THE SCIENCE SIDE OF

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1564, 7 October 1912, Page 5

THE SCIENCE SIDE OF

A BALKAN WAR.

IF IT HAPPENS. INTERESTING FOR OFFICERS. [By Gtro.l Ordinarily the points about a war which interest the "man. in the street," do not interest the serious student of warfare at all. Tho childish questions which are often raised in. cheap literature as to pluck, dash, elan, heroism, picturcsqueness, 'etc., make him smile, while the more '■ serious matter which is attempted in tho heavier English magazines rather weary him for lack of dennileness. You havo to read through an ocean of print to arrivo at a drop of relevant conclusion. To any of our Territorial officers' who may l>e inclined to watch the science side of a possible Balkan war it may be said, with great definiteness, that there are certain situations which nriso in the major strategy, of big wars which have repeated themselves since tho days when men fought with bows and arrows'ami will repeat themselves lill tho end of Time no matter what the weapons used may be. The theory so beloved of war correspondents that "modern weapons have revolutionised warfare," is only so much picturesque moonshine. ■ Moreover, in relation to these constantly recurring situations in major strategy, there are certain conclusions always to be drawn which are as universally true as the multiplication table or Newton's laws of motion. Given a certain set of antagonists the interesting questions are: (1) Which side will take the offensive? (2) What would be their ultimate objective? (3) What geometry on the theatre of hostilities would dictate tho strategy and movements thereon?

Ihe answer to the first question apparently is that the offensive would be undertaken by the combined forces of Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro, with (though this is not so certain) an Italian field force landed for the first tira« in European Turkey to tako a more active hand m a war in which they have already been engaged for twelve months. It may also bo added that Italy and Austria arc, owing to certain commerce complications in the Adriatic, so far from friendly, thnt tho co-operaHou of an Austrian field form against Turkey is at least problematical. Also, the reported mobilisation of seven Russian army corps is probably for some other purpose than direct entrance on to what would Ik the theatre.of war, if war should happen. Secondly, if the-=o motley forces assume the offensive, what is the objective tho capture of which would win and end the war? .Many people would'say Constanlinople. This >s not quite cetbin, though it is'very probatte. Usually, in big ware, the iiltimate objective is not a geographical one. but (he field forces of the defending si:lc which the attackers require to meet, engage, and destroy or <li?perss. That obj»cti.-o always corn?.* before the capture of any town, city, capital, etc. It sometimes lnppens, however, that the capture of _ some town or capital leads to a dissolution of civil authority, and consequent distintegration of the armies of that civil siuthori'.y. Would the capture of Constantinople be sufficient to lead to ft rapid discntegration of the Turkish forces in Europe? One is rather inclined , to think that it would. The third point is tho most interesting one. In the event of Serbs, Greeks, Bulgars, etc., attacking Turkey, what lines of strategy would be pursued with respect to lay of the, theatre of war? This is an easy question to answer. Wo should seo the old, old principle, what is known as "convergent forces" in operation once more. Ihe Bulgar army would march due south, Serbs south-east, Greeks might go north through l'hcssaly, or go to Salonika by water. Previsa add Salonika would be two tempting starting-points for the Italians, and thus a ring of convergent forces ronnd the Turkish army would be established as an initial deployment. It is a curious thing thnt divergent operations on any big theatre of war nevor did any good yet. All the Japanese operations in 1901-5 were convergent, and thoso of tho Russians more or less divergent. All Lord Roberts's operations in IiJOO were convergent until the occupation of Barberton, when the Boers doubled back all over the country. The,n the British operations became divergent, and nothing but trouble ensued until Lord Kitchener established an efficient system of block-house Hues and drives. This made operations convergent over local areas, and, as soon was done, the Boers were "dono" too. It must not be supposed, however, that the side which is convergent with respect to the defending side necessarily lias matters all its own way from the point, of view of major strategy. The defenders, ringed as they are with enemies—it would be the Turks iii Ibis case— still have tho central position, the inside running, the interior line.?. That was the silnation which Napoleon used to enjoy—his own army held well together in a central position, and he darling first, here and thon thero smiting iirst one part and then another of the encircling ring of convergent enemies. That would be the style of strategy which the Turkish coujina'iidcr? would no doubt seek In adopt It usually leads to a number of apparently disconnected and confused battles all over tlir- theatre' of war, but they are really not ?o disconnected and confuted as they look.