RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1740, 3 May 1913, Page 18

RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY.

BERGSON IN AMERICA. J t LECTI'KE ON "SPIEITUALITY AND f LIBERTY." ' Jl. Tlenri Borgsou, tlio French philo- J soplier, who is probably tho Inost interesting personality in the world of modern f thought at tho present time, recently paid 1 a visit to the United States, wlievo his 1 lectures attracted much attention in i scholastic-circles, and wero also attended j by crowds of people from outsido tho ! academic sphere. You cannot prove immortality, says Pro- . fes/or Dcrgson, but von do not liavo. to in order to bo justified in believipg it. 11l- i deed, tho luirdeii of proof is on t'lio doubter. "Nobody can prove that something will never come to nn end; such an attempt would bo absurd," is another pni-t of his assertion. "But if we can prove , that the role of the brain is to fix the at- , tention of the ininil on matter aud that by far Hie greater part, of mental life is independent of tho brain, then we have proved tho likelihood, of survival; and it is for those who do not believe it to prove they aro right, not for us to prove they are wron?." As reported l>y the New York "Tribnnei'.' these sentences form a part of the lectures given bv the French philosopher at Columbia University, 011 "Spirituality and Liberty." The lecturer added this further comment on the right to believe in immortality:— "If everything in the mind had its counterpart in the brain, the survival of the human personality would bo highly improbable, but if the mind transcends the brain, and if the brain only reflects that part of mental life which, lia-s to do witli action, tlioa wo may conclude that survival, though uncertain, is at least likely. "And not only is such survival probable; it is susceptible of more and more dchmte proof. Science can show ever new instances of mental facts , which have no counterpart in tho brain and of mental faculties whose operation is independent of the condition of any particular part of tho brain aud cannot be localised in the brain." Intuition is sure, but vague, asserts Professor Bergson, in defence of his method, "and it needs to. bo mndo do finite by constant observations." In reviewing his philosophical standpoint he gives other cautions about procedure:— - "Wo must remove from its [intuition si path all prejudices, all preformed opinions,- its function is to free us from the barrier which conventionality, the habits of thought engendered by our mode of life,'has wrapt around our true selves. It helps us know ourselves, and, in conscquence, live moro intensely. "There aro forces which endure and which aro profoundly susceptible to the influence of time. These forces are spiritual. There are others which are uninfluenced by time. These are material. It is as if there were two currents in the world, ono . rising toward freedom of action, the other descending, weighing down the rising current and in every possible way opposing liberty of action. Iho first is tho force of life, tho second that of matter. _ . . "In viewing evolution; we have the impression of a force which is trying to use matter for its own ends, to twist tho determinism of matter into a vehicle for free will. The only success of this force is man. When wo compare matter and mind wo are struck by the contrast they afford; 0110 makes for precision, the other for vagueness. ~ ~ "Ono make 3 for determinism, the other for freedom. When two tilings present wholly different characteristics, it is usually true that they have common origin. Tho origin of matter and mind is probably tho same; evolution is but tho splitting of this initial force into two elements, each, opposed, yet each in a senso complementary. Slatter divides mind, makes it moro precise; it intensifies it, too, for it provokes it to' effort. It draws from mind not only what it has, but what it hasn't, for it provokes it to now creations. It is both an instrument and an obstacle; in dealing with it mind forges itself, liko steel. . "What does man seek? It is not pleasure, surely, that wo seek niost constantly; it is not happiness. It is what you Americans express so well in your word 'efficiency.' This word expresses the tendency of evolution; it voices the'fun-

damental tendenoy within us, . which is that of creation.

"We seek efficiency, or, perhaps, it would be truer to say that ve seek the immediate product of efficiency, which is joy. Joy is not pleasure, hut (he satisfaction of' creation. Staking money gives pleasure, no doubt, to the artist; his joy, however, comes only from seeing the picture grow under liis brush, from feeling that lie 13 bringing something new into the world. It is this joy which, in somo form or other, man always seeks." In Professor Bergson's system will befV>mes the chief element of the mind, and ho combats the view of physical science that it is dependent for its exercise on tho condition of certain parts of the brain. "Science shows us that the memory of words has been localised in certain sec-

tions of the brain, for when theso sections aro paralysed by a blow these memories perish—proper names, nouns, adjectives, and verbs disappear in the order named. "Why can't we, then, as science would have us do, view all mental states as purely physical conditions of the brain? If such a view wore correct, .1 cerebral dictionary could, in theory, at least, bo formed, stating tho precise relation between cerebral and mental facts. A powerful enough intelligence could, from tho merely pnysical condition of tho brain, deduce tho past and fiituro history of the individual who owned it. "Let us follow this chain of thought more closely: On tho one hand science suggests that consciousness is perhaps but a light struck by the friction of various elements in the brain; on tho other, that it is tho translation in mental terms of wlfat the brain expresses _in physical. Ivjlier of these interpretations of consciousness. is the 'negation of free will; both were current in the seventeenth century, and tho fact that they originated before the birth of mortem science should make us sceptical of the scientific origin thi is claimed for 'hem

"Tho second theory—that consciousness is the translation into mental terms of what the state of the brain translates into physical—is traceable to the metaphysics of the seventeenth century, which. 111 turn, derives from the mathematical nature of tho human mind, from its proncness to a determinism which would both satisfy its desire for definite explanations ami enlarge its field of action by giving it a precise view of definite and constant laws, the knowledge of -which is the first condition of successful action." ■ The lecturer -takes the stand that the "affirmations of science are but arbitrary theories, and the 'proofs' they supply often extremelv dubitable." Ho remarks: "Take, for instance, the way science uses tho law of the conservation of energy as nu argument against free will. Science tells us that as tho supply of energy in 'he 'vorld b cr. s'nnl, fr?o will is impossible, for a free act would imply the creation of something new, or, in other words, the bringing of fresh energy into the world. "Such reasoning begs the question, feu it applies a law derived from inorganic matter, in which the human will does not. intervene, to organic, in which it dues— and wlin can affirm that the action of the will is not tho creation of energy? The processes of nature indicate an effort to 11=0 the smallest possible energy to releas« tho greatest nossible forces, ns one by touching n trigger explodes a revolver. "Nature seems to store the greatest nos.sible amount of potential energy that it. may be used by will with the least possible effort; it is as though she were trying to elude tho law of the conservation of energy, to elude the determinism by which effects are rigidly proportioned to their causes in order to increase the liberty of action of living beings.