WHERE THE CAMEL CORPS FELL.

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 1879, 13 October 1913, Page 5

WHERE THE CAMEL CORPS FELL.

SCENE OF THE SOMALI FIGHT.

There is no worse campaigning in the' world than in Somaliland, a place of sand and scrub and stones (writes Mr. lovat leaser in tho "Observer"). Most of tho supplies lnwo to be taken thithor from,, overseas. There are no rivers, mid wells arc infrequent and often bad. It is no placo for British soldiers iu largo numbers. Tho Indian troops hate tho country, and it is most difficult to maintain them there, Tho Somali levies are used to the local conditions, but are uncertain when in action. The only troops which flourish t'hero arc tho African regiments from other Protectorates. We bavO' done our best with 7000 men, but if wo .sent 20,000 there wo should probably fail., to bring the Mullah to book. The Mullah has no city which can"be captured, and no country which can bo seized., He lives in a camp several miles square, which ho can move at will. Ho can march far moro rapidly than wo can. If ho bolts into Italian territory tho Italians, whoso Somaliland Protectorate is little moro than a name, will not attack him. Wo have followed him there three times, with ' no permanent result. Tho Abyssiniaiis l'ought liim once, and killed 2600 of his followers, but ilw> soon recovered, and .at Adis Adeba they have no desire to repeat , the experiment. We cannot make ternis with him, for even if wo send him conciiiatury letters he .merely murders our messengers. His lieutenants have fought us in one pitched battle, but they will not do so again, and they can always evade us.

Wo hnvo two objects to serve—the pro- _ serration of our interests and the preservation of our honour. Our interests arc safe if we stick to Borbera and Zeila and leave the interior alone. In Italian Somaliland such- a course is taken without detriment or risk to the interests of Italy.' We should take our chance of the revival of the Mullah's activities affecting ..tho populace in our other African possessions. 1 • We are bound to take our chalice, because; wo cannot strike at him. The only re- > maiiiing question is that of honour QNJ*' our pledges., "but if our Imperial tram.tions mean anything, at njl, f ' las bocomo , tl lo greatest question of all. It is holdover, a matter which must bo looked at in tho light of common sense. As has been shown, apart from tho friendly tribes, wo have no object to gain in entering the interior now. Wo never meant to develop Somaliland, and t'no limited pnrposo wo had in v;ow is already attained. Even an Empire should liavo a • practical business basis. Wo cannot liojie to protect the friendly tribes in their nomadic wanderings. We cannot smash, tho Mullah, except at a prohibitive cost, and if ho continues to bolt to other terytory when pressed, we cannot dispose or. hini by any outlay whatever. All .that, seems practicable is to offer the friendly tribes efficient shelter near the coast, ami maintain them there until tho Mul-lali's power grows weaker. The expedient sounds clumsy, bull 110 better alternative is in sight. Wo made our first mistake when wo went into the interior at all r am! our second when we thought minor • expeditions could supnress tho Mullah; ■ m but our greatest mistake has been in try-' ing to. help the "frieudlic.s" -with a few, cavalry at tho cost of a few pounds.