The Dominion WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1913. CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1684, 26 February 1913, Page 6

The Dominion WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1913. CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON.

The optimists who scout the idea that a European war is possible, and possible in the not distant future, will probably maintain their attitude in defiance of the plain enough fact that recent events in Europe point in any direction but that of peace. ■ Russia has taken a stiff tone in her communications with Austria regarding the Balkan situation; Germany and France have both announced largely increased expenditure on their armies; there is open talk of Belgium becoming a German highway into; France; the British Government is beginning to admit that some form of military training may be a national necessity; and M. Delcasse has been sent to St. Petersburg. By itself, this last event >vould bo sufficient to arouse uneasiness, or, at any rate,-to command attention, because circumstances have made M. Delcasse the embodiment of pro-Russian and antiGorman activity in France. When his appointment was announced last week, it was hailed with delight in Paris and St. Petersburg, as a proof that the Franco-Russian alliance had strength and reality. In Austria it was cxpccted that a result would bo the stiffening of Russia's attitude towards the Balkan situation; in Germany the press interpreted the appointment as "a blow against Gormanyj" and an indication that the gravity of , the international- situation had increased. M. Delcasse was mainly responsible for tho continuance of the Franco-Russian alii; ance, and it was his Anglophile policy which.led to the Anglo-Ftcnch arrangements in' Morocco, which led to Germany's anxiety to drive him out of the Rouvier Ministry. Tho full history of the events that led to the'sacrifice of tho French Foreign seven years ago has not been toW, hut all .the world knows, and it is not denied in Germany j that he' was -the victim of German intrigue...' .When the Mon is Ministry was,formed in 1911, it was the inclu-. sion in it of M. Delcasse that alone seemed important. In the Gorman press at'the. time there were signs of alarm,. Jaut some of the leading German papers' professed .not to care, declaring that "M. Delcasse's metli.ods" were:no longer applicable. It is small wonder that his resurrection,', and his translation, at this conjuncture, to St. Petersburg of all places,, should cause uneasiness in Germany. Every sane person will hope that the tension which assuredly exists will pass away without leaving over any explosive' results, but equally it is the duty of all sensible people to realise 'that, war must'bo prepared for, and hot dismissed as an impossibility. 1 -MB; Ciitlß'ciiiLL .meant,the British' nation Wifraw its own lesson when he referred in these terms to the war in Turkey: '

"Hero is a war that has broken out In 'spite of all that rulers and diplomatists could do to prevent it, a war in which the press hurt no part,.a war which the whole lorce of the money-power lias been subtly and steadfastly directed to prevent, v;liich has colno upon us, not through, tho ignoranco and credulity of the people, but, 011 the, contrary, through their knowledge of their history and their, destiny, and through theif intenso realisation of . their wrongs and of their duties as they conceived them; a war which, from all t).eso causes, has burst upon us with all the force of a spontaneous explosion, and which in strife and-destruction has carried all before it. Face to fncowith this manifestation, who is tho' man bold enough-to say that force is never' a remedy J". '

He did nob need to add "Do to fabula." ... Mr. Spenser "W/Ilkinsom, the famous military critic,- who is now the C'hichele Professor of Military History at Oxford, expanded Mr. Churoi!ill'_s point, and added some : now ones, in a notable address last month to the' Historical Association on "Some Lessons of tho .War in the Balkans."' This war,' ho said, exemplified tho "ono great main feature" of war: "the principle of the relation between motive and effort.: *-•

■ Wars were the working out by violence of qilarrels between Siates, and in order to understand thorn they must • understand that the State was a living creature, not a, machine.' War was the conscious activity of the State, involving the energies of its life or soul, and they could not ejfpiwn tho actions of a, liatiou, either iir war or in peacg, oil merely mechanical principles. The community of.men was capable of. responding to tho stimulus of an idea in a way which no mechanics could explain. Professor Wilkinson went on to deah with the age-old but ever-livirig fact that a community can and does insist on war when an idea moves it as an earthquake. If the State wero a machine, as'"anti-militarists" and the deluded extremists of the "peace party" think, a statesman could declare war as easily as he could turn a tap or press a button. But actually the State is not a machine, and the most potent forces that causo .wars are "spiritual"; in other words, the statesman is not the warmaker, but only the executor of the national will.

Two other points of the highest importance, were' stressed . by the learned Professor. The first was that "the activities of war required a long and arduous previous preparation," . for disaster could only be avoided'by having harmony between 'policy and defence preparations, and it.was "a fundamental principle that tho energy of a nation in war was proportionate to the degree to which the motive or cause had taken hold of the'whole community." The cases of the Boers and thoy Japanese arc in point, but the best illustration of this truth is'afforded by the case of the Balkan allies. They were consumed with a desire for freedom, they had prepared long and carefully, they saw that Turkey could bo broken up, and they/struck,. with the results we havo scon. The other fact that emerges from the Balkan war is that nowadays the decisive blows of a war can be struck with great rapidity. This is not the age of seven years, and thirty years, and hundred years wars. .In Professor Wilkinson's view the possibilities of a general European encrageinent. are not j negligible, and British statesmen will have a difficult problem in keepincr Britain neutral, and yet enabling her to keen her self-respect. "For that reason," he concluded, "it was desirable that all Englishmen should make up their minds while there was time as to their country's duty in Europe and concerning the necessity of national organisation Lfor war."-