POINTS IN THE FINDINGS.

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1507, 1 August 1912, Page 5

POINTS IN THE FINDINGS.

THE T [TANNICS LIFEBOATS. . The Titanic was required.by the Board of Trado regulations to carry Ki boats. Although a vessel of 45,000 tons, she eiuno under tho class "10,000 tons. anil over" in the Board of Trade rules,-winch had.stood uureyised for many years. The life-saving appliances actually carried-by tho'vessel wore as follow:—It lifeboats, 2 wooden cutlers, '1 Englehart patent rafts, 35G0 life-belts, -lti life buoys. The 'capacity of the bouts was 1167 persons, and the liner held u passenger certificate to carry .'1547. Tlio total number, of souls on board at the time of the, wreck, according to the Board of Trade's information, wus L'iftS. The total number saved was 711, or -158 less than the capacity of the boots. The Ice Warnings. The full gravity of tho warnings as to ice which the Titanic, received before tho disaster was brought out in tho infiuiry before Lord Mersey on May 22. Six vessels communicated with the liner by wireless telegraphy in the course of her. voyage, and each gavo definite information of tho ico region which lay to tlio westward of her. Tho Solicitor-General drew an oblong space on the Atlantic chart enclosing .these positions, and pointed out that the Titanic .when she .struck was actually Within these limits. Tin) last iivo of tlio warnings above were received on the day of the casualty, and the final one only Uvo hours before tho Titanic ran inlo tho iceberg. lord,.Uor?py asked whether he was right in assuming from the messageiNsent to the Titanic that the ship was running into a spare (hat was bounded by icebergs to the south and north. The So-licitor-General ! said that was so, according lo tho messages. Tho President then asked Mr. Boxhall (the fourth officer of the Titanic) whether lie could explain, assuming that these messaies had been received, how it was that the Titanic was allowed lo plough her way into such a dangerous region. The witness renlied that ho did not think for i\ moment'tliat all the- messages had been received by tho Tilanie: but if I hey had been received ho was unable to explain tho navigation The Duff-Gordon Incident. The Titanic's No. 1 boat, referred to in tho cable message, was built to'hold some forty persons, but was occupied by only twelve, of whom only two were womenLady Duff-Gordon and her sceietary. George S.vmonds, one of the look-out men, was in charge of the boat, which lay off the sceno of thq disaster and made no effort to save others ivheu the Titanic sank. Sir "Rnfus Isaacs, the Attorney-General, slated at the inifiiiry on .Time 14 that there wn* a point lie wished to make clear villi reference to Sir Co.-mo and Lady l'ulT-Gordon. The view he took, as he intimated when.he called them a? witnesses, was lhat their conduct—lie was not making any -comment upon if. whatever il was—was riuile immaterial to the ifir)ili ry. The only point of calling Iheni was that _53m:' light might be thrown on a suggestii.ii (.Imt it ; wa> thought possible might underlay one part bf the slnlcliK'iit; of the fireman llemlrirkson as to bribery in connection with the boat not going back. Tile J're-ident: f have bi*eti thinking about it tibo. At present I am of opinion that T am not required, and ought not to exnress opinions upon tlio conduct of individuals in the position of passengers. Diffprcnf riiav !in-e with reference lo Mr. lsniay. but f will soy nothing about: thai at'piTM'iit. Mr. Ismay's Position. Mr. Isnin.r's main position, in his evidence. wa* (hat lie ti'ivrllr-fl ; pns>r>p_ gor. having no responsibililv for the n.-ivi-gntjnn of the liner, and iishu 111117 noun. Founding upi-a.a llarconisram from tho

steamer Baltic, which Captain Smit showed to him on tlir- afternoon of th fateful Sunday—a message containing warning about the presence of ice—th Attorney-General strove hard to couvinc •Mr. I Mnay Uiaf he occupied a posilio: somewhat higher than that of an ordinar passenger, but llr. ]sni!iy declined to L' convinced. flu ,liiue 1t tlio position of Mr. I«ma, was diseiis'vd. The pre-idt'iit. J.or Mersey, said: "N'o; afler all, the questio of (he conduct of Mr. Isniay is pnl material to tho extent to which it ma be said to have inllncnced the captain'." Sirjiufus Isaacs addtd: "And si far a it affected the' navigation of the sli.i[ mill what was done in (lie ship. I am no going to make any comment with regar ; to Mr. Ismay's conduct in leaving th ( ship m the boat at a jiarlicular momcnl ' 1 lliink il is it very difficult thing lo- dr ' terming in special circumstances whethe or not lie took the right course. I slioul ; rather suggest that it involves consider* , tions which are not quite those that ougli , to guide tho Court in their delcrmiiwi j tions." The President: I aWlutely agree. 'Was the Captain Negligent? A. few days later T.ord Mersey asko that evidence should be called to sllow t.h action taken by other shipmasters in th vicinity at tlia time of (ho disaster o receiving warnings of the ice. Lon Mersey said his reason was that ho wonli havo to .consider at the proper tin) whether Captain Smith was guilty o negligence or merely guilty of an erro of judgment. He thought his opinion oi that point would he 'greatly indueiicei by the conduct of other experienced nnvi gators traversing tin: same district at th same time. He was very anxious not b fix the blame on a man who could no come before the Court, unless the matte could be very clearly proved. The Attorney-General: You have ti take into consideration that liners whicl are in direct competition do run unneoes sary risks. They may all have dene tin same thing, Imt still it is running .11 unnecessary risk in view of the numbe: of passengers carried. The President: Of course, you ma; imagine that every man in the trade ha: been negligent for the last twenty years but I should be much more disposed t< say that a man who has followed a prac tice which has existed so long is guiltj of an error cf judgment. I am not argit ing it, but only mentioning to you tin consideration which I think might bi -given to these facts and figures. AMERICAN INQUIRY. ITS MAIN CONCLUSIONS. Tho report of tho American Senate'. l .inquiry into the lots of tho Titanic was published 011 May 28. J'hc cpminittct reached the following main conclusions:— (1) That the Titanic virtually ignored tho ice warnings. (2) That, owing to the ncii-waterligW character of tho deck at which the transverse bulkheads ended, tho supposedly watertight compartments were not reailj watertight. 1 (3)' That after the impact no genernl alarm or systnnatic warning to passenger.was given. ' (I) That the Califomian paw the distres? signals of (he Titanic and failed to respond to tliem "in accordance with the dictutes of humanity, international usage, and tho requirements of the law." (a) That la. n .k of preparation was most noticeable in regard to tho loading of th« boats, and that failure to utilise their full capacity sacrificed several hundred lives. _ '(II) That had there been much sea, it is questionable whether any boats would have reached the water /without being damaged or destroyed. (7) That, in the belief of the rommittee. proper discipline would have admitted of the concentration of survivors in some of tho boats, so that the rest of the boats might have been free to go to tho rescue after the Titanic had foundered. (8) That the telegraphist of the CarTCithia failed to shorn - proper vigilance in handling tho important work confided to his care. From these conclusion's certain recommendations, w-ere obviously inevitable.- In regard lo safety appliances,, it was suggested that boat accommodation 1« provided for everyone; that at least frur sailors bp assigned to each, boat; that Iho crew _bs drilled'least once 0 month in lowering ond rowing; that passengers be apportioned to 'boats before sailing bv groups of rooms; and that all ships with more than 100 passengers be compelled to carry two searchlights. • In regard to wireless telegraphy, the committee thought it essential that there should always be somebody 011 duty at the apparatus, which should be provided with auxiliary power independent of the main engines, and that there should be legislation against amateur operators and for the secrecy of messages. The committee, however, lays most stress upon the necessity of a number of structural re,pirements r.s to bulkhead?, safety devices, etc. Californian Censured. In the course of its report tho Committee came to the conclusion that the Titanic's lights were visible to the Levland liner Californian before the former struck the iceberg, and that the Californian must have seen the distress rockets fired from the bridge of the Titanic. It continues:— "The only reply was a counter-signal from a large white light which flashed for nearly two hours from (lie mast of tho Californian. In our opinion such conduct, whether arising from indifference or gross carelessness, is most reprehensible, aiul places on the commander of the Californian a grave responsibility. Tho wireless operator of the Californian was not aroused until 3..10 (New York time) (111 the morning of the loth. After considerable conversation between tho officers and members of the crew had taken place aboard that ship regarding theso distress signals or rockets the operaW was finally directed by the chief officer to see if there was anything the matter as the ship had been firing rockets during the night. An inquiry was thus set on foot and immediately disclosed the fact that tlip Titanic had sunk. Had assistance been promptly proffcrecl. or had the wireless operator of tho Californian remained a few minutes longer at his post 011 Sunday evening, that ship might have had tho proud distinction of rescuing the lives of Ihe passengers and crew of the Titanic."