FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS.

Dominion, Issue 1337, 15 January 1912, Page 5

FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS.

CABINET MAKING. INDIGNATION AGAINST M. CAILLAUX. THE AGADIR INCIDENT, Bj TelcrraDh—Press Aesociatioii-Oopyrichl Paris, January 12. M. Bourgeois wns offered the Premiership, but declined to accept it. President Fallings thou offered tlio position lo M. Delcasse, who, after consulting his friends, also declined. Tho President then offered the Premiership to M. I'oincaire. Tho French newspapers are unanimous tliat the crisis must bo terminated. Tho Ministry, it is declared, wben not influenced by personal ambitions, is competent to deal with important problems. (Roc. January 11, 5.5 p.m.) Paris, January 13. M. Poincaire has accepted tho task of forming a Cabinet. M. Delcasse refused the Premiership on the ground that he did not possess (ho requisite qualities, and preferred to devote himself to his own Department. There is a feeling of indignation in Paris against M. Caillaux. The newspapers represent that his negotiations wero intended to servo tho Franco-German promoters of the Congo-lvamerun railway. The abandonment of that scheme led to tho dispatch of tho Panther to Agadir. The Paris "Journal" states that M. Do Selves (who was then Minister of Foreign Affairs) thereupon proposed to dispatch a cruiser. On the same' day M. Paul Cambon asked Sir Edward Grey, "If we send a cruiser, will you ?" Sir E. Grey replied, "Yes." After two days M. Caillaux, in M. Do Selves's absence, notifiod Sir Edward Grey that .flies cruiser decision had been postponed as it was feared it would create a grave situation. The "Journal" adds Sir Edward Grey's engagement was overruled by a majority of the Cabinet. M. Caillaux alleges that tho proposal to .send a cruiser was abandoned on M. Dclcasse's advice. ' Two Ministers declined to sign M. Caillaux's letter of resignation to the President, owing to its attack on M. De Selves. THE NEW MINISTRY. (Rec. January 15, 0.15 a.m.) , Paris, January 14. The new Ministry has becu formed as follows:— M. POINCAIRE, Premier ,and Minister for Foreign Affairs. \ M. BRIAND, Minister for Justice. M. STEEG, Minister for the Interior. M. MILLEKAND, Minister for War. M. DELCASSE, Minister for Marine. M. ICLOTZ, Minister for Finance. M. DIiPRIY, Minister for Public Works. M. BOURGEOIS, Minister for Labour. M. Delcasse and M. Klot?. held the same position in the previous Ministry as they hold in the new Cabinet. M. Stceg was Minister for Educatim in M. Caillaux's Cabinet. [M. Raymond Poincaire, the new Premier, is a member of tho French Academy. He is an eminent lawyer, and is 51 years of ago. He was Minister of Public Instruction in 1893 and 181)5, and Minister of Finance'in 1901 and I'JOG. Ho is the author of several literary works.]

BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE. STATEMENT BY SIR E. GREY. In his groat speech in tho House of Commons on Britain's' foreign policy on November 27, Sir Edward Grey (Foreign Secretary) said:— "On that day (July 1) tho German Ambassador camo to tho Foreign Office and made tho following communication:— "'Some German firms'established in tho south of Morocco, notably at Agadir and the vicinity, have been alarmed by certain ferment that has shown itself among •the local tribes due to somo recent occurrences in other parts of tho country. These firms have applied to tho Imperial Government for protection of tho lives of their employees and their property. At their request the Imperial Government havo decided to send a warship to tho port of Agadir to lend assistauco in the case of necessity to their employees ns well as to protect the important German interests in the territory in question. As soon as tho state of affairs in Morocco has resumed its former quiet aspect the warship charged with this protective mission snail leave tho port of Agadir.' "The ship I believe was then on its way to Agadir. Now that was accompanied by explanations given to us at the same time. It seemed to mo much more important than vho actual information as to tho sending of a ship. The explanations given to us made it clear (hat tho Morocco question was being opened—the wliole Morocco question—by the sending of a ship to Agadir. They made it clear that the German Government regarded a return to the status quo in Morocco us doubtful, if not impossible, and that what they contemplated was a definite solution of tho Moroccan question between Germany, France, and Spain. Tho whole question, or at least tho kernel of the question to my mind after that communication was received, was: What was tho definite solution of tho Morceoan question that Germany contemplated. If a return to the status quo was doubtful, if not impossible, then the only alternative was a definite solution of tho Moroccan question. What was tho nature of that: That was clearlv tho objective that Germany contemplated. Was it to bo a partition of Morocco, or what was it to be? That was what occupied our minds after receiving that communication. "That communication wa.s made to the Foreign Office on the Saturday (July 1). Next Monday, July 3, 1 asked tlie German Ambassador to come and see me' I informed him I had seen tho Prime. Minister and that wo considered the situation created by the dispatch of tho Panther to Agadir as so important that it must bo discussed at the meeting of the Cabinet; I would say no more pending the Cabinet meeting, but I wished the German Government to learn at once that in our view the situation was sorious and important. ("Hear, hear.")' . The next day, July i, I asked the German Ambassador to conic and sco mo again. I said that 1 must tell him (that was after the Cabinet meeting) that our attitude could not bo a disinterested one with regard to Morocco. Wo must tako into consideration our treaty obligations to France and our own interests in Morocco. We were of opinion that a new situation had been created bv the dispatch of a German ship to Agadir. "After that there was a period of silence. The German Ambassador was not instructed to make comment-to me about my communication, and we received no information from the German Government as to what their aims or desires were and what they had in mind when tliey>spoko of a definite solution of the Moroccan problem for some time. Some information reached us from other quarters leading us to apprehend that the settlement contemplated by the German Government might be the partition of Morocco arrived at by negotiation to which it was not intended that wo should bo a party. After further references to tho crisis, Sir E, Grey staled that on July 27 the German Ambassador brought a communication framed in an exceedingly friendly tone, not only to Great Britain but to France, and from Hint day forward there were no difficulties between the German Government and ourselves as to tho Morocco negotiations. In tho communications Hint followed between Franco and Germany, tho French Government: consulted us at every point where it thought local British interests might be affected—"most loyally ou every point"— and, ovontually, as all the woi'ld knows, an arrangement was camo to,