, that the Germans would and must try and got across the Mouse at Liege, and thereiore must tako that town in some way,, by occupation or by force, so as to render its fortifications inoffensive to themselves. How do we know that a British contingent would operate in that field P We know it because, it would bo impossible to keep the British lino of communication separate and intact, and impossible for a'British forco to act in conjunction with the French, save by its presouce'upon the-extreme north of the French line. The real strategical Frontier of France is, as I have said, the Meuse River. The forts of Namur and Liege aro as much part of the French scheme of fortification as those of Epinal, Toul, or Verdun. Yet. though Germany makes no concenlment of her intention to attack a neutral country, and to attempt to cross the Meuse whore it runs through Belgium, Frauce cannot in time of peace defend that river! Well, then, Liege and Namur would be forces coining into Belgium from the west, whether those forces were English or French, to march up in aid of the Belgian garrison of Liege, which, immediately alter the outbreak of war, would certainly be "contained." It oannot be doubted that within the first lew hours alter hostilities had begua the German troops crossing the .'frontier in tho neighlxmrnooel pi Aix-ia-Uhapelib . wouid have come under file of the oasioru ' most tort ol the great twenty-mile ring of torts which surrounds Liego; and 1 would add that it cannot be reasonably doubted either that, with the utmost rapidity,- the German forces Vould form a circuit-all about that great ring, and attempt to.bring about its fall. They would • do ; that long before any French or British' troops could bo gov upon the sceue;and we may take it thai a siege. of Liege-would be the first imperative necessity imposed upon the Germans at the.outset of the campaign. It would be a woeful miscalculation to imagine that such works as those which protect Liege could bo forced simply because tho Belgian army is smaller and less instructed than thp army of one of the Great Powers. It is amply sufficient for such' a task as maintaining the ring round Liege intact; at' any rate, for a spice of time long enough to permit the arrival upon tho scene of relieving armies from the west. ! Since the lesson of Port Arthur no on* should consider . the capture and occupation of one of the great modern ring-fortresses as the maltrrr of a few hours, or even of a few days. , Let tho reader glance at the sketchmap. It will be worth while, 'for, though the point is a commonplace with military critics, it has not caught hold of general public opinion that Liege is the pivot ot a Franco-German struggle. _ The works round Liege consist of twelve isolated forts, forming tho most perfect and the most formidable rings of defences in Europe er in the world. '. The ideal ring-fortress would be a town capable .of ample provisioning, and lying within an' exact cirole of heights at an average of some 8000 yards distance, eaoh height some 4000 yards from the next, each crowned with a self-contained closed work, and each such work within support oi at least tiro others,. No such absolutely exaot conditions exist of course, in reality, bnt skill and the relief of the soil combined have endowed Liege with a ring of forts very r.early combining these conditions. The circle, though not exact, is more r.c-arly exact than in tho enso of any other ring- fortress; its largest diameter is not 20 per cent, in excess of its shortest. The greatest distance between any two works is but 7000 yards, the average less than 4000. Each work is easily supported by two others, and often by three, and in one case by four' In a word, Liege with any adequate provision of gunners and supply, would stand a siege more thorough and prdlonged than any of the other great ringfortvessos of Europe; and calculations based upon "rushing" its defences are calculations of defeat. Liege, then, could be neither neglected nor carried- It would have to bo reduced; and, as I hjvve said, to -prevent ,

jj. that reduction would be the whole bu I > ueas of Anglo-Fronch forces advonci: across the iiat country from the sea I it W m l° we r line of the Jteuso... j n Ao army can tight, upon two front: at .least, not for long. To compel i 10 arm ? upon two fronts is pret much tho same thing as compelling , n tc te defeated. '■therefore, before any great siege a £ undertaken, tho besieging forces must 10 ' rom attack from outside its circ r- , 'hero aro other armies, in tho fie :e Jfside the army shut up in the fortrc 3 { the besieging force niajica itself secu r by tho use of what is called a "covert II " rl ?7> or "array of observation," and n i!L. J? asIMS9 of 'this last to defeat ai i- De 1 at J any outsido force. coming up io i.Pj* called the ''relief" of the fortre: :h larger tho forces which may eoi l s up m relief of the fortress, the larg s, fevering army has to be—quite apa )t lrom the numbers which may be neoi in ? ai 'y ."ff conducting the siege. The me Knowledge that the enemy will soon ha ;e } n .'ho held, in the neighbourhood of r _ besieged fortress, a force of such and su it f. compels one, before undertake tlie siege at all, to provide, for a cover! 10 army of equal strength. ?■ IT. i P ra °tice, thorefore, tho knowld 11 that large forces would be availal , 'Kitsm ? f®, w days of tho opening of h< jf tlities, in the Belgian plains behind Lie e. makes it that the siege of Lie ft could not be undertaken without inu ig larger forces for both the reduction ie the fortress and the covering of the o io erations. ' i- ft was precisely here that the infra ie Jsijjtj of a. British contingent was evide ie to the Freijoh. That contingent in itse 3. even if we suppose that it would real g have reached tho numbers of 150,000 me j Fl 1 • not have been sufficient to prevo d the immediate containing of Liege by t- -- uermans upon'tho outbreak of war. t. i» passage of the Mouse below that tow 1, and the formation of a large coveri: .e army to the west of it upon the left ha: > 0: the river. n ■: But tho fact that a large army w n to-gather'in • the flat count to the west of the town would inental compel the German plan to'develop ap< 5 the Lower Meuse. ft would fix the se Sll 6 war » aQ d it would fix it in °. a ! S calculated to administ *• that first check to the German offensiv which, seeing that the whole German ph x depends upon a very , rapid and immet ateiy successful offensive, would bo tl 1- a^ies ible combut '* * It has been eaid that the -throat ■ ? opmbmed French and English action : 1 Belgium would be sufficient'to preve: f a siege of Liege at all. I confess I < a n v e( i e how-this contention can be mai tamed. The offensive must be tafcl somewhere by either party. The Frent can take it where they like, because the opponents have drawn up no defensi' lino. The bermans niußt, in the fact • the very thorough defensive line draw up by the French,. attack immediate upon some one of two or three restrict! areas. I have said why I do not belie there would bo fin attempt to turn tl Frenoh line by the south and the Swi: mountains, and why I do not credit tl T more plausible but, I aju convinced, e roneous theory that a German advam 1 co i, a ' to place through the Ardennes 1.0 sum op, it 6eems inevitable that i s case of hostilities Liege and the Lowi J Meiise would be the point of attack; thi _ tho. old German conception 'of "rushing { 3 ring-fortress, evjn with no stronger r a sources behind it than tho Belgian,' mui , be abandoned; that a regular siego < ; J-i'-ge would have to bo undertaken b J W( a general Gorman advance into Be i 611 m was safe 1 ; that the forces require lo conduct such an operation would Im j to be larger in proportion to opposir forces that might soon be gathered i tho Belgian plain; that Britain w: ; peculiarly suited to afford aid at th: . print, nnd that the expeditionary fort . which was prepared to leave for the 001 3 tinent last September would have lande . upon the stretch of coast between an . including Boulogne and Ostend, an would have been asked to operate in th 1 flat oountry, whose limits upon the eai t run somewhat beyond the line of Kami] t and Louvain.