NAVAL SUPREMACY.

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1487, 9 July 1912, Page 5

NAVAL SUPREMACY.

WARNINQ BY MR. W. H. LONG. GERMAN MENACE. By Tclcirapli—Press Association— CoDyriclit London, July 7. Speaking at Fenny Stratford, in Buckinghamshire, Mr. W. 11. Long, Unionist M.P. for Strand, commented on the gravity of England evacuating tho Mediterranean. He hoped that after the manoeuvres the battleships would return there Germany's naval law of 1912 made for tin) increased readiness of her fleet, and augmented her naval forces available for immediate action by fifty per cent. She now had twenty-nine battleships available for instant action in tho North Sea, and Britain had only twenty-seven. If tho Government took the nation uniescrvedly into its .confidence, whatever sacrifices were necessary for the safety of the Empire would bo cheerfully made. WHAT THE DOMINIONS MIGHT DO. ' The nnval correspondent of tho London "Daily Telegraph," in an article on v the reduction of tho Mediterranean squadron, says tho solid fact of the situation is that under tho new Navy Law Germany will maintain twenty-fivo lrattleships in full commission. Thero will bo sixteen other battleships in reserve, with the crows of four vessels distributed among them as nucleus crews, and tho Act definitely suggests that theso officers and men may be utilised to man four of these vessels to war strength in an emergency, raising the number of battleships fully manned to twenty-nino. This is specifically stated in the new measure.

■\Vheu the British Admiralty's scheme, of expansion has reached fruition, including tho vessels based on Gibraltar, there ivill Iw only thirty-three in full commission in the First, Second, Third, nnd Fourth Squadrons of tho Homo Fleets. If, as is suggested, the Fourth Squadron at Gibraltar is to bo held availablo mainly to support British prestige in the Mediterranean, then at our average moment we shall have only twenty-five battleships in tho Nor\h Sea and the English Channel to Germany's twenty-nine at her selected moment:

In such circumstances it is true that we should have sixteen battleships based on British ports with nucleus crews, whilo the remaining .twelve reserve battleships of Germany would be unmanned until reserves could be called up. But this does not detract from tho need which, will become increasingly urgent in a few years' time, to keep tho Fourth Squadron mainly in Northern -waters, with the conre-. quent loss of power and prestige in tho Mediterranean, sinco wo shall havo no battlo forco iu or near those waters.

The correctness of tho decision of tho Admiralty— ivith tho naval personnel and material at their command—is not questioneil bj tlio best naval opinion. But this does not render tho regret of nnval less, anil they still hope that the Dominions may decide to provide the necesomcer.s of tho highest standing any the snry "pivot" force at Gibraltar, tluis setting free at onco eight battleships for the direct defence of the Mediterranean. Emphasis is laid on the fact that theso vessels could be sent back to Malta immediately, siuco tho situation in Northern waters to which tho Admiralty's action has called prominent attention will not develop for two or three years, and in tho interval tho ships for the Special Service Squadron at Gibraltar could bo built in British yards if a basis of cooperation between the Mother Country and the Dominions could be arranged.