DANGERS OF INVASION.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1596, 13 November 1912, Page 8

DANGERS OF INVASION.

LORD ROBERTS'S WARNING. COSfPUtSOEY TRAINING ADVOCAtED. Earl Roberts received an enthusiastic welcome, on September 23 on paying a visit to Norwich under the auspices of the, Notional Service League. Addressing a great public meeting, over which the LordLieutenant,of Norfolk (the Earl of Leieester) presided) the veteran field-marshal said lie imagined that the reason, they did not seo tine necessity for the introduction of universal training was that they believed the protection already afforded to the British inlands by our armed forces was sufficient). and that 'M other nation was powerful enough to dispute our hold ovor tho Empire, or was desirous of doing so, They had been led to beliovo that . an invasion of their shores was ail • impossibility. That this should bo 60 was the cause of great anxiety, to hini. "An Utterly' FalSo Idea." , It was an utterly false idea,, but it was. one which it was very difficuft to get rid of, for they were kept in the dark for political and party interests as to tho weakness of our naval aud military arrangements. He wished to make it clear that, /unless our countrymen were prepared to undergo the required small amount of sacrifice—which, all other nations had had to, take upon themselves' —it was not possible for Great Britain, to continue as an Empire, or even fortho Bafety of our country to'ha. assured, To this end two things were necessary—the Navy must be considerably increased, and the. made sufficient in numbers and-training to free, the Navy from the necessity tif being tied to our shores. His lordsttip. roferttjd to the-growing strength of the German Navy, and 6aid it was the bounded duty of the British Government to keep a watchful eye on what Was.being done, and not allow our navy to full below "tho two-Power Btaih ■dara/' as it bad done,'until it was how very little superior .to the German Navy alone. Year by year the German Navy wits adding to its strength, while the Strength/, of ■ our' navy, as ! coin' pared with those . of other nations, had steadily declined, with the alarming: ! .result tnat-onr Fleets' had had practically to be withdrawn from tho Hedi- ; terranean and other Seas and concentrated' i i.n Home waters, in order to balance tho German navy in' the North Sea. The : bringing heme of our Fleets from the Mediterrhnean Was the. heaviest blow that bad befen dealt us. The Mediterranean Was the most important of oui', bread routesv Two-thirds of our supplies came to us from ; ' .Southern Russia, and India by its waters. Unless wo were masters in that; sea, we GOiild not continue...to .hold Malta and] Gibraltar, .and our. position ■ in . India, would be seriously jeopardised, j ~: ' The Remedy, The remedy for this dangerous state of Affairs, was 1 simply to increase our Navy •until it again, reached • "the two-Power standard," .and to have an Army- suffice ent in numbers ■ and training, to guard our shores, in. the absence of the tiopary force, and free our Navy to per-' form its legitimato, duty ,of protecting o.ur-| commerce, and ensuring: that 'our ifooij SMjblies were not cut off. Th& Army inust bo l&oked upem as part arid parcel of. .the' nation, as something belonging to the pfeople themselves, until 'we became,'.'a'nanoh in arms," Thevoniy.': way.this could be brought about was by: ; the. introduction orVcompulsory military training, for.-all classes of society! and this Was the only-way: by which Great ■ Britain could be .•■ extricated •■from, tho ■ dangerous f position.in Which she was. now placed, owing to. the persistent neglect of I jner, Arjttyv The responsibility for whatever;' calamity .might befall, the' country, j on discount of- Our military, weakness:, .Would rest upon the 'statesmen who had | been our rulers ever ■ since ..the war .in South Africa demonstrated how .great, was our need for ft more efficient army, They had' systematically neglected - -.to' tike - .■jvarnipg from.'the''Jcsso'nj of .that war,' ■arid had refused to be"jj.u.ided by the re- ; ports'of the'two Royal Commissions on. our shortcomings. " The opinions "of. those Commissions were! recorded in the "fofiowinjj military system will be satisfactory which. ■ ; does not '" contain powers ' of expansion outside .'.the ■ limits of the Eegular Forces .-of the. Crown, whatever those limits may bo," and, "A hoinedefence armyi capable, in the absence ; of the Whole or tho greater part of the Itogu Forbes, of protecting this- country front invasion, tan be raised and maintained : orrly on the principle that, it is the .duty : Of every citizen of military age and sound, physique to be trained for the national: ; defence, and to take part, in it should : emergency arise." .'...',. More Officers and Men. ■ The organisation of the 'Territorial." Force was quiter excellent,; #nd all that' was needed for a,Citizen'army;, but, While expressing his appreciation of tho organ isation and his admiration for the patriot-', .ism all rfrnlts displayed, he would pot be ' true to them nor loyal to his country; un-' iess he spoke out'frankly as" to the absolute necessity, for' both officers, and men '' being far more numerous, far better dis- ' cjplined, and far more highly trained than it was possiblefor them ito be under the voluntary- system. . ' The experience b£ fifty years had proved that 300,000 was • the outside number of men that could bo procured by voluntary enlistment for the'citizen army, and. now*, adays even this inadequate number could not be reached; and it. was impossible'for., employers to spare their' men iong enough • ■for the absolute necessary' training, until all employers wero obliged to da the same. If the 300,000 were doubled, or,' even trebled, they would* be of no us'>. ■ .unless they were sufficiently trained,.and, were of a suitable Age, instead of being,'; for the most part the mere boys Who weio' now allowed to.join the ranks in order to swell the numbers. It was for the: country to decide whether they would. trust , the defence of this great nation to men who, however courageous and anxibus to do their duty, were hot, and 'never, could be, puracienfly trained Under thevbhiii-'j twy.' system, for, the simple reason that neither the employers nor the men could j afford the necessaTy time. The idea of the Tertitbrials being given sis m«nths'. j .traitiw alter, war brok« ent' Was I sheernonsense. ■ If' our citizen .soldiers were not,. capable . of ' guarding ! thsab.shores the'very day hostilities com-, Sensed they would be of no use. Andoi this they might bo certain—that hostilities would oomtnence • by surprise and when they were least prepared for them. The facts they had to deal with were as fellew :■*; _.•'■'-■; "\. Our naval supremacy is being challenged', by-a natioh whoso fleets art. rapid'., ly becoming '& tiumerous dnd.as power-, fill as «&ts.. And.—what is a most important consideration—every single, vessel' of which can be'concentrated in any,, one sea, while a large proportion of our Navy must necessarily always bb,.engaged.' .in protecting the vessels conveying our food supplies, without, the Tegular arrival of Which we should.either Starve or quickly, bo forced to make aft ignominious peace Sind pay a heavy'penalty. Battles :;at Sea, .:..•: "2. We have nothing to guide us as to. what the result of a battle at eea might be under the new conditions. At the pic sent day loiig-range guns, submarines, torpedoes, i and aeroplanes Are the' means > by which victories will be gained. . Wc ' have no practical knowledge'of the effect' which these new. 'instruments of war ; will: have in deciding battles,' but one thing is certain—ships 'of war could not comb ■ to close quarters/as of old, and that,:, therefore, the splendid yalour, , unsurpassed seamanship, and dogged courage' of British sailors., which 1 gained us victories in days of yore, winnofc now-, have' the samo chance of .deciding tho fortune.' of .the day. Ei.en ivjttiin tho last'.few ; Weeks, durihg tlie naval manesuvres off,! this very East Coast, it has been clearly, shown that it was possible for. trahsporte,' l supposed to be tlie eiiemy'V to elude, the vigilanceofthodefcndiuirflects,.oridla'rld a considerablo number of soMiera oh our. Shores. This was effected under circunisjances most favourable to tho defenders;.' They wer« in superior strength, (hey had accurate jnforniatjoß as.to. tho direction from which the invader's fleets were coming, and they know t]io portion of-j the. cbast line to be 'watched:- .The wch- j ther was ;imich as usiml in tho North Sea; on this occasion it helper! the in-] vsners, and. so'ft-nvav:do again. ■ "It Was very denriv brought -home to us this iirtm - last year," concluded ■ Lord ll&l?ttfeVi'!lM''i!:e' .6M»ot;"J»liL'. fc,«s

Espe'ditionitfy force .'for assistance in the matter of hoi«o defence. ' I'hat force] is specially maintained for Imperial purposes, and it may—indocd, Jt is highly probable that jt will—be sent abfpad on account of disturbance in-our own liibro distant possessions before trouble com*mcuccs nearer lipme. Anyhow, gentlemen, it is the citizen army, audi not the iteffu-' Ift* Army, upon v.-hich we have to do pend'for the,' safety of bur homes, and are wo- going to be mad enough to alb* this important,' this sacred duty to b<) entrusted to' men unfitted for it?' Should the invasion of England ever take place, the troops our defending fqreo would: Have to meet would bo composed of pick*: ed mos tho most experienced and the nv ?». highly trained the «nemy possesses. to have any chance of holding our own against siich men, we must witheut delay adopt tho system of compulsory training,. Tho only eystcni wbieiiis fair: upoii all, hjgh and low,, rich and.poor,.' andthe only system.bv which our citizen' ■soldiers can bo given the required amount oi discipline and training*' ■': "