ARBITRATION TREATIES

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1324, 30 December 1911, Page 4

ARBITRATION TREATIES

A few months ago, when the draft of the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty had been signed and was awaiting the ratification of the United States Senate, some surprise was caused by an article in which ex-President Roosevelt, the negotiator of peace between Russia and Japan and the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, took up an attitude which tended apparently to incite the Senate to reject the Treaty. _ The most striking and characteristic feature of the agreement, signed by Sir Edward Grey and Mr. T.aft, was that it virtually did away with all reservations as to the class of disputes that might be settled by arbitration. This had been hailed as a great step in advance, for it was felt that so long as cither of the parties to a Treaty of Arbitration could declare that* any question at issue affected its honour too vitally to admit of settlement by judicial or arbitral means, there could be no real security against war. Mr. Roosevelt, however, declared in the Outlook that ' America "ought never, to bind herself to arbitrate questions respecting her honour, independence, and integrity." He admitted that, if there were no other Powers to bo considered, such a Treaty with England would'bo permissible, because it was impossible that there should ever be war between tho English-speaking peoples, but he strongly cautioned the American Government against making any Treaty with one country, which could not be made in tho same form with another great civilised and friendly nation. Bitterly as Mr. Roosevelt was assailed for these expressions, his view after a while was admitted as not unreasonable. The Treaty was redrafted, and instead of providing for the automatic reference of all disputes to arbitrait was so drawn that tho compulsion in cases which either nation regarded as vital questions of honour extended no further than to require such disputes to be freely and openly investigated before a Commission of Inquiry. Treaties of this scope, both with Great Britain and with France, were.submitted to the Senate. The terms in each ease were identical, and it. was given out as the policy of Mr. Tai-t that America should be prepared to enter into a similar Treaty with any country in the world. This partial change of purpose probably tended to a more substantial promotion of the cause of peace. Treaties of the exclusive and closolybinding character of the first draft would necessarily come to be regarded by less friendly nations as alliances, and in fact German criticism quickly showed that Mr. Taft's efforts were actually so regarded, at Berlin. Alliances are liable, to be met bv counteralliances or by increased armaments, and thus some of tho evils which were, to have been prevented might, in the result, have'been intensified! Mr. Roosevelt was, therefore, in fffect,. as.hc undoubtedly was all the time in intention, a peacemaker. . In another and more recent article in the. Outlook Mr. ■ Roosevelt again takes objection, but on somewhat different grounds, to the "arbi-tratc-everything" policy. He now insists in general terms, and without special reference to any nation, that "such an agreement would amount on our part to a covenant to abandon our duty, to an agreement to surrender the rights of the American people about unknown matters at unknown times in the future. Such an agreement would be wicked if kept, and yet to break it—as it undoubtedly would be broken if the occasion arose—would be only less shameful than keeping it." This is nothing more nor less than a clear statement of tho original and familiar objection to unlimited Arbitration Treaties, and when the intentiou is to offer such Treaties to any and every nation, the objection is unanswerable. Mn. Roosevelt goes on to advocate a means of facilitating a settlement of disputes of the exceptional class:

to this end a provision should be inserted in such treaty i hat if either partv to it claims that a dispute involves it's vital interest, its independence, or its honour, then (always provided that neither party takes a position that necessitates immediate action by the other) upon (lie request of either parly, all questions of faet ami all questions of law involved in tho dispute shall bo referred to arbitrator?, who shall have no power to decide tiro dispute, but shall be authorised to pass upon Iho controversy as to questions of ft»;t and of law, and to recommend such adjustment of tho dispute a.- they may deem just and honourable to both the contracting nations. The recommendation of the arbitrators should then bo irivcu publicity, and, unless rejected within a specilied time by one or other of tho oontr.utiuj,' parties . . . , ahould become binding upon both,

This is the same in principle as

Iho new clause in the Treaties with Britain and Franco as finally subiniltcfl tu the American Senate by Mn. Taft. The .Senate objected to the clause, and according to our latest information, it still refused to ratify the Treaties. It may now bo reasonably hoped that, with the President and ex-President in substantial agreement upon the, policy that should be followed, and public opinion favouring the Treaties, the fionate will not much longer withhold its ratification. And time may perhaps show that in providing that the wise and necessary secrecy of diplomatic action shall in certain critical circumstances leave room for "a calm and dispassionate discussion _of the controversy before the civilised world," the negotiators of Ihe Treaties will have done more for the peaeo of the world than they could have accomplished by insisting upon the making of contracts which, under the stress of events, it might be shameful cither to keep or to break.