SICK OF WAITING.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1755, 21 May 1913, Page 8

SICK OF WAITING.

D BATTERY.

CRACK CORPS DISCONTENTED. OFFICIAL NEGLECT.. I'or some time past considerable dissatisfaction has existed amongst the officers ami men of D Battery over th-e way in which, it is stated, they have been neglected by tlie military authorities in connection with the Battery's armament. Before the new defence scheme came into operation, D Battery was tho crack field artillery corps in the Dominion. In 1010 th's corps won tlie New Zealand Artillery Efficiency Shield nnd the Rhodes Cup for 15-pounder field gunnery under activo service conditions. It is now. practically speaking, a back number. This dissatisfaction has recently been investigated by a member of Tun Dominion staff, anil what follows fnay bo regarded as a representative survey of the position of tho Wellington Artillery Brigade from tho Territorial soldier's point of view.

Obsolete Mountain Gur.s, In the old scheme of things there were five field batteries in New Zealand, one at each of tlie four principal centres and one at Nelson. Their armament, was tho old 15-potinder quick-firer. With the introduction of tho new defence scheme came a change in Hie policy of the military authorities, with regard to the field artillery corps, and amongst other things D Battery was converted into a Mountain Artillery Corps, with four guns, and mule lransnort. At the same time an artillery establishment was croatal at Nanier, and another at Palmerston North, and to meet the requirements of training in other centres the old 15-pounder guns were taken away from D Battery, which then sat down to wait for its new mountain guns. The mountain guns duly arrived— it is not yet possible in these days of rapid doings to cable for puns and net them out by the next mail—and when they did arrive they v.'cr* discovered to b? obsolete. They remained in Nov; Zealand foivsome time, while the men of D Battery familiarised themselves villi gilns which were destined never to be fired, for they wero finally sent back, a purchaser liavins beer, found for them somowhero in the Balkans.

So the thirteen odd mules which tho Department had succeeded in gathering together for instruction purposes in the training of the mountain artillery were turned out to crass, and once more 'the gunners of D Battery sat down to wait for their armament. By and by two of their old 15-pounders found their way back to 'tho Artillery Drillshcd in BuAlo Street, and that is the present, stato of affairs. They hays no horses—these havo pone eleswhere—e-r.d ihe guns are only used for indoor instruction. The other day a fine new howitzer batten- passed by, en route for Palmerston. Tho predicament of D Battery may well be' likened to Tennyson's brook, slightly modified— "guns may come, and guns may go, but we sit here for ever, apparently.

Grounds for Criticism. No doubt the general staff at headquarters—which means the General Officer Commanding—knows what it is nhouf, but there is in the Garrison Hall a fair number of officers who respectfully kg to differ, and «i very material points, supported by cogent reasons. From the. general body of opinion certain points may be taken'as affording ground for criticising the policy of General Headquarters orb tho question of tlte artillery corps. In the first place, tho personnel of a mountain artillery corps must consist of .specially picke<l men as regards physique, for tho handling of the guns, the loading up of the mules calls for more than tho strength of average men. That has been demonstrated in the experience of the Imperial authorities. Secondly, it lias Wen found, in the same region of experience, that it takes about six years to raako an efficient gunner—of the AV class. Gunnery is a specialised and highly technical subject, and mountain gunnery is the most arduous and complicated branch of artillery work. Taking these fncts into consideration, and also noting the period of training required for the territorial gunner, suggestion of critics that the mountain battery should be established withimthn Permanent Force seems to have reason behind it.

What Should be Done. In Palinerston itorl.li, where tho new howitzers have gone, they can't Ret enough men for the battery, let alone officers—the Howitzer Battery '.is commanded by a territorial officer of subaltern rank, and less than two years' artillery service! The famo difficulty obtains at Napier, moTe or less. In Wellington there are more applications for places in D Battery. than tho establishment will allow—th» whole of the Wellington Field Artillery Brigade conld b9 recruited in the city without any difficulty. There aro plenty of experienced and highly-trained officers, and numbers of seasoned non-coms. . At least two batteries cowld easily be established, while tho Palmerston and Napier batteries could bo converted into infantry or mounted rifles. Tin? question that is put forward is this: Whether it would be better to thoroughly train the artillery brigade in Wellington city by reorganising the establishment or only half ir-airi the gunners, as in the case at present? Suppose the brigade wcro recruited and trained in Wellington., and efficiently trained—field Kilns, howitzers, and mule guns—and war approached. In hours from the receipt t)f tho very first suggestion of war. .a battery of mins could be detrained at Palmerston. In not much longer time a ■second battery could lie detrained at N«nier. By centralising the brigade in Wellington, and utilising one unit of horses for the instruction of the whole, a great savins■ of expense would be effected, and at « gain to efficiency. Finally, who istoblamo for the present nosition of the Wellington Field Artillery Brigade, and of I) Battery in particular? Ts the General Officer Commanding the Forces nctinir on his own resnonsibility cr 011 the advice of his artillery staff officers at headquarters? If ho is acting on his own responsibility, then lie should be prepared to justify lii 3 policy. Can he?