UPPER HOUSE REFORM.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1576, 21 October 1912, Page 8

UPPER HOUSE REFORM.

ELECTIVE AND NOMINATIVE, (Contributed.) The Upper House, in theory, is the brake on tho wheel, or governor on tho propeller, of the Legislative ' machine Its functions oro mainly to revise and correct tho form in which legislation is presented to it and hold over for further consideration such of its principles as, on mature consideration by cultivated experience, appear hasty anticipations for party purposes, rather than considered expressions of the organic will. In other words, the chief function of tho Upper House in matters involving legislative changes of principle is to delay tho often false interpretations put by a party majority upon tho national ivill. Of the corrective function of the Upper House, a good instance (unfortunately of neglect) is to be found in tho undetected error which permitted the ruin of individuals by tho passing of a law enabling Commissioners delimiting electoral districts, to disfranchise electors at local option polls. Of the function to delay party misinterpretations of tho organic will, a good instance is presented by tho attempt of Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet in Britain to carry Home Eulo for Ireland against what proved at the succeeding general elections to have been the will of a largo majority of tho constituency. For the exercise of such functions tho units composing the machine must be endowed with mature general knowledge, experience of public business in New Zealand conditions, and independence from fear or favour. These qualifications were sought by committing the choico of members of the House to the Governor ae advised by his Executive, as a sacred trust for the nation. At first tho appointments were for life, and a grievous mistake was mado when tho term was reduced to seven years,..,and the first qualification, "independence," was thereby undermined. Now a Conservative Government actually proposes in a Bill on its passage through Parliament to make the nominations for three years' only; thus transforming thoso whose principal function should Dβ to resist party extravagances into party slaves.

The Conservative Government, but for the Upper House, would have passed into law the Legislative Council Elections Bill as a measure of reform. The excuse.was that tho lato continuous Ministry had made FOine appointments to the upper Chamber which it would bo difficult to justify on other than purely party grounds. Tho "reform" proposed tho limitation of the number ot members of the Upper Chamber to 40. The election of twenty members from each of tho two constituencies—the North and South Islands of N6w Zealand. The ©lection of members by universs.l suffrage on the same electoral roll 43 that used for the election of the Lower Chamber by the transferable vote system; the election of half tho number of members only at each general.election; the. retirement of half the number of members at tho second following general election; and so on at each general election thereafter. The Bill is so farcically inept that one is tempted to regard it as a satire upon reform. Let us have a brake by all means in deference to custom; let us go to expense to havo the form of a brake, but disconnect it from the wheels! Is there one of the essential functions of an Upper House to which the reform will conduce ? Will tho electorato bo wiser in the election of the Upper House than it is in that of the Lower House? If so, is this great wisdom duo to tho increased size of tho constituencies or to the transferable vote? If eo, why is tho election to the popular Chamber left in the rut of tho discarded methods?

Tho machine of representative government as it now exists, by process.of evolution, is of a highly complex nature compacted on olastio lines in the hope of seenring at once public order, and the greatest amount of liberty for tho individual that is consistent therewith. Such a machine has tho defects of its qualities. It can be worked efficiently bv two parties only—one for tho time in charge of the administration, and tho other desiring to possess it. The Government and tho Opposition must, in the nature of things, bo at perpetual war with one,another with all that inflames human passions, tho desire for conquest, the spoils of office, as tho prize of victory. To ensure the smooth working of tho machine two parties must each be united by common interests which aro often only tho spoils of victory—the powers, patronage, and emoluments which for tho time are the rewards of the members of that party which has successfully interpreted tho national will; at times one or other party professes to represent the desire of a majority of the nation for organic change, or for a complete alteration in the conduct of the administration, but even where great principles are contended for, the spoils of office are always at the back of the party mind and provide the latent unexpressed motive, which impels many to sink individual opinions and submit to party discipline. Tho idcnl s party man ia he who, in tho words of "loknthe";—

"Always voted at his party's call "And never thought of thinking for , himself at all." Party cohesion results from mixed motives of which publio spirit is only one. Party cohesion, however obtained, is essential to the smooth working of tho maohine of representative government and only two parties aro contemplated by the echeme of construction. Compromise is essential. When the fanatics for "ists" and "ics" and "ites" prefer rupture of tho party most sympathetic to them into dependent sections, to compromise and delay of their special fetish in tho interests of the best government and legislation obtainable for tho general goodthen the machine is in danger indeed. Its action is paralysed 'and the community suffers from disorder in tho working of tho whole machine Tho Lower House is the forum for party action. The leaders guess (for it can only Iμ a guess)' at interpretations of the popular will. Too often they permit tho lust of power for personal and party advantage to mislead them in their guesses, or appeal to tho emotions of tho constituency in a manner misleading from the true interests of the nation, lhus Gladstone carried the Midlothian election and tho party's campaign in Britain, by lurid pictures of Bulgarian atrocities. The sequel showed that the Treasury bench dn the House of Commons, and not the unfortunate Bulgarians, had inspired the flood of eloquence which gained votes. Thus party government has its faults, and the working of the whole goveruiug machine is often endangered thereby, but no human niachino can be better than tho human elements of which it is composed, or the electorate which chooses them for the purpose. Thus representative government is only possible in a community which has learned to Iβ guided by reason rather than emotion, and its olfspring fanaticism, ond the prevalence of the former qualification measure tho fitness of tho machine. As I have said, the main function of tho Upper House is to control the ex- ' cesses of party, and over tho door of tho Legislative Council Chamber these words should be writ largo: "Abandon party yo who enter here." Under tho former nominative system, Councillors were nominated by tho party in power, it is true, but this power was by unwritten law esteemed a sacred trust exercised in favour of men who had been members of ono or, other, of tho parties of the day and professors of tho general principles of tho party, Lut who by experience of public business and mature age nnd character seemed qualified for the discharge of duties which demand such qualifications. The Councillor was, in the atmosphere of tho Council of which he was a life member, able in timo to alough his party scales, and to exercise his untroubled judgment upon such questions as presented themselves without fear or hope of favour. His life tenancy of tho position protected him from fear, and tho expectation of party favour was so remote as to disturb lus judgment but little. Now all the utility of tho Council is to be demolished, because tho lato continuous Ministry is alleged to have abused its trust in nominating somo members who do not, it is alleged, possess tho necessary qualifications. Why not abolish the Second Chamber rather than deprive it of all usefulness? Under this so-called reform, it will bs deprived of oil independence, nnd become n mero section of the Lower Chamber domiciled in another room. It will be nominated nnd balloted for without aiiy special qualifications, instead of being nominated with some discrimination which even the most profligate of party governments cannot, for.

its own sake, venture to neglect. If only tho nuinler required present themselves for nomination they will bo declared elected whether fit or unfit. If thorp ie ft oontest thoso supported in tho elections by tho dominant party for tho time being in the country will secure election whether qualified by ago and experience of public business or no. Iho proposed size of the constituencies will make it impossible for personal qualifications to assert-themselves—no canvass will bo possible. The support of ono or other of tlio parties will alone socuro tho return of candidates who will have to Co voted for by the electors because their unknown names figure on tho party tickets. Only men of absolute leisure or great wealth could hope to bring their names even under tho notice of the great body of electors during an electoral campaign whero party conflict is absorbing tho attention of all. The successful parly impulse iu tho country would create ,tho Council as a by-product of its energy. It is true that only half ■ tho Council would owe their seats to one general election, but if a party wero given, power by an election and survived defeat at tho next, tho entire Council would bo of one colour, and party slaves in consequence. Tho normal tenuro of offico by a member of Council would bo six year's, but a dissolution would shorten tho »erm; and two dissolutions might reduco it to on experience of months. Unless tho <pay wero . greatly increased, fit men would refuso to accept nomination wnich involved the turmoil and expense and humiliation of elections, and tho subsequent slavery to party masters, w'thoufc tlio anticipations of place and power which now induce only a few qualified men to contest seats in the Lower House at the price. Tho country under tho alleged reform" would have to pay dearly for "rejects" to enact a solemn tnd costly farco as the fifth wheel of a coach. The "reform" is exhibited to the country as a. matter of tho first importance to democratic government. Tho country is only interested in it if it tends to good government, and for tho reasons before given the present "reform" can only destroy that utility in the governing machine which an Upper Chamber is intended to supply. The official parties, when they do not excuse their defaults undor a plea of its obstructiveness, continually misrepresent an Upper Chamber as an obstruction to the frco expression of tho national will. But ie this true or only a bogy eet up for party purposes? No Upper Chamber, in modern times, has ever dared to defy the clear and considered manHato of the electorate. _An Upper Chamber has refused to reg'etor tho edicts of a successful party, and ineisted on time for further consideration, whero tho mandate, was uncertainly, expressed, or obtained or partially obtained by party tactics in tho neat of a contest fought on many issues of vr'aieh that questioned by the Upper Chamber was only one. It sometimes happens tinai a party is successful at tho elections on a general platform composed of many planks of unequal importance and unequally stressed during tho contest. Tho mind of tho country may bo really expressed en one question only! tho necessity of a change of Administration for example, which at the moment has overshadowed all other issues; yet the victorious party may seek to use its victory for the purposo of inflicting on. tho country some organic change, the importance of which was never sufficiently considered.

I repeat that the proposed change of constitution in the revising Chamber is a question of primary, importance, rather to party interpretation,, than to the real expression of the national will. If tho outlines of the subject have been correctly laid down, any changes in the constitution which makes for tho immediate and unrestrainablo expression in legislation of temporary party interpretations of tho national will, conduce to deformity rather than reformation. The change at present proposed haa never been adequately before the constituencies, and; therefore, in my judgment, tho Upper Chamber ia doing its duty by resisting it. It would be easy to lay down tho broad linos of a revisory Chamber which would deserve .well of posterity, even the most democratic. In the constitution of euch a tody let the main principles bo the qualification and independence of the members. Let tho term of office bo for life or-not less than ten years. Let tho'qualification be: (1) Age of not less than 40 yearsfor all. (2) Membership of the Lower House for not less than one Parliament, or office, for two terms at least as Mayor of a oity of not less than inhabitants, or chairman of a County Council. To these qualifications might be addod nomination by election in their respective guilds, of representatives of tho professions or trades find labour councils. From such a body of nominees, limited by possessing the necessary qualifications, the right of choice might bo left to tho Government of tho day. The number of members should bo limited, and tho possibility of a deadlock avoided, by a power vested in tho Government in the last resort to have recourse to the referendum on tho question in difference. If 60me such 6chemo bo not adopted, then stive the expense of a useless fifth wheel by tho abolition of a. Second Chamber, which, under tho proposed reform, will be deprived of all -utility.