The Dominion. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1913. NAVAL POLICY—AN UNTIMELY SUGGESTION.

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 1886, 21 October 1913, Page 6

The Dominion. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1913. NAVAL POLICY—AN UNTIMELY SUGGESTION.

: The revival of the naval holiday, proposal by Me. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, is not likely to be taken any moro seriously than it-was when put forward on a previous occasion. In spite of Mu. Churchill's periodical assurances that there has been no falling away in Britain's margin, of naval supremacy, there is a widor spread feeling in Britain that the rate of construction is not adequate to meet the building programmes of other Powers. It is true that there has been a speeding up recently, but it has not been sufficient to make up the leeway caused by previous slackening! off which was permitted in order to conciliate "some trusted Liberals" who were "disquieted about the expense ■ of the Navy." This wavering policy proved to be a dangerous one, and even Me. Lloyd-George recently admitted that in view of the naval and military activity of other nations it was useless for the taxpayer to expect any decrease in the annual Navy | vote. He deplored the fact, but could not shut his eyes to its truth j or take the responsibility of ignoring it. An, effective naval, programmo cannot be confined to a single year. It has to be spread over a number of years, a certain amount of construction being allotted to each twelvo monthly period. Any slowing down necessarily' involves a greater strain later on, and fends to disorganise the whole scheme. The critics of the Imperial Government contend that the existing programme has , not been consistently carried out, and that, as a result, a satisfactory margin of supremacy has not been maintained. No one could have stated what ought to bo done better than Mr. Churchill did last year, when, he declared that "we ought to learn from oiir German neighbours, whose policy marches unswervingly towards its goal across the lifetime of a wholo generation." He went on to lay down as general principles: (1) Thatwe must have an ample margin ■ of strength instantly ready; and, (2) that there must be a steady and systematic development of our naval forces untiringly pursued over a number of years. These principles aro excellent, but, unfortunately, Lord Selborne has only too much justification for his assertion, in the Empire Review, that the "unswervingly" of tho British Government bears much the same comparison to the "unswervingly" of the German Government as a roll of putty does to a bar of steel. What is the use of appealing to tho German Government for a naval holiday? The last time Mh. _ Churchill made a similar suggestion the Kaiser and his advisers listened very politely, but instead of a slackening off therewas a speeding up in German shipbuilding, and the German naval policy continued to march "unswervingly towards its goal." Germany has a perfect right to pJeaso herself as regards expenditure on her navy; and it is the business of the British Government to take effective measures to meet the situation, and to see that its naval programme is sufficient to maintain the requisite margin of superiority. Pleadings for a naval holiday, however well meant, are more likely to create tho idea that Britain is weakening in her naval policy than to convert her neighbours to saner ideas on naval expenditure.. The Overseas Dominions are now beginning to shoulder a larger sharo of the burden, but it is most undesirable that this fact should be used by the Home Government as an excuse for any slackness in carrying out its own programmo. Tho Dominions and tho Mother Country acting in concert are quite able to keep pace with whatever Germany may do. The Germans are no doubt a great people, but they aro already feeling the strain of the enormous growth of their armaments on land and sea, and the limit must eventually be reached. It is generally understood that 1915 and 191G will be the critical years from tho naval point of view; but there seems to be a difference of opinion between tho Imperial Government and its critics as to what will bo the relative positions of the British' and German navies when that time arrives. Will the 60 per cent, margin of superiority laid down by the Asquitu Government itself be maintained? Lord S;-;l----doisne contends that it will not. He uta.tos that .at tho end of 1D1& the

German Dreadnought battleships and battler-cruisers will number 26, and Britain has only made provision for 39, whereas ->2 would be necessary to provide for the CO per cent, margin. The Government started the present year three short of the number set out in their programme, and this leeway has not yet been made up. In considering what will bo the position of 1915-16, Lord Seijiokne writes: —

' The' basis 1 take for my statement Is ' tho assumption that all the ships of this year's programme will have been completed and in commission by tho end of 1915—that is quite as much as they possibly can. be—and also that tho corresponding German ships will have been completed and, come into commission, i also take as my basis tho correctness of Jlr. Churchill's statement that in tho year 1915 two members of the Triple Alliance, Austria and Italy, will possess a. fleet of ten Dreadnought battleships ill tho Mediterranean. What will then bo our position? Germany will havo 28 6hips of the Dreadnought type in the North Sea. In order to maintain our 50 per cent, margin over that tho necessity for which Mr. Churchill has insisted again and again, supported, so far as wo knoiv, by all the members of tho Government—wo shall have to station iu these home waters every single Dreadnought battleship or battle-cruiser built by the Admiralty and paid for by the British taxpayer, and that will give us 39 to Germany's 2G, and there will bo no 10 per cent, margin, no margin whatever, for the Mediterranean or for any other part of the world of ships of that type built and paid for by the British taxpayer. But at that moment tho Austrian and Italian fleets will havo reached that strength when Mr. Churchill says in his Memorandum that the British forces in the Mediterranean rmist be reconstructed. In 1913 and 19H he remains content with four battle-cruisers and four armoured cruisers as our squadron in the Mediterranean. I <!o not think, and never have thought, that force sufficient, even in the years 1913 and 1914. But he himself lays it down in tho most positive manner that in 1515 that force will have to bo reconstructed in order to meet the ten Dreadnought battleships of the Triple Alliance in tho Mediterranean, but he will not have one single British-built Dreadnought battleship or battle-cruiser station there, not one, and he will have to fall back on two ships, and two ships only-the Malaya, and the New Zealand, tho one paid for by the Malay States and tho other by the taxpayers of New Zealand. ... And in the whole of tho rest of the Empire . , . there will be one solitary ship of tho Dreadnought type, tho Australia, another Dominion ship, which in time of peace will bs tied to Australian waters.

Taking all these facts into consideration, the present moment appears to bo. a most unsuitable time to be talking about a naval holiday. It is the duty of the Imperial authorities to do their utmost to mako up for past neglect by pushing on with increased energy in the work of battleship building. The policy of delay followed by an occasional spurt can never be satisfactory, for it throws the wholo scheme out of gear, and exhibits a spirit of indecision which must have a bad moral effect. Mr, Churchill himself seems to feel that it would be inopportune to give effect to his holiday suggestion in 1914, and most people will probably bo of opinion that it will bo early enough to think of any such negotiations when the Government has "unswervingly" carried out its promise to see that Britain has her CO per cent, margin at the end of 1915. Judging by tho ■ sarcastic comments of the German press on Lord Haldane's recent reference to the growth of tho spirit of concord among the. nations, Mr. Churchill is not likely to receive a very encouraging response from that quarter. One Berlin paper declares that idealism, or the growth of international morality, has nothing to do with the policy of the Powers, and states that to read into the recent disinclination for war a desire among the nations for more fraternal relations "is Lord Hal- ' Dane's peculiar and exclusive merit." Tho same paper significantly asks Britain to set an example of altruism by offering Germany some of her colonies. In view of these and other facts, it would seem to be.rather unfortunate that Mr. Churchill should, at the present stage, show any inclination" of departing from the excellent principle previously laid down by himself of maintaining "a steady and systematic development ■ of our naval forces untiringly pursued over a number of years."