CAUSES OF TURKEY'S DEFEATS.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1644, 10 January 1913, Page 6

CAUSES OF TURKEY'S DEFEATS.

.... CI GERMAN EXPERT VIEWS, * lo ; I ' 1 : of TOTAL UNREADINESS. m ■.■■■■ ■ ... ... .. . ei ■ ' -- -. > ■■■■ , pi The Berlin correspondent ef the London it ''Daily Telegraph" writes-.— Two German officers, who possibly know more thin any, other foreigner about the Turkish army, have now given us some • Of their, impressions as; to the causes of ■ its defeats. ; ■ Eield-Marshal ,Ton do Goltz, who super- • - vised the work of military reorganisation T in'the Ottoman, Empire from 1883 to 1895, vi dealt with the miittor cautiously and ten- sv tatively, in a few words;, in introducing ei ■ tho lecturer at a meeting ,of the Oriental j . ' Society. He said that the fact had been t disregarded that up' till 1908 Turkey ■ had oc no army. There had, it was true, been an organised levy, in the organisation of w .•which he had for many, years co-operated, <]i . ' but it was only in 191)8 that Turkey had C 1 eet about creating an army in the modern p , sense, v/hlch had a trained peace estab- y ■ lishment and; behind it-a long series .of ■"-T6S6rV6S» ;• ' : ■ This work had been inaugurated with fereafc industry and zeal, -but possibly not r with the right iwderstanding, for. after « - ■ thirty years of lethargy; the .necessary .in- C 6tructive forces were lacking. How was it it possible .suddenly to communicate to ti people' a knowledge ,of modern "tachcs, « of shooting,-of a proper use of the fea- ei , tnres of :the : country, when was no ©i i ope 'to ''act as instructor? Possibly there, p tad ( been too much delay, in procuring a j t , staff.of. instructors. As in .this country tt ' the. Reserve officers had been called in, g I>ut the; formation of a uniform officers a v corps a number of . years, rho first sot of Reserves still belonged to tho Hamidiaii epoch,, and had never beon al-. ; lowed to '"practise field; In the , " hour of teed it was necessary, to call .in g: .'- all the available men, in order to bo able a to fill up tho units. ; There was no: time li to consider whether they had been trained d for war. •• '• „. c "Army of 'Recruits." ! .. T "What had succumbed in,';the Balkans « ka9 an army of recruits and nothing more, ti ; The experience of any other Power in a. si similar condition would have'been the. 1< :: 6ame' against 'fan army which . had ...been n preparing for Avar for "twenty-seven_years. . ■■ jlo-must repudiate the;idea that/Turkey .■ was dono for. In the-ipast her'national i": forces had been overtaxed; ,to ,- main-, j 'ff.tain the European; provinces and -to j 1 ;,in , them from outside.'- j \ Ottoman strength in- /Anatolia, .tad -j ■ always had to. make sacrifices-for lur« T key's European possessions, and .had thus • • become exhausted. Ho believed that by % getting rid of Macedonia,. Turkey, would : 1 bo rather strengthened than" ' and anyone who was acquainted with Anotolia and its Asiatic hinterlaiid . wquld ( agree with him ;that' .Turkey nad by ro {] .". means' been destroyed. -■ . 1 V Much'more;exhaustive is the ana.vsis j of , Imhoff, ~ w'ho, under , ■■■ Von der Goltz, reorganised the Ottoman , artillery. Writing in the "Vossischej/.ei-. 1 ■ tang," ho 'enumerates fourteen .possible, -■ causes which .have been advanced ..as. Ac- • Counting for the . Turkish . collapse, ' and -- these are given below, . together with pviet. ( ■ condensations of his'.'own comments iron ( 1 'The necessary re-formation of the en- ' tiro -army, after the Involution. -is • . obvious that four years was not sumcient . to train an army of the sizo or that of j .Tdrk#' : ' v aßco#ilinic'' to'modern-principles,. ■ i ~ . i asithe promising beginning- made y. as 'in-. . v -tertSred with by internal political <lisecnsions, revolts .in Albania, Sjria, and j • Arabia, and tho war in .'Tripoli.c Non-Moslem Element. •, I , 2. Tho introduction of tho non-Moham- ' medan population into the army, '100 ?--.once-fanatical;-''furious, --oand.';-. daumless : - Turkish army," which, was tormed into a. \ liomogoneous- whole, by. religion-an-1 na- , " '- tion'afity', taken into itself eh-D.ents - which have no interest ! in'the maintenance ' of tho Ottoman . Empire, whose s.vrnpatines wero« with. the enemy. "Histori- -j cal experience teachcs that State '■uul Em- . pires can be kept alive, and nourishing ,■ "only by the forces to which they, owe their ' -. existencd, and that'was here-pure,Oimah- '■ • - ism, which' has now been mixed.' " 3. The mischiovou's effect of'polities 'on i ■ . - :i the.army. ;The causes of tho defeats are .. to be sought especially in the'demotvilisa- : ■"■■■ tlon of-'the officers' corps,, whose ent(i"re:in- . . ' ■ terest .was. engrossed by politics and-party ! - .!:.;disseiisions'.Authority and discipline suffered thereby, and a deep gulf wus open- ■.< ed"out between officers -and fmen; ' .The. . , ' ißudden great freedom after the revolution ' '" was a misfortune :for ! the: army, nnd in-' . discipline shot up with . mushroom-like Tapiuity. .'The onlyremedy after the con- - : elusion-of peace will be the'introduction • of an authority olothed with • dictatorial vi . . , power,. which, supported by the Khalifa; : - will ' a changed : and • ■; -expel from the army every ,officer who ' . ocoupies himself :'wi_th: politics. ; v' •„* 4. Tho-undermining- of Governmental 1 authority. Tho authority of tho menfc was shaken by tho frequent changes V of Ministers and the unmeasured critic- * ism of the highest officials. ' • Tho principle of authority On" which tho-State' : ..and array are based was thii3 irrepnr(ably injured. ■ The nation, was not ! ripe < lot. Liberal political notions and ideals. , ■ Inadequate/Training, j < , 5. Insufficient training ,of men and offi-. icera. As an interested party, General i' v'~ Imhofl . withholds- his. opinion on' this . point.' •' -- .1 .' . 6. Mistakes in the higher leadership. '. Till the official reports aro availdble, an unbiassed judgment is impossible, but it , must be:aamitted that, in consequence of tho absence of manoeuvres since 1909, and tho lack of'in'actice, there wos, in spita ■■ . . 'of the high intelligence of the Turkish . officers, a deficiency ,of thoroughly trained , leaders. Much is explained-by tho. fact '.- that in the short time since 1908 tho higher ;. officers in the General, Staff had not had ; time for a thorough, at any rate, theoretical training for .the tasks that, awaited them in warfare. .'.Excess '.'of administrative ■work, politics/ long .absence? for ...the sup-. •. -,- pression of internal jdirbrders,' and,Vabo.vo . a3l, the 'years under - the -old : regime, in \whioh they had becomoj unaccustomed to ■ Intellectual labour, sufficiently account for ~... tho failure of the leadership and the "- ; General Staff. - ■ . . . 7. Mistakes of subordinate leadership, 'defective! firo discipline, 'firet controlf ,and utilisation of the formation "of the ground, " - and bad .choice- of artillery l positions.' V ■iHere,- again, the explanation, is that. no. ®ormal peace, training, had taken place! . General'.'Breakdown, - . 8. Delay in attaining complete readiness •, , . rfor war. Weight must be laid on the ex'tra territorial: distribution of tho troops ■ ■ ■ in peace, the defective through railway connections, the. absence of good roads, ■ ■ tho incompetence of the officials, and tho external and internal complications, such pr. the Italian War and the Albanian ris- . , ing. With, regard to' the breakdown' of .v thff' commissariat and < munition strain. OHeral Imhoff records tho'utterances of . 'others, but reserves his own judgment. 9. Complete of the in tellipence service'at and-behind the front. - As to this a final judgment ennnot bo given till tho. official reports , are available. ' 10. Numerical . inferiority. . In Mace- • Honia, tho Turks were: undoubtedly in numerical inferiority,' which was aggravate! 1 bv the spl'ttjpij, up of tho forces. In "Thrace the Turks could have had numerical superiority, but required moro time than was left them by their oppoj- nent. In particular the precipitate offensive of. Adbuliah Pasha, on orders from above, which led to the defeat of Ijirk-Kilisse, robbed"them of the opjjortunity.of making use. of their numerical suneriority in Thrace. 11. Division of forces. This is to be attributed .to the consciousness that the Turks have never re-obtained at the con- : .elusion . of' peace territory which they have once abandoned. - 12. Inadequate Orientation of Turkish dinlomacy abroad. Privato information shows that tho Ottoman Government derided upon tho discharge of 150,000 men, who left ■ the colours in September on the strength of the assurances it receiv- # cd from, all sides that; there could not, ond-wonld not, bo war. 13. Alleged superiority of the enemy s artillery. This .weapon cannot bo regarded as actually existing. Field euns ol ' all Powers are approximately on the same level. The best weapons can effect nothiri? in untrained hands, and -firo control and firo discipline, ore tho'sole decisive factors in modern warfare, \The sys :

;i ' 1 " " v ■' em, and not the officers' corps or the sollier, mast bear the chief responsibility. 14. Moral superiority of tho Allies. An inbiasscd critio must< further recall and luiy praise tho military progress of the memy, The earnest, far-seeing labour, lational enthusiasm, idea of freeing from ong expression co-r<sligionist9 and pooplo >f the same stock, combined with'the nodel arrangements of the enemy s gen•ral staff to contribute to the lull exiloitation of a rightly-judged opportuntr. - . - - '