JAPANESE DANGER.

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1481, 2 July 1912, Page 5

JAPANESE DANGER.

IF WAR CAME--1 WHAT AN AUSTRALIAN WRITER FEARS. By Telegraph-Press Aesociation-Oopyrlirlit London, Juno .11). Tho Hon. J. A. Hogue, of Sydney, in an.-article, iu tho "Nineteenth Century and After," deals with tho growth of Japanese power. Tlio .Tnpiinisn'ion of Chin,i, ho suy.s, will eventually make Japan mistress of the Ensl. The writer emphasises Australia's vulnerability, and adds: "Any I'owev holding Australia holds tho key of South Alrica." Ho instances the recent Japanese Antarctic expedition us merely part of ii design to spy out Pacific territory. Ttio Australian opinion, in the event of (to. Anglo-German war, is that Japan Bill tako decisive action in the South Pacific. Tho keeping of Australia, tho article continues, not merely concerns Great Britain, but the United States and European Powers. This consideration alone oight to keep Germany from quarrelling with Great 'Britain, or Britain from thwarting Germany's African expansion. THK PACIFIC PERIL. The Japanese danger was the subject of an interesting «r(icio in the Montreal "Star" of Apri! 12. Tho writer says:— Tho gravity with which the American Senate and tho American President have, treated tho shadowy suspicion that llio Japanese might Ijo contemplating the establishment of n naval base at JUigdalcna Bay—in spite of tho stout denials by the Japanese Government and the tigh improbability of such a manoeuvre, —serves as an illustration of tho supersensitive tendency of tho people on this continent to look for danger from across tho Pacific. We find the snmo tendency in Canada; for it was* only the. other tiny that a British Columbian was telling the people of England that we must have a battleship fleet on our Pacific Coast ns a part of any plan for Imperial naval defence in wliich Canada will share. If this apprehension can bo felt nt all when there is no nation across the Pacific with real hitting-power except plucky little Japan, what will our attitude bo toward this possil.ilo menace when_ China is awake, armed and—if we pin-prick her enough-aggressive? There is-as wo have frequently said-the slimmest possiblo excuso for imagining that Japan contemplates anything like an attack on this continent. Nothing could bo more insane than for Japan, with her heayjybnrdoned finances." and her hugo task ot colonising Korea right at home, nml tlio immense Chinese problem confronting her hourly;, to dream of going to war with the wealthy, distant, and inexhaustible United States. And Japan has shown no signs of insanity. • The Japanese Alliance turns tho spear head" of tho Japanese Navy automatically away from us anil towards any enemies who niay arise. "But will Iho JapaneseAlliance last?" you ask. Let us see. On what does it depend? It depends absolutely on British sea power. If tho British command of tho sea wero to be broken, the 'British Allianco would instantly become worthless to Japan-; nntU under the callous code of international ethics, Japan woidd very soon find a way of escape from a worthless alliance. The alliance may not last ns long as does British sea power, but it certainly will not cficctivcly last an hour longer. . So the first requisite for keeping the Alliance in force is to help maintain the snpretnncy of tho British Navy m the North Sea. Now, if that supremacy is maintained, what is likely to be the duration of the Japanese Alliance? Well, it sprang-on tho side of Japan—irom tho fear of Russia. Russia is just now recuporating every day; and it looks as if there might soon be-juicier morsels than Korea to attract its attention to tho Inr East Aro these conditions which, will render Japan less afraid of Russia than she was when she renewed tho Allianco on tho morrow of her successful war. J Aot "riwn' Britain and Russia, have become exceedingly good frionds-they aro obviously inclined to think that -t is to the interests of both to bo found in tho same international camp, an entire change from tho tlovs wlion tho first Japanese Treaty was written. Now this implies two things -first, that so long, as Britain is the friend of both parties, slio will probablj nave influence enough to keep them from attacking each other (which tact give=.the Japanese Alliance a new value to Japan), nnd, second, if Japan quarrels with Britain, and either tries to.set i.p alone in. the world or joins the German, c>imp, she will do so in the face of the knowkdge that Britain might find herself compelled to help Russia attack -Top™And if Britain still commanded the sea. wlien this crisis arose. Germany would l>e helpless in the Far East, while the naval onuitions.affecting the transport of troops would bo the exact reverse of the last «ar. Russia could bring up her men at leisure indferw them over to Nippon under the escort of British battleships.