The Dominion. THURSDAY, MAY 1, 1913. A DANGEROUS MOVE.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1738, 1 May 1913, Page 4

The Dominion. THURSDAY, MAY 1, 1913. A DANGEROUS MOVE.

The i decision of Austria to take independent action against Montenegro will make the situation in the Near East even more critical than it has been for some time past. It is very doubtful if Russia will be content to play the role of an onlooker if Austrian troops attempt to occupy Montenegro, and if Russia intervenes the question naturally arises: What will Germany and Italy, France and England do' ? The future of Scutari is the principal matter to be settled, so far as Austria is concerned. Writing before that city had been captured by the Montenegrins, the Zeit (Vienna) stated: "Let it be assumed that Scutari has fallen. Then, if there is. unity in -Europe, let it be unanimously settled what is to be done. That is the real task. Everything else is play and pretence." The latest information, however,'goes to show that owing to lack of "unity in Europe," it is very doubtful whether any line of joint action can bo "unanimously settled" by tho Powers, and so we are now told that Austria is going to act independently. It would ue a very risky matter for Austria-Hungary to make war on a Slav people, for she has a very difficult and dangerous problem in her own Slav population of some 20,000,000, who arc, as the Spectator recently pointed out, at present practically invisible for purposes of government and influence on high politics. "Is it likely," the Spectator asks, "after the triumphant emergence of the Slav in the Balkans, that tho niost cultivated, tho richest, and the best educated section of the Slav raco will be content much longer to sit like Cinderella irt the corner among the potato peelings and the ashes f This internal racial problem makes it necessary for AustriaHungary. to walk warily in dealing with the Balkan question; hut it whs stated some time ago that her patience was exhausted, and Dr. Dillon, in tho Daily Telegraph, supported this assertion with the words: "I' affirm what I know, neither more nor less." If, however, it is a fact that' the Ambassadors' Conference "failed to decide on decisive measures being taken against Montenegro," then it may be taken for granted that at least one of tho Powers disagrees with Austria's proposed action, and it remains to be seen whether such disagreement will take the form of active intervention.

• The difficulties of the situation lmve been increased by the agreement between King Nicholas of Montenegro and Essad Pasha, whereby the latter was allowed to proclaim himself King of Albania in return for allowing the Montenegrins to score a point against Austria by taking possession of Scutari before the combatants had agreed to accept the terms proposed by the Powers. This dramatic little arrangement, besides putting the Powers in a. new difficulty, has created serious trouble in Albania, inasmuch as a large section of the. population of that country are anxious to placc themselves under a European Prince, and do' not want a Turkish ruler lo lie foisted on them us (he result of an intrigue between Scrvifi, Montenegro,

and the Young Turks. For some time past there has been bitter feeling between the Young Turks and the Albanians. In 1010-11 Gexehals Djavid Pasha and Tokgiiut Pasha carried on a war of extermination in Northern Albania, writes Mi:. J. Macdonald in his book on Turkey and the Eastern Question, and he goes on to say that Tokouut's atrocities were as savage as any on record. "Let them choke themselves to death like swine in a morass, " Tokohut exclaimed, when he cut off some thousands of non-combatant Albanian shepherds from their mountain homes and, penned them in

swamps, to die of malaria and starvation. Such incidents as these do not encourage the idea that Albania would submit quietly to bo governed by a Turkish -King. The oppression of the Young- Turks resulted in an entente between Albania and Montenegro, . and now, to gain his own ends, the Montenegrin King seems ■to have becomc the tool of the Young Turks, and to have betrayed the Albanians, just when they were in hopes of throwing off the Ottoman ■yoke. There can be 10 doubt that the armed intervention of Austria will be viewed with uneasiness and displeasure by Russia; while Germany is getting nervous regarding the general international outlook. It is understood that Germany would be compelled to go to war with Russia should the latter find it necessary to strike at Austria, and in that event France would also be embroiled. For ourselves, the question which must overshadow all others is ""What would Britain do?" There seems to be a good deal of misapprehension on this point, as may lie gathered from an important remark made in the House of Commons recently by Me. Asquith. Hitherto there has been a very general belief that Britain was pledged to dispatch an army of 160,000 men to the Continent to help France if that nation found ,it necessary to go to war with Germany. On March 10 Lord Hugh Cecil stated in Parliament that it was generally believed that Britain was under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, to send a very large armed force out of the country to operate in Europe. ' To this Mr. Asquith replied: "I ought to say at once that is not true." This statement, however, does not make tho position quite clear, for the Echo de Paris, in commenting on it, explains that "England reserves to itself the right to treat each particular case according to its merits, therefore she binds herself to no general engagements. But it is still true that there has not been a single Franco-German crisis without the assurance of English military cooperation being given to the French Government." Taking the remark of Mr. Asquith in conjunction with the comment of the Echo de Paris, it "seems probable that, though Britain may not be pledged to act exactly in the manner described by Lord Huoh Cecil, yet her obligations are such that in case of war _ between France and Germany she will find it very difficult to keep out of the conflict. Such bein? the case, the present crisis in the Near East is a matter of the utmost importance to Britain, and _ incidentally to the Overseas Dominions.