ANGLO=GERMAN CRISIS

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1329, 5 January 1912, Page 2

ANGLO=GERMAN CRISIS

THE FABER SPEECH. LORD CHAULKS HEKESFOKD OX HUSPAKEDNESS. The latter part of November, it will bo remembered, was notable for a dramatic quickening of the tempo of European politics. On November 20 a short eablo message summarised a rqinarkablo speech by Captain Fabr.r, the member for West Hunts, and this was the beginning of a series of sensational telegrams bearing on Anglo-German relations. The "Daily Mail" gives this report of Captain Fabor's speech:— Captain W. V. Faber, M.F. for West Hants, replying to the toast of "Tho Houses of- Parliament" at tho mayoral, banquet nt Andover, said: A'great deal of what he was going to say would be denied, but they could lake what he said as truth to the best of his ability, from the highest authorities or next highest that could bo obtained. Ho was not going to gloss over anything. Tho lato crisis over the State of Morocco between Franco and Germany was exceedingly grave, and at that time there was a division in the Cabinet as to whether we should . stick to France or nol.

He was next going to say things about the Army and Navy which would not bo liked by some people. What actually happened was this, and he had it on the highest authority they could have, that when the pinch came our fleet was divided into three portions—one was in the South of England, the next was near Ireland, and the other, was in the North of Scotland. He! was fairly right about . the positions of our three fleets. At tho moment we lost' of the German fleet, and no one knew where they were, and the real danger was that the Cabinet did not know what was going on. and that the German fleet might attack our three fleets separately. Another danger was this, and though it would be denied, it was true. Tho admiral in charge of one part of tho fleet knew that we wore in very grave danger of war. Ho sent a man to 'the officer commanding tho land forces, who ought to have been able to guard him with his guns, and asked him if the Ileet was safe under cover of the guns of the fort. The reply came back that, far from being safe, if the laud forts fired their guns they would fire into the British fleet instead of covering them. That ho heard from absolutely high authority,, whoso word was beyond reproach. That would tell (hem some of the dangers that beset us not Ion" ago, and tho Cabinet knew perfectly well of these dangers much better than ho did. The Cabinet were wise enough., in the time of national emergency, to sen-1 'the best man I they had got to the Admiralty. The present Government were Radical and held political views different from his, but they got hold of the best man available, and that man was Winston Churchill. They might not like it, but it was true. The first thing Mr. Churchill did was to wire for Sir John Fisher to come home from Switzerland, and the next thing was to send for Lord Charles Beresfofd, a Conservative member of the llouso of Commons. That was undoubtedlv an extraordinarily wise proccedimr. The next thing Mr. Churchill did was to form a War Board for tho' Admiralty, which could in future sea that there were 'no such mistakes again as riot having enough coal and theguns in the forts laid so that when the Nayy wanted- cover at night cloKj to land it could not havo it. They could not put tho blame on anyone; it was the system. Mr. Churchill was a wise enough man to see things were altered, and without any reference to poli-tics-.ho'(Captain Fisher)-believed he was man enough to do the job to which he had been put, He would tell them, on tho best authority, that the Army was more prepared than the Navy; for"some reason or other tile Navy was not up to the pitch of-the Army the other day. The idea at the time o'f the late stress" was to send six .divisions of regular troons to help our,ally..France, but the crab of that was,-, and he said so deliberately, that if we had sent those six divisions abroad it would have left no regular troops at home which to defend these shores, and ■ : lhe defence would-have largely fallen on the. Navy. ... . . ,

The "Observer" next day corrected C'apttiiti Riber ; on all material points. Lord Charles Beresford spoke at: Southsea on November 22, and referred to tho crisis-hud''the 'preparations'-of the fleet at that time. The British fleet,'ho said, was then divided. ,We had'no reserve of con!; thousands of tons'of coal were scut from Wales to Scotlnnd because there was none there. We had no military guards over our magazines, only a few policemen.' We 1 .-had no guards over dock gates and caissons nor over railways, where the permanent way was liable to be destroyed" at-a moment "of crisis. We had ho ;inin"o -cleavers for our ports'or fnir-wnys,-'■•notwithstanding the,fact that by the Declaration. , ' of London they wer'o legalising piracy ' and inviting danger, and we-had no oil supplies in the north, whereas the destroyers in thnt locality were consumers of oil fuel and not coai, and had to draw'supplies from battleships. All this might l>c provided for by having a war: staff at the Admiralty. A/very other nation had one, and they must be amazed that we, who owed our notional existence to the serf, had no such shit to prevent the state of things he had described. We ought to have at'least two hundred, thousand tons of conl- always ready.in reserve in the event oi' our being suddenly called into action, and most of it in floating depots, so that they could shift it to positions where it was needed, ami he pointed'out that in the late crisis the Welsh coal strike was in full swing and the railwaymen struck, and ho felt thnt there must have been .some curious association between, tho disturbance at Home and the' misunderstandings abroad. Writing on November 21, tho Berlin correspondent of the "Westminster Gazette" showed that "tho Fnber revelations" had greatly accentuated tho Anglophobia, of Germany. He says, in the course of his article:—

Ihe more important BerliiMiewspapers have dispatches from London which depict Englishmen as differing over details but agreeing in an admission that thu British Government had planned a naval attack on Germany, without itself having any conviction that Germany on.her side intended to make a breakdown of negotiations an excuse for war. ■■The National newspapers accept only half the "revelations," that is, that England was on the point of attacking, but reject the charge that England unexpectedly found herself navally unprepared. Apart from the objective probability of this interpretation, it fits in with the fashionable cry that Germany is in danger, and that shipbuilding must be accelerated, and that a fresh Navy Bill must be presented to the new Reichstag preparing for a German Navy which, in the words of a recent Liberal resolution, shall be "of even birth" with that of Great Britain. . . .".

The dispatches from London are mostly framed on lines which recall German Kcichstag speeches. That is, on one side is shown the British Foreign Office, with deep secret designs, .and on the other the blind, ignorant masses who are being 'hurried .into adventures of which they know.nothing. Even tile English Conservative press is described as being aghast at Iho anti-German war-plans of tho Foreign Oilice. The "Lokalunzeiger" describes the "astonishment and discontent of the British public over the danger into which, the -.'entente' with l:'rnnee plunged the unsuspecting country," after which follow ((notations from Unionist newspapers expressing this astonishment and discontent. Tho "Vossischo Zeitung" also has a telegram describing the alleged resentment of the British public at the. Continental entanglements in which it finds itself. The object of these dispatches and articles is 10 , represent the British Government in the same light ns Ihe GeVinan Government is represented in England—Hint is, as being capable at any moment of rushing the nation into a war which the nation neither expects nor wants. . .* .

Newspapers call upon the British Government to make clear what its action would have been if a breakdown in the negotiations' had led to Germany .requiring France to withdraw from Fez, and return to the Algccirus Act, and the l!)Hfl Agreement. In that caw, it is argued, Germany would have been formally in tho right. Tho "Berliner Tascblntt" holds that this would have certainly catii-od war, as the result of n French refusal. A member of an Embassy which was obliquely concerned in the controversy told mo yesterday that his own Government lia.l no knowledge whatever of any special British preparations for war, and did not believe that war was possible; because, had negotiation on tlio compensation basis fnilod, the German Government had no intention to make categorical demands of any kind. ... propagandists aro already exploiting "rovolatioiis" with effect, and that

the regular political parties, arc being raorf unci more compelled t.o define their atti tilde towards tlie "British I'oiiU" and to justify themselves from the charge of being indifferent to tho nationul safety. Tlio Imperial Government i>robably looks on this with mingled feelings, as tho patriotic agitation is markedly anti-Gov-ernmental; and Die National-Liberals who aw working it with most energy are at tho same timo emphasising their antagonism to Dr. von Jjcthman-lloliwcg and his Conservative-Clerical supporters;. Also the Freisiim Radicals, who arc essentially Germany's Peace and Retrenchment party, nre unable to get along without a .strong tingo of Anglophobia, begotten of tho events of the last !i\e months. However, not until after the general election will it be possible to judge how much lasting substance there is in the movement against England, and how much-is merely ..good tactics. '