The Dominion. MONDAY, JUNE 2, 1913. INVASION OF BRITAIN.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1765, 2 June 1913, Page 4

The Dominion. MONDAY, JUNE 2, 1913. INVASION OF BRITAIN.

In one of the old English dramas an eldftrly and nervous upholsterer is represented as sitting up night after night consumed with anxiety concerning the safety of England. Tho enemy was about to desccnd upon tho land. Then, as now, there were in certain quarters fears, vague and undofinablo, of coming disasters. That was about what might be termed tho martello period, when tho Government, yielding to the popular clamour, spent millions of pounds in erecting fortifications round the coasts to prevent tho landing of foreign troops. Conspicuous among the fortifications were tho 'martellos, small round forts built on the ooast and containing a bell which, to give the alarm, had to be furiously beaten with a hammer. This plan of defence, it is somewhat curious to learn, was "greatly in favour" with the military men of the time. The duty fell upon a famous civilian member of Parliament, Richard Cobden, of pointing out that thoiigh the coasts of Britain were lined with martellos, and bristled with arms, no effective purpose would be served, once England lost command of the sea. With the ocean highways closed to her, Britain would be helpless,in spite of impregnable fortresses and tho best-equipped army in the world. Tho enemy would simply wait and leave starvation to achieve the victory. The era of coast fortifications to alone repel invaders is past as far as concerns Great Britain. It is upon the naval arm that chief reliance is now placed, and the world has had fully demonstrated before it that it is upon her navy that Great Britain relies. There is to-day no cause for the old fear that the fleet may be decoyed away and the coasts left defenceless to the enemy. The first line oonsiats of the sea-going fleets—the Homo fleet and the Atlantic fleet—consisting of battleships and cruisers and auxiliaries. In addition, there is a system of mobile defence on the cast coast which is always present, stretching practically from tno Orkney Islands in the north to Dover in the south, and round the Channel to Portsmouth and Devonport, A Dundee newspaper recently published an interesting description of how tho ca-st coast ofi Scotland has been,, or is about to be, rendered impregnable. Instead of towers and bells and steep ramparts with cannon, the means of present-day defence take the form principally of flotillas of destroyers, gunboats, and submarines, assisted by aeroplanes. In tho Far North, at Scapa Flow, in the Orkney Islands, is a naval base, an area of water ten miles by eight, well sheltered and excellently adapted as a rendezvous for big naval squadrons. At Montrose, on tho Forfarshire coast, and at Port Laing, on tho Firth of Forth, "air-ports" have been established. Three naval aeroplanes, a month ago, wcro stationed at the latter port, and six were then expected daily to reaoh tho northern town. Kirkwall, in the Orkneys, Aberdeen, and Dundee are to become permanent destroyer stations, and, further south is the great naval base and dockyard at Rpsyth, on the Firth of Forth., In addition, garrisons at coast towns have been strengthened, and forta rearmed with the latest weapons. All the towns on the east coast of Scotland have, in brief, been closely linked together to form one solid chain which ofters\a practically solid front to any invading Power. Fleets and regiments will be so stationed that a sufficient number can concentrate at any given point, without delay, and prevent an enemy landing. .The writer of the article in tho Dundee newspaper tells what would happen in the event of an enemy appearing:

Take the example of a threatened landing in Arbroath. In two hours twelve Dundee submarines and twelve destroyers will be on tho scene, in four the battle fleet from the Forth, and in six the Aberdoen flotilla, and every regiment within a hundred miles will be concentrated at tho striking .point. The Montrose aeroplanes, too, will not bo idle. They will be rushed to the spot as fast as their high speed will take them, and, with the accuracy which has been demonstrated is possible, will be loosening their terrible engines of death and destruction among tho ranks of tho foe. By this means will Scotland protect herself. Even if this attack should prove to bo only a feint or a ruse to attract attention from tho principal point of offence, the equipment, establishment, and organisation of the other centres will suffice to hold the enemy in check until tho main body can bo concentrated.

The system of defence adopted for the east coast of Scotland is, in effect, the same as that established' to near the western extremity of the English Channel. In the neighbourhood of the Thames, Portsmouth and other places where the fleet is always more or less in evidence, the system naturally is different. Everywhere, however, the rules appear to be: Nb precaution omitted, no weak or broken links in tho chain of defence.

While all may rest assured that the defenders and people of Great Britain will never be completely taken by surprise by the attack of an adroit enemy, the one and great question remains unanswered. That question is: Is it possible to land '200,000 of the enemy's troops upon English soil 1 Lord Roberts— who is not a naval authority—is one of those who discern little difficulty in accomplishing the feat. He tliinks that five of the largest German liners would suffice to transport 70,000 troops across the North Sea, and adds tfiat there are a dozen German ships that, between them, could carry nearly 200,000 men at 20 knots an hour. Slit Arthur Wii,son\ early in his career as First Naval Lord, expressed his conviction that, excepting most unprecedented mishaps, an invasion of Great Britain, with the British Navy as it, even then, existed, was practically an impossibility. All the ships operating in _ Home waters, he reminded a mooting addressed bv him, whether they were in the North Sea, or Channel, or elsewhere, wore in wireless communica-

tion with tho Admiralty, and with tho Commander-in-Chief. Were a fleet o£ transports sighted anywhere by a single cruiser, or oven by a merchant ship fitted with wireless, all ships which happened to be in a position to intercept the transports would at once get tho order to concentrate for the purpose, whether they wcrc_ at sea or in harbour. "Even supposing that by somo extraordinary lucky chance," said the I 1 irst, Sea Lord, "tho transports were able to reach the coast without being detected, their presence must be known when they arrived there; and long before half the troops could bo landed the transports would be attacked and sunk by the submarines which are stationed along the coast for that purpose." Sir Arthur Wilson's opinions, as thus expressed, are the opinions held in naval circles at the present time. The systems of sea and coast defence appear to be as perfect as scientific knowledge and practical experience can suggest. It is because of this sense of security that Lord Roberts has had such a desperately hard uphill fight to win over the British public to his views on the subject of universal military training. It is a remarkable tribute to the position which the veteran soldier-statesman holds in the eyes of the people of Britain that he has, in faro of such a formidable handicap, succeeded in carrying conviction to so large a section of the public that the course lie advocates is essential to the future welfaro of the nation. It is doubtful whether Lord Roberts will live to see his proposals carried into effect—but that his advocacy will not be without some definite results in the direction of strengthening Britain against' the risk of invasion may already be regarded as certain.