The Dominion. FRIDAY, JANUARY 23, 1914. THE NEW MONROE DOCTRINE.

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 1965, 23 January 1914, Page 6

The Dominion. FRIDAY, JANUARY 23, 1914. THE NEW MONROE DOCTRINE.

The new foreign policy of the United States, as expounded by President Woobrow Wilson, appears to embody elements which cannot well be reconciled. On the one hand the Government of the United States is demanding an amplified recognition by Europt?an Powers of its supreme authority in the domain of Latin American politics, and on the other it is showing a disposition to cast off sonic of the responsibilities of control which it has accepted in the past as an offset to the vecognition of its authority by European States. When President Wilson declared in an address at Mobile in October last that it was the duty of the United States to emancipate the South American republics from the material influences of foreign countries, the statement, provoked surprise rather than dissent, arid his speech was praised for its fine idealism, although doubts were expressed as to whether his views would work out in practice. Events in Mexico have since made the position very much plainer, and it is now'widely accepted that it is the policy of the United States to leave the Latin republics to get along without outside aid and maintain internal order as best they can. This involves a decided reversal of policy, and it very materially affects the position of foreigners who have settled or have invested capital in South and Central America. The world at large is not likely to quarrel with President Wilson's declaration that the United States seeks no more territory and will never try to secure an additional foot by conquest, but his policy of non-interference opens up a possibility that other Powers may offer to assume the duty of protecting investors and foreign residents which the United States apparently proposes to lay down. Past experience of the Latin republics does not suggest that they are fit subjects for the application of the principle of letting well alone. Non-interference in their ease would be rather a matter of leaving ill alone, and any weakening or withdrawal of the control which the United States has hitherto exercised on its own account and that of other Powers, would presumably tend to destroy the, qualified security that now exists. One consideration advanced by those who support President....Wilson's policy is that commercial concessions in the republics, and in some cases their treasuries and the machinery of government, have at times been exploited by unscrupulous adventurers. On the other hand, it , is not disputed that the republics have attracted numerous European.settlers and a host of legitimate investors, who have conducted their enterprises on such lines as would secure .them the full protection of the law in any really civilised country. President Wilson's idealistic aspirations of self-regeneration for tlw turbulent Latin republics will bring email comfort to investor!! of this claes* and. as little to Americas .and £u«mean citizens who have established. them-

;Ee!ves!ini?t; s§;Jn^paji^ ;; ycarsyt':h;is)iwn'gene'rAlly' ;rccognisc_d/ % 'Monroe" L)6ctriric;impbscdSu'po)v'the :United IStatcsfthc ;dutyToFinterven■irig|,in: support vvher!;;Xorcignfcapitalists,?'Aiiiericaiis .and■others,i:invest<?d*;.funds ; -in" South -ing' victimisccl,v.byjJiheymposition ; of' exorbitant taxation oribyi-the■' nonentered FrequontlywthcJ.Amencaii.'AGovcvnnietit was.;.called' upon.; in/.such cases ■'. to become'.a collccting'agenf.for claims originating,Mipt only, in 'the- United States,^.but?in" , oth«-.'countries, .and it showed. na'",-.disincUnation to carrv Out this'taskS' 1 The, new.'.intcrprctaiiori. of,. thc.-.MoNROE Doctrine seems to.be, according , t0 , .;.0ne. authority, ■"that the .United States shall refrain from any such interference \vith the autonomy ,oi;ydomestic .concerns , 'of South.American nations; , , that it ■ shall..-expect: v Comments to do .likewise, , , their aid, how:in;.'a]lj cases'.where s a' exists, for the purpose- o^ sustainino; .elements making ;f° r , law.and order, :, and when stable established, refiwiving such elements to make good the. losses .incurred . by foreigners through aggressions resulting in the actual .destruction of property dnr-ine.-the period.of disorder.":- This is the interpretation'-of ; .a-.* , friendly critic (the Washington ■■■ correspondent of the Economist); who takes a:hopeful ■ vicw..of : . Presidekt Wilson's, innovation, , but- the actual ex : ample of. Moxicq'lends no."support to ,, his somewhat optimistic'' estimate of the new;- , policy .and .its probable operation.-•■ On- the contrary, it suggeststhat an'essential feature of the policy is.to'leave investors to sink .'or.swim,'unaided, in the maelstrom of Latin, American-politics ., .Investors, in.;the.United States and elsewhere,,; who , -have-interests in South and Central America, are reported to bo seriously perturbed, and under the circumstances this is not t<s be wondered at, ■■ The tolerant- attitude of the British Government towards the new policy of the- United States is. presumably to be attributed to its general 'desire , -'to , , maintain AngloAmerican relations on their present friendly footing. Even so, this attitude- seems somewhat remarkable, in view of the fact that British capital has been largely invested in the . Latin republics. Germany and other .European Powers are believed to regard the situation with great distaste, and it is also suggested that they consider > lr.to developments as :indicating too strong a tendency to establish an ■ : undertaking between the,JJnited States and Great Britain, and'consequently as prejudicial, to the interests of rival Powers.

'. In America itself, President Wilson's policy seems to have met with a certain amount_ of approval, but, [apart from. the investment groups who object to their interests being sacrificed, , , there are not wanting critics who denounce tho weakness of the policy, and contend that the United States has a distinct mission of control and domination where the Latin republics are concerned. President Wilson and the supporters of his policy are -no doubt actuated by an'honest hope that the republics will work out? their cwn->sah>>ition if given a chancy to do so, b'uftho past history of these restless nations does not. encourage a belief that the hope Ms -'likely toybe>»rcnlisccl.- -'-A. , number ' of them are so frequently, in a state of violent upheaval and transition ihafc anything like an appeal to the public conscience, where they are concerned, would be quite futile. They are, however, in a position to derive great benefits from the- importation of foreign capital and from an infusion of the commercial enterprise in which their native populations are generally lacking. These benefits have been conferred to a largo extent in the past, but it is difficult to see how they can be continued if investors are, in effect, to be thrown to the_ wolves. Some of the larger republics may be capable of realising that if they wish to secure the benefits incidental to commercial enterprise and development they must provide nnd maintain guarantees of security from victimisation and aggression, but no such enlightened-outlook can reasonably be expected of States which are continually passing from one violent political convulsion to another, and in which the niter of to-day is the proscribed outlaw of to-morrow. To reduce international intervention to a, minimum in the case of countries falling within this category will presumably have no other result than to accentuate' the disabilities under which they now labour. Legitimate commercial enterprise by foreign capitalists will be debarred, and the only investment enterprise possible will be of the Undesirable type whieh works hand in hand with political adventuring. It remains to be seen whether the anxiety of the United States to minimise its external responsibilities can be_ reconciled with the continued assertion and amplification of the Monroe Doctrine. Even should Great Britain accept the position, as she apparently intends to do, it is improbable that the European Powers will consent, without protest, to let the Latin American republics, and the foreign interests involved, become a prey to disorders whieh intervention might minimise or avert. .-.-.