PACIFIC NAVIES

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2129, 22 April 1914, Page 4

PACIFIC NAVIES

IMPERIAL OBLIGATIONS

ADMIRALTY'S CHANGE OF FRONT

> AUSTRALIAN POSITION

Speaking in the House of Commons last nfonth, tho First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Winston Churchill) made a statement which, in the opinion-of tho Minister of Dofonce (Senator Millen), practically meant the abandonment of the scheme for the naval defence of the Empire, and especially of the outlying Dominions, agreed to .at the .Defence Conference held in Loudon in 1909, and jndorsed in lull. 1 , , • , Tho matter was considered of suet lrcent 1 importance by Senator Milieu he CommonwealtK'Minister of Defence ,hat he lias prepared.,a-:careful state aent setting out exactly tho losition, and urging'.the vital import ,nce of.tho Imperial Government and re iresontativos" of tho Dominions meetini n conference early in 1910., J-" 0 Stat* •«it was as followsy-r- 'v

"If tho reports';W .-hand of Mr: Wii Bton Churchill's 'epoecli 011 the Naval Es timates are correct, : on of grave importance,'and suggests ill necessity for reviewing* tho whole Im pcrial nuvsl positiOftjrit so far a the Pacific put Mr. Churchill's'statement .jnter alia in volves'ia d^arationi:l(l) That a bat tie cruisefiii3i®tlli;flg(Sessary;Eart of fleet unit ? srovided. by/;, the' Dominions and (2) tHa^^'pi«s6iK»' : of',snch vpa sels in' th'o: Pacific is not necessary t< JJritishj interests.'" . This indicates so start ling a chang< from tte opinion and policy ill conform ity with Which' Australia, fins addressei herself/to the Question of naval defonc that it J is desirsble'to recall the; circum stances in'which her; present naval de fence scheme tfas adopted. That schem was the outcome of tho 1909 Conference and its basis was a memorandum pre pared by and therefore presumably ex pressing the views of the Admiralty This latter/factor is so important that i is pertinent to reproduce the followini extracts from the memorandum itself "If the problem of Imperial naval de fence were considered meroly as a prob lem of naval strategy it would bo fount that the greatest output of strength fo a giveii expenditure is obtained bv th maintenance of a single navy, with th concomitant unity of training and unit; of command. In furtherance ,thcn o the simple strategical ideal, the maxi mum of power would bo gained if al parts of the Empire contributed, accord jng to; their needs and resources, t< tho maintenance of the British navy It has, .however, long been recognisec that iii defining the conditions undei wliicli the naval forces of tho Empire should be developed, other considerations than those of strategy alone musl be taken into account," and "In _ the -opinion of the Admiralty, a Dominion Government desirous of creating a navy should aim at forming a distinct fleet! unit;i and the smallest unit is one which, while manageable in time of peace, is capable of being used in its component parts in time of war. . . .- Unless a naval forco, whatever its size, complies with this condition, it can' never take its proper place in tho organisation of an Imperial navy, distributed strategically over the whole area of British intorests/'

"Tho fleet unit to be aimed at should, therefore, in J tho opinion' of the Admiralty, consist at least of the following:—One armoured cruiser (new Illdo mi tablo class, whichMs'of the Dreadnought 'typo), three uriarmoured cruisers (Bristol type), sis destroyers, threo with the 'necessary auxilinrics, such as dopot and store ships, etc.," which are not here specified."

"Such a fleet unit would "bo -capableof action, not only in tho defence of coasts, but also of the trado routes* and' would bo sufficiently powerful to deal, with small hostile squadrons, should such ever attempt to act in, its wators."".'..'-' . ■ ■

"As the armoured cruiser is the essential part of the fleet unit, it is important that an Indomitable of the Dreadnought typo should bo tho first vessel to bo built in commencing the formation of a fleet unit."

Australia's, Decision.' As a icsult of the discussion at tho conference, it was decided, subject to approvaLbeing obtained from tho Commonwealth Parliament, that Australia should accept the responsibility of creating and maintaining a separate fleet unit as proposed by tho Admiralty, and that "the Australian: fleet • sliould form part of tho Eastern- fleet of tho Empire t-o bo composed of similar units of the Royal Navy, to. bo known as tho China and the East Indies units respectively and tho Australian unit." It was further decided that the New Zealand battle criiiser should'form the flagship of: the China unit, arid us a result of an with tho New Zealand Preniierjt was arranged that portion of that~"unitj-iiiclriding the battlo cruiser, should bo stationed periodically in New Zealand waters'. From tho quotations above, it is clear that in 1909 tho Admiralty were of opinion that Australia's effort should be directed ;to the croation of a complete unit/ which should be self-contained, ' and of which, the battle cruiser was rei garded. as the essential part. It is further dlear .that', in.the judgment of tho 'Admiralty,' at .leant, threo such battle oruisers were necessary for tho protection of Imperial interests in the Pacific.

'Admiral. Henderson's Roport, This view; \rtts endorsed by Admiral Sir Ik'giiiald Henderson...in' 1911. That officer was selected, by tho "Admiralty in' respojiso to)•Australia's.-request for-ex-pert advico 'regarding hoiyiayal efforts, urtlio same- way that Lord Kitchencr had been asked to ; advisoon military preparation. Admiral Henderson not only ,'accoptcd tho policy of the "complete' unit" with its central battle cruiser, but ho put forward a programhio which included the building of seven more of these .vessels, and proposed the expenditure of - very considerable sums upon'-dockyard and other facilities for meeting their needs. In tho same year in which Admiral Henderson so recommended there was held another conference in London, and the records disclose .-tlio fact that the Admiralty was then fully in accord with tho policy it had approved in 1909, nnd the continuation and extension of which had been recombended by Admiral Henderson. ' • ■

Judging;, however, from Mr. Winston Churchill's statement, tho Admiralty has abandoned 'the view_ adopted in 1909, and endorsed in'l9ll, and now.regards' the battle-cruiser as qui to unnecessary, either' in tho composition of a fleet unit or as an .adjunct to British naval strength in the Pacific. The prime justification which Mr. Churchill appears to have advanced for the Admiralty's present view is the existence of tho Japanese Alliance. But that alliance existed in 1009 and also in 1911,/ and, though its bearing upon the disposition of British vessels is obvious, Jt is difficult to see how it in any way disposes of tho arguments advanced in tho Admiralty memorandum above emoted. as to tho necessity of establishing that complete unit upon which it then laid so much stress. Tho necessity for creating a unit which, "while manageable in time of peace,, is capable of being used iu time of war," and of whioh an armoured cruiser is "an essential part," is quito unaffected by the existence or otherwise ol international

alliances. It may be that the international naval .situation, as it has developed sinco 1909, demands greater concentration iu tho North, Sea than was previously ncccssary. _ But this would bo a reason for regret that the needs of Imperial naval defence iu thb outer seas could not bo met, not that those needs should bo regarded as nonexistent. It is impossible, therefore, to resist a feeling of disappointment that tho action taken upon Admiralty advice and ivith Admiralty concurrence in 1909 is now stated by that same authority to bo based upon entirely wrong premises'.

Australia's tfaVal Sentiment. But, whatever may havo prompted this change of view, it is nccessary to emphasise that portion of tho 1909 memorandum which affirms that "other considerations than those of strategy alone must be taken into account." This is perfectly true. It cannot bo denied that, aiiito .apart from its immediate value as an addition to tho naval strength of tho Empiro, tho Australian fleet has enabled Australia to commence the training of the officers and men and the formation of an organisation on land as well as on sea | J for>'that greater fleet which, it may be predicted, • -will come with succeeding Repruiting has proceeded in [Australia to'an extent exceeding expectations, but it is q,uite certain that it would not have proceeded with the same rapidity if the vessels in which the men wero to servo bad been detailed for duty at tho other sido of the world; Again, the adoption of the present policy has done ranch to stimulate a healthy naval sentiment and a national Imperial consciousness in Australia, tho advantage of which cannot bo expressed in.-words. Tho potential value of .'these concomitants of tho Royal Australian Navy was fully recognised at the conference of 1909, and is now specifically reaffirmed by Mr. Churchill in the speech under review. In view of these considerations, Australia is _ enlifted to request from Mr. Churchill astatoment reconciling the Admiralty advice in 1909, that a Dominion desirous of creating a navy should aim at forming a distinct fleet linit, with his recent .statement.

Danger of Alliances. It is entirely satisfactory to' Australians that Mr. Churchill can speak so confidently as to the continuance of the alliance between Great Britain and Japan. Australians will join inoat heartily in tho hope that tho good understanding with that country will continue indefinitely. At tho same time, it is difficult to accept the existenco of that alliance as a reason for tho departure from the naval policy which Australia has adopted. Tho alliance covers the next few years. Australia's efforts to crea.te a fleet aro tho outcome of a very natural desiro to bo possessed of the peans of protecting herself, and assisting i)i the protection of Imperial interests in tho southern seas for all time. Tho pages of history are strewn with, the wreckage of fruitless alliances. In any case, tho present alliance may not be renewed after its termination; and it is vital, therefore, to British interests in tho Pacific that an effective nucleus should be created immediately, to meet any ftossiblo contingencies that may arise in tho future; If Australia is to wait until an emergency is actually upon her beforo addressing herself to the creation of suoh a nucleus, the opportunity wilj have gone. But, quite apart from the outcome of the Japanese alliance, it is conceivable that other contingencies may present themselves, rendoring it extremely desirable that in such an event Australia should not be entirely unprepared. ■ This preparation cannot, I repeat, be carried on if the more ant vessels of the Australian fleet are detailed for duty outside' Australian waters, such preparation covering both tho training of men for service afloat and dockyard and other 1 shore establishments. 'V- :' V , . '

Australia's promises. Kopt. . There is another aspect of tho' problem which it ris'impossible "to ignore now that the matter has becomo cue for pub-, lie discussion. Whether the agreement of 1909 was sound or not, it is obvious that it was an agreement—an agreement arrived at between' Australia and other dominions and Groat Britain. As.a result of this agreement." the Commonwealth committed itself to the creation and maintenance of a fleet unit, on tho understanding and in tho belief _ that Great Britain would place .two similar units in tlie Pacific, tho three units representing a joint force, capablo of cooperating in tho cffcctivo protection of British interests in these waters. Australia, having entered into that agreement, discharged its obligation in tlio anticipation that effect would ,bo given to other portions of* that agreement. For reasons which, no doubt, tno Admiralty regard as sound, that arrangement has been departed from; first, by tho transfer, of . tho New Zealand to: Europe, and next, by the.failure of Great Britain to provide the third similar vessel for service in the Pacific. Even if it bo admitted that this modification is warranted 1 by changing international factors, it is a matter for regret that Australia was not made aware of the modification when it first called for consideration, Tather,than after ifc became an accomnlished fact. Mr. Churchill's declaration of tho present attitude of tho Admiralty, both as regards the naval efforts or tno dominions and as to its intention in respect of the 1909 agreement, throws upon Australia the responsibility of most minutely analysing tho soverat considerations Upon which its naval policy is founded. That policy was designed to provide an Australian fleet, charged,primarily with the duty of aiding in tho protection of British interests in the Pacific, and relieving tho Hoyal Navy of tho exclusive task previously undertaken by it in these j waters."

Area of Operation. In stating the position in this way, it is not to bo inferred that the operations of tho Australian fleet' were to be limited exclusively. and ill .all circiimstancos to Australian waters. It was the Imperial aspect of'the Australian naval schema which' commended itself to a considerable section'of tho Australian people who had previously favoured tho contribution policy. Mr. Churchill in effect destroys. tho idea-of a joint Imperial fleet, of which tho Royal Australian Navy was to be part, working for common ends and discharging a common Imperial responsibility, and renders tho Royal Australian Navy an isolated force, tho very circumstance which Mr. Churchill himself condemns., It is inconceivable that Australia, should tlio occasion arise, will take a narrower Imperial view regarding her navnl.rosources than sho did with her military organisation. Indeed tho agreements made in 1909 and 1911 provide expressly for tho use of tho Australian vessels for general Imperial purposes in, timo of war or other emergency, and tho arrangements for co-operation with, and, if necessary control by, tho Admiralty in these circumstances havo recently been completed. But tho central idea was unquestionably that of an Australian section of an Imperial fleet, a section built by Australia, manned by Australians, interchangeable with and capable of being harmoniously merged in tlio Royal Navy, yet which, in normal times, ivould, nnd until its Governmentotherwise decided, bo based upon Australian ports, and consequently more immediately responsible for British interests ill Australian waters. It represented a policy the direct opposite 1 * of that of "contribution" which immediately preceded it. Mr. Churchill's speech, however, suggests a reversion to tlifi .discarded policy of, contribution. He makes no proposal in this regard; it is true, but with unmistakable emphasis he affirms tho desirability of Australian ships being dotailed for duty in Homo waters, or, as a less drastic change, that they should form part of

an Imperial squadron, presumably for service anywhere. In other words, wo are asked to revert to tho abandoned policy of contribution, tho only differonce being- in the form that contribution is to tako. Although tho Admiralty has apparently changed its views 011 this point ill tho fiyo years intervening between 1909 and 1914, there" is nothing to suggest .a corresponding change in Australian public opinion. If there has been a change'it has been in the direction of tho people of Australia becoming more unitod and more resolute in their attachment to the policy adopted fivo years ago. If this view is correct, and I hold it without any qualification, it is impossible that 3lr. Churchill's proposalfor the dispatch of Australia's battlecruisers to Home waters will bo entertained. Indeed, it is a 6afo prediction that neither of tho great political parties will, in existing circumstances, approve of such a vital departure from Australia's existing naval policy.

An Imperial Squadron. For the same reason tho suggested Imperial squadron would appear to be premature, even if its ultimate efficacy is established. That such a squadron may discharge highly useful purposes la tor on, and that m the course of time Australia may bo able to detail certain of its ships for service therewith, would appear to bo quite a reasonable anticipation. But Australia's first duty is to placo its fleet and the associated organisation upon a thoroughly sound foundation. Not until this has been accomplished is the suggested Imperial squadron likely to. appeal with any great force to Australian sentiment, nor, indeed, is its utility in the Southern Pacific calculated to be very great beforo the Royal Australian Navy is placed on a sound foundation. Tho number of vessels in the Australian fleot is not today more than sufficient, if indeed sufficient, to provide experience for the creation of that organisation without which, in time of war, a fleet would be worse than useless. This has a practical bearing on the efficiency of a British fleot dispatched to the Pacific ill time of emergency, a- contingency evidently present to Mr. Churchill's mind. The First Lord of the Admiralty contemplates the dispatch to the Pacific of capital ships whe/i tho necessity arises. It is open, to question whether it is desirable, in tlio interests of the Empire, to rely on the ability of the Admiralty to send to a sphoro of danger at least four or fivo weeks distant from Europe a powerful fleet in timo to meet any emergency that may arise. In any case, however, tho Australian naval „schemo provides an essential organisation and nucleus for such a fleet. Naval bases cannot be kept up to an adequate stato of efficiency unless they aro continually used by every type of vessel for which they are intended, and this applies also to tho . training of officers and men.

The Henderson Programmo, But even if it is taken for granted that the retention in time of peace of Australian ships in Pacific waters is to be maintained, another, and equally important, question is raised, by Mr. Churchill's utterance. That is as to the type of ship Australia ought to build. According to the First Lord of tho Admiralty, battle-cruisers are wasted in the Pacific. If this is so, then it will' be necessary to revise tho Henderson programme to the extent at least of substituting other .vessels for the battle-cruisers, for which tho programme makes provision. For the logical deduction from Mr. Churchill's speech is not only that our policy as to tho disposition of Australian ships should bo reversed, but that the Henderson programme should bo thrown into the melting-pot.

'•'' In this \coiinectipn' it-is instructive to refer to'.'the-details and'cost ; of tho building programme submitted by Admiral Fenderson. These contemplated the expenditure of £23,290,000 during the next; twenty years. Of this sum over £1G;000,000 would bo represented by' battle-cruisers. It appears, there-' for. that according to Admiralty advice, Australia is asked to appropriate twothirds of its naval expenditure upon vessels which are to be detailed for service in European waters. In his report Admiral Henderson urged that "continuity of policy was essential," arid that "tho "development of the Commonwealth naval forces must proceed oii defmito lines with a definite goal in view." No argument is required to support tho soundness of that contention. Yet almost ■' beforo the foundation of the policy inaugurated five years ago has been laid, we aro urged to'adopt modifications so radical as to amount 'virtually to its abandonment. In these circumstances thero irf little room for surprise if the simple faith with which Australia accepted tho Adtnjralty as .its guide on a former occasion should now givo place to hesitancy and some amazement at the pronouncement of the First Lord of tho Admiralty.

Necessity for a conference. One thing is clear. Matters cannot rest where they are, and the comploto change of . policy announced by the Admiralty must be discussed at tho conference table. One' of tho first things which tho present Government did upon assuming office was to cable • (in August last) to the Imperial Government, sug-. costing such a confcrence, and its views on this 'point were clearly indicated in tho following paragraph in tlio statement of policy submitted to Parliament in the early days of tho last session. "Questions arising out of the Imperial agreement, of 1909 which have an important bearing upon tho naval programmo of tho Commonwealth and Imperial interests in tho Pacific, suggest tho advisability of a conferenco at an early date. Communications on this matter are now being addressed to tho Imperial Government. Meanwhile tho proposals submitted in' Admiral Henderson's report will be generally adhered to." But though difficulties have interposed to defer the realisation of that proposal, tho need is more imperativo since Mr. Churchill has spoken. If, tho suggestion then raado by tho Commonwealth Government had been adopted, tho conference might have been held nt tho beginning of this year, and would thus havo avoided synchronising with times of political stress in both tho Mother Country and Australia. This would havo had tho further great advantago of placing tlio Imperial Government in _ possession of tho view of tho Dominions beforo Mr. Churchill's statement was made. In tho present conditions of politics hero an Australian Minister could not attend in London for somo timo. But it is patent from tho considerations to which I havo referred that that conferenco ought to bo held at tho very earliest possible moment, and, whichever Government is in power in Australia, there would seam to be no reason why it> should not bo summoned for, say, the early part of 1915. It can bo satisfactory 'neither to Australia nor to tho Empire that tho naval provision of the Commonwealth should apparently be based on principles-, and havo no definite aim or direction, and no clear placo in tho defence scheme of the Empire in common with other Imperial forces with which it is at present unrelated and unco-ordinatcd. Under tho 1909 agreement its purpose and function wero clearly defined. This is no longer the case. Conclusions. To sum up, Mr. Churchill's statement involves: — , (1) Tho definite non-fulfilment by tlio Admiralty of obligations undertaken by the 1909 agreement. (2) Tho destruction of the basis on which tho Roval Australian Navy was organised, arid as a result of which tho Australian people committed themselves to tho expenditure of soveral millions of public money. (3) Tho abandonment or those foa-

turos oT the Koyul Australian Navy which in 1!)U9 W'jro regarded by the Admiralty as moat essentia!, especially the expression of opinion that battle cruisers arc not needed in tho Pacific, and should bo sent to homo vat-firs;

(•1) The replacement of n definite ni-ter-Imperial co-opcrativo policy for tho naval tlefcnce of the I'ueiliß by an uncoordinated, ephemeral scheme posscsamg neither permaiicneo nor cleat aim aiiu function.

(o) Tho substitution of tho scheme of n powerful joint ImpeViat licet in the Pacific by ineffective isolated units. (6) All interpretation of the effect of tho Anglo-Japanese Alliance which is not accepted in Australia as justified by tho circumstances, and, if adopted by tlio Imperial authorities in cither 1909 or 1911, might have- involved a serious modification of tho scheme recommended in those yenrs by tlio Admiralty for acceptance by tho Dominions.

(7) The ignoring of those "other considerations, which aro so important from the wider Imperial point ©If now, and on which tlio Admiralty laid so much stress in 1909.

(8) The announcement of a vital departure 'in many important mpecte from a policy agreed upon between tho Dominions and tho Imperial Government, without any previous consultation with, or even preliminary notification to tho Governments of the Dominions.

' Australia is irrevocably pledged to, and will pursue with determination (tad consistency tlio policy oil. which she en> barked on the. advice of tho Imperial Government five years ago. She mil not bo deflected from her -course by tho pronouncement of. tho First Lord .of tho Admiralty, for she regards tho task wliiclt sTie has undertaken aa vital to tho cause of. Imperial.defence and Imperial union, and an essential safeguard for her own protection.