The Dominion. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1912. BOTHA'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1635, 31 December 1912, Page 4

The Dominion. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1912. BOTHA'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY

. The present position in South Africa invites a retrospect of the progress made by that country since the war. To those who know the oountry, and believe in its great possibilities, the result of such a retrospect must be sadly disappointing, It is commonly said that neither a man nor a nation can stapd stil}. That with either it must be advance or retrogression. It , is probably true. But if there;is an..exception, then South Africa is that exception. The country cannot' be said to have gone back since the war. But if it has made progress, then that progress falls so far short of what was easily possible that, it is hard to find., . Perhaps opinions as to the cause .of this failure may differ, at least in form. But they would all, we think, be found to trace bac}c to one bed-rock cause. And that, with a _ reservation which we will deal with in its proper place, j.s undue haste. The Tr.ansv.aal .did not need responsible - Government when the cries of a small but noisy minority carried the day. .It could have done well without ' even, Representative Government under Mr, Balfour's scheme, for at least another couple of years. And the Orange River Colony could with advantage have waited much longer. This cause would not have had an existence if the two,colonies had been all-British to the'-extcnt that the Australasian colonies have .always been, or even to the extent that Canada has been for at any rate the last fifty years, But they were not. Apd the ideas of the two Sojith African white >.races on the subjects of government and administrative morality were, and are, as wide apart as the two poles. The need of the two colonies was a nonparty, progressive, and honest system of ' goyernmentn-a Government composed of British and AngloAfricans, whoso directions should be carried out by a Civil Service trained and led by British civil servants. The achievements of such a Government, whether in the form of Crown Government or of' Representative Government, would have been twofold. Progressive legislation for the benefit .of the minesj of the land, of agriculture, of immigration, would have been initiated on sound lines and placed on a lasting b.asis. And the high standard of the British Civil Seryice would haye been definitely set the standard .for the public service? of the two colonies for all time. To ensure the attainment of these not chimerical ideals, Crown Goveijnment should haye endured until a safe British majority in the Transvaal 'was assured. A few years more "of Crown Government .would have sufficed. ' But the Orange River Colony, with its large majority of Dutchmen, should have remained a Crown Colony; until South Africa was ripe for union. However, the political needs of the English Radical party tempted them successfully, not'for the first time, to place those needs before the best interests of distant colonies. Responsible Government was granted, a large number of qualified British residents were struck 'pjf the rolls on the ex parte statements of Dutchmen, and a. Dutch Ministry, although representing, a minority only of the electors, attained office and power. Similarly, in the Orange i River Colony a Dutch Ministry came to rule. The personnel and the policies were strongly racial from the outset. The veld-cornet system was re-established,. Englishmen to the number of some 'thousands- were turned out of thejy billets to make room for Dutchmen, and the real needs of the colonies received no further attention than _ jn-qmiscs in speeches made for British consumption. ■ Than the question of union canw.to. the fore. For varying raa-.

sons, no one of the four colonies was really competent to pronounce an opinion on union under the then conditions. The details of it were to be j controlled largely by the Ministries of the day. Given that those Ministries represent majorities, as they should do, this would be a fair proposition; but they did not. The Natal Cabinet (British) represented a large majority of the electorate. So, too, did the Orange River Col-, ony (Dutch). But the Transvaal and Cape Colony Cabinets (both Dutch) only represented minorities: —the first by means of a "doctored" roll, the second by means of an anti-' quated distribution of seats. The Transvaal roll should have been amended. In Cape Colony the distribution of seats was 50 years old. It was fair enough originally as between urban and rural districts. But at the time of the last Cape election, while the population of the electorates 'of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and East London was six times what it used to be, and the country electorates had altered but little, the representation in Parliament was unchanged, with the result that urban (and British) electors were largely under-represented. This anomaly should have been remedied and a fresh election held, and the same step should have been taken in the Transvaal. But to do this would have handed South Africa to tho British majority,' and would not have suited He. Churchill. Thus it came about that the British entered the union in a' hopeless minority. ,

It may be asked why did the British agree to enter a conference at which they knew the dice were loaded against them. _ For one reason only, and it constitutes the reservation of which we have • spoken. Union was premature then, and; -something else also. But if it did not pome then, there was likely 'to be serious trouble between the .in-; land colonies apdthe coast colonies, i Friction between them on questions of Customs tariffs and railway rates was fast becoming acute, and there ■ was believed to be a danger of its getting out of control. _ To avoid the risk of such a calamity to their adopted country, the British accepted , the position, unfair as it was, and entered on a conference in which ! their opponents had a solid and unsh.akeable majority. As a consequence, they had to allow a number of important clauses in the proposed Act of Union to remain loosely worded, and to .be content with yerbal "understandings" as to their meaning and intent and operation. Had they insisted on clearer language, there would pot have been any" .union then, or perhaps now, whilst a-ccor.ding to some there might have been civil war. The union was formed, General Botha at oncc broke the understanding ■ that the first Cabinet should be a non-party one, and he did, more. He summoned to his Cabinet' Messes. Sauer, Fischer, .and Hertzog, .the three most notorious and bitter racialists in the country. He has since, : as occasion offered, confirmed in Speech and broken in act almost every other "understanding" made at the conference. The country has been governed as if it belonged solely to the Dutch. Few of its needs have received practical. attention, and it has only progressed to this extent, that the worst of the excesses of the' Kbuger reyime have not as yet been repeated. Two years ago, commenting on General Botha's defeat by Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, we' : said: "General Botha's behaviour during the last twelve months has evidently revived in Anglo-African minds the old opinion, formed in the earlier days after Vereeniging, that he was woak and vacillating to an extent that often created the impression of duplicity." Even ■ plainer language must be used now. He is utterly weak and utterly insincere. Apparently the present'crisis has been brought on' hy the. somewhat belated loyalty of Colonej, LjucHAits, of -Ijratal, who at last refused to countenance any more of the thinly- . veiled disloyalty of General Hertzoa. It has given General Botha a great opportunity of at least partially rehabilitating, himself in public opinion. He could have dismssed the three malcontents, and either have replaced them by Dutch "Moderates, or have offered a coalition to the Opposition. The former course would have suited the Opposition best. The latter, if succe.ssfjil, would havo paid the General best, for if the Opposition had taken the bait,, they would have seriously crippled themselves for that work of reforming the administration of the Union, including the Civil Service, which must be one of their first tasks on taking office. General Botha apparently has taken: neither of tnesC courses. He.has retaiped jfcwo of his "rebels" and replaced Colonel Leuchars' by another harmless- Natal "Independent." Who he.appoints to General Hertzog)b vacancy is therefore no longer a matter p'f moment. He has missed a great chance, and should rue it at the next election, for there is every prospect that present abuses will conitinpe without material diminution.