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BRITISH FIGHTING SHIPS.

FIRST LORD REVIEWS THE POSITION. < GERMANY WATCHED THE MEDITERRANEAN BATTLESHIP SQUADRON. GUARDING THE PACIFIC. ~* ./ By Teleeraoh—Press AfijoelaHan-tioDrriehl (Rec. March IS, 10 p.m.) ■UtVtiofi, March 18. Speaking in Committee on I '.e Naval Estimates, Mr. Winston C~*-' '.11 (First Lord of the Admiralty) salSTiliat the Admiralty's policy as ekpkincd in 1912 had not heeu changed. There was onethird more horse-power in the fleet than in 1912. The 15-inch gun, continued the speaker, was the' best tho Navy over had. It was most accurate at nil ranges, and would he csceptinnally ionslived. Ten vessels would he armed with these Rims wheu tho next nnval i'owcr two. The Adniiralt.v desired tu complete eight squadrons before the next strongest Power' completed its ganisation. German development was. less rapid than anticipated m 1912. Three Ger-' man squadrons vforo heiug comph't"d by the end of 1914, bat, owing 16 planning difficulties, tlra second wou'ld be reduced by three ships temporarily. Britain had therefore postponed "tlio com-.j plotion of its fourth -squadron. Ever} , delay on Germaiiy's part wsts lieingj watched, our organisation bsing only ' completed as needed. ■ Mr. Churchill anticipated that next year Great Britain's Estimates would] bo substantially below those, for 1914. The Admiralty would piafe eight Dreadl'Oiislits, in the Mcditci'rattcjiiu at the end of 1915. Two ships <if the 1914. programme would he hastened to compensate the delay oi' Canada icgardins the Pacific fleet. , ' , In the Paßlfic, -■ Mr. Chiirchill pointed out that tli-c Japanese Allianeo secured the safety of Australia and New Zealand. !'»■; situation, in the Pacifte would be absolutely regulated by the position in European, waters. -TJis Admiralty -hud cooperated loyally in-the development of tho Australian fleet. The Doniinions would' be afforded appofitinity for individual 10-cal development, which was nocressary .to maintain a keen naval interest »)id procure tho sacrifices which, were necessary to tho development oj their naval power. . Owing to trade conditions (eonliistied Mr. Churchill), there was some likelihood of many of the vessels being com■l.ileted in 1914 without aeeotofiititig or spceding-up. If war broke out to-mor-row, every ship Wuld be scat to sea fully equipped.. In future, Ik-iiteuants with eigiit years' service would he termed lieutenant-ponimanders; Seventy merchantmen would be armed by. the end of 1914.

The speaker'.declared with emptasis that Great Britain wmld remain tlio iu-der-endent 'guardian of her Mediterranean interests. The Government was iifrt unhopeful', that Caluufc waalil meet her share in naval defefico. While Igpan was allied to Groat 'Britain, and Bri-. tain possessed a travel saperiority, Jni?an was safe from attaeks by Hie great fleets of .Europe. "lit..iso.:other way, in tho .•years-immediately before" ns', citu Japan adequately protect herself," said the, speaker. The growth of -European interests in China, and the dcw?topnwit of European navies on p, jxreater than Japan can afford, wontcT increase her reliance on Great- Britain. Our obligations to Japaii provide against sjiy increase in European sQluittrons in the Far East. - . . ' '

Mr. Churchill contended thai, tho Gevornment had given full effect to the ISO 9 naval agreement, although they, weje hot doing in ' the same way, 'Mwy were keeping the battleships in Hohus waters, where alotte tltey would meet their equals. They hud seat the SwiTtsure and Triumph- to the China and In* dian stations, which was 'sufficient, nnd an improvement in the mere duirfiontdo-n of the Australian unit.

Japanese Pojicy, There was no reason to suppose tli-ai, Japan would need. EjiglaiKj's iriejj.dshj.p less after the expiry of the atliiineo in 1921. The bond between -Japan and Britain would moan the effective p-rotec* tion of Australasia, That bond ctepeiided entirely on the maintoi-uui.oe of British naval supremacy. Tliere ivero n.o means whereby, ill tlio next doxeu years, Australasia could maintain itself singlehanded. If Britain's power were shattered, the only course then' opoi.i to the whites in the Pacific would be to seek the .protection <jf t!« United States, From this point of view , , tho profound wisdom of the policy which had hitherto been adopted (sould he appreciated, It provided the mast effective way to their own, and to the eoninton security.

the Admiralty, he added, was bound to uphold the broad principles of unity of command, and concentration,,-- in the decisive theatre, aijd regarded tins effort of the Commonwealth ii.s bernic- "We will leave nothing Uridoiifl to assist them."

"Sound arrangements liaye been, madeby U3_for the Cwnmontt'cftlth's fleet iu war time, ',I'ho Oovenlraent has' Used tho impoi'tanco of creating a naval sentiment in tlte Dominions, and had therefore advocated tlw c-fftation of-an Imperial squadron." He urged the importance of naval stations and dock repair plants in Canadian, and South African waters, defended by local destroyers and submarines. This svotild help to arouse a local interest.

Tliougli tho Government believed that the foundations of peaco a.nioiifsst the great Powers had been strengthened, yet the causes which might lead to a general war 'had not J»e-n removed. There was not the ■slightest abatement of naval and military preparation, and attempts to arrest that had been ineffectual. Tlio Admiralty's responsibilities camo homo with brutal reality. Unless Britain's strenpjt-h a.nd solidarity were unswervingly nia-intaittO-i!, the Government -.vould not in doing its duty. .

Mr. A. H. Leo (Conservative) charged 1 the Government with failing tn keep its promises in regard to the CO per cent, vstauclard.

They would be* tiir-co short in Heme waters during the suminor, four in 1015, two in 1916, and nl&o tort cmspletcly failed to carry out the MctJiterranean pledges.

When the Navy -Estimates for ISI2-W3 were published, with the" First; lord's Explanatory Memorandum, tl>e Jatt*r whs mefaced with (he Wloffiujf neb?-.—-"These Estimates have been framed on the a* sumption that, the existing projrrammiis «if other naval Powers will net be incronswl, Tn the event of swell increases, it will be necessary to present Sunplemicnteiry Estimates'both for men'and rnonev." In a .subsequent sncecti, Mr. Chureliitl spote of Ilio iiof.sibili(,r of pwspiiting i« IHIS lo the House oC roniHMins the Kstiinatcs not of one year, but of n series of vrars. He showed' Hint mnvfi the tw-Power slamlanl was first: odopfwl it. Iwil lo.«t its npnlication. A convpnifii'l ruin when I he two next strongest IV.wers Were France and Htissla, the stsiiiflas'd wo-hW now. if applied to Europe al«ue, lie inapplicable lrccmise .inuclcnnato. Therefore, "the actual Standard ef new construction which the .Admiralty has in fact followed during recent Tears hiw teeii to develop a GO per Mjit. superiority in vessels of the Dreadnought type over the

German Navy, ob the basis of an existing fleet lav." If that law wore fldIrereil to this standard, in the absence oi unexpected developments bv othtt countries (said Sir. Churchill), would continue to !re a convenient guide for the next 'four or five year*. But if Ums_ Admiralty were confronted with an addition of two slii]is te the German programme in the ii<?xl; six years, they i>ropasNl to meet tfifi addition upon a bisher ratio of superiority by laving down tour ships !in the same "period. If tho addition was three shins within the six years, tb,'; Admiralty would meet it by layiris down six ships. Thus tho prospective programmes for the six y-ears from 3912-1913 (inclusive) were, in tlx? case of no German additions, four ships and throe ships in alternate vearft; in the case ef; two additional Gerntan vessels, fo'.ir ships t» the first year, five in the second, and four in each of tlie last four years; ana in the cf.se of three additional Gel-man, vessels, alternative yearly programme* of I fives and fours, as agrniiist the German I. alternation of threes and t«o.=. As to fthp existing situation: "The Admiralty are prepnreil to siiarmitec absolutely tfte main seeiirity of the conatrV and of the Bmpire day by clay for the next few year.;." j

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19140319.2.41

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2011, 19 March 1914, Page 5

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,282

BRITISH FIGHTING SHIPS. Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2011, 19 March 1914, Page 5

BRITISH FIGHTING SHIPS. Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2011, 19 March 1914, Page 5

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