WHO WILL WIN?

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1253, 9 October 1911, Page 6

WHO WILL WIN?

i THE TRIPOLI EFFORT. A MAN WTO MIGIIT HAVE DONE IT. WAD EL SENOUSSI. (Br Gyro.) Does any correspondent know definitely, from reading or otherwise, whether Wad el Sonoufc-i is still alive? It is generally understood that he is dead. If he were alivo and alert Italy would be as good as "down and out." But Wad el Senoussi, apostle of holiness and right-doing (according to his lights) has not been heard of for years, and if it had not been for German sources of information, which arc ever tho moro reliable, we should not have heard of his death at all.

Wad el Senoussi was the ono man who scared Kitchener—perhaps the only man in the world who ever did so. From beginning to consummation, Kitchener's advance on Omdurman required a quarter of a lifetime to complete, and what held him back? Pfcrtly his lurking fear of tho tactical unsteadiness of the troops which ho might be called on to command—the unsteadiness of troops long accustomed to peace under fire has long been a notorious subject—but chiefly that the leader of the vast Senoussi brotherhood, might dawn in a hugely uncomfortable strategic position on his flank. If Wad el Senoussi had so appeared it would have beon necessary that Kitchener should have faced round to meet him—frontally to Senoussi, but divergent to his objective, and (as even the small youths of the upper, middle and higher classes of England who graduate for the army know) divergent operations never did any good yet.

To put it as shortly as possible, Kitchener could not have advanced up the Nilo had Wad el Senoussi have menaced.what may be called his strategic flank.

And why did not Senoussi, good Muslim as ho was, do that? Because no nation, outside of Germany, has any rational theory of war. Some sociology, somo religion, some'bookish ness, some dependence on the newspapers and magazines, debating societies, money, sentiment, a mass of catch-words delivered to a public greedy of such, and the colossal total of the humbug and affectation derived from all of these, havo made it so difficult in the present days to wago absolute war, that, pro tem, wo cannot get it. Tho London "Times" says definitely that "wo cannot have absolute war because eo many other factors come in." This is merely utterance by design. Wo shall havo absolute war by 1025, and a very sore war for us it will be.

Wad el Senoussi's obstacle in holding off from Kitchener was religion. He hated the Taiishi section of the Baggara tribe —hated the Khalifa Abduliahi, as a churchman hates a Dissenter—because, both from tho point of view of orthodoxy and doings, both from the point of view or faith and works, it seemed a smaller creed. Tho doings in Omdurman, by way of " works," and as tangible evidence of "faith," wero unspeakable, and Wad el Senoussi washed his hands of them. That is really why he stood out of the Nile war, which he could have altered so much. If he / had advanced into it, nothing could have put Kitchcned at Omdurman yet. In this present article we can only consider the old roan Wad el Senoussi and the effect which he may have if he is still alive on tho present war. Tho tactical unsteadiness of Italian soldiers and sailors is probably at present no greater and no less than it was in the sombro days when Abyssinia made its onfall on poor Baratien, and if Italy wishes to emerge from the- conflict with a whole skin, it will bo entirely necessary that that great tactical force, the Senoussi brotherhood, does not fall pell mell on top of them, their own somewhat powerful navy gives them tho option of landing in Turkey, but if they did land it seems quite safe to say that tho venture would not go very , • arn " es aro German-trained, but the .Turkish Army is by temperament far m °™ suitable to receive • the impression i "erimui system than tho Italian Army. Iho German system in its essence depends on tactical steadiness, and recklessness of death in the rank and file, and that fine virtuo is not ono of tho things which Italy can claim. A century of war can show very conclusively that she has not got them.

In endeavouring to forecast tho trend of any war the obvious way is to strike out the tilings which are impossible, and then to look squarely at the rest. Manifestly, the strength of the Italian navy gives Italy the choice of waging out the issuein. blood in any theatre of war that she pleases. Conversely, Turkey will have to light in whichever theatre of war is imposed on her.

Ihe most direct operation, and, undoubtedly the most telling one, would l>o tor the Italian standing battle squadron to bombard Constantinople, which is easily accessible from the sea. Against this must be put: (1) tho international difficulty as to taking a war fleet through tho Dardanelles; (2) the- undesirability of having shot and shell flying about among a harbour full of valuable shipping belonging to certain outside Powers. These two considerations, no doubt, render Constantinople safe. v

The next best operation, from a military point of view, would be an invasion of European Turkey by an Italian field force. Thero is no danger of Italy doing so, for tho Turkish army can indeed fisht, and Italy has no wish to again exhibit her tactical weakness on a pitched field of that sort. Wo may rule this possibility out.

The only other likely theatre of war, excepting small naval skirmishes, is Tripoli itself. Turkey cannot reinforce whatever detachments of nizam and redif sho may have there. Italy, on tho other hand, may land troops as she pleases. Which, of course, is very pretty for tho Italian Government, as long as the situation remains that way. But what if. the formidable Senoussi should be minded to take a hand in the war? One way or the other, that will probably settle it.

After only a week's instruction, Bri-gadier-General David Henderson (chief staff officer to General Sir John French) has passed tho tests and gained his pilot's certificate. General Henderson adopted tho alias of Henry Davidson while taking an aviation course at the Bristol Company's school at Brooklands. In the course of his week's training he made eight trips as a passenger, and three solo (lights. Up to the present all the army officers who have taken pilof.s certificates have been of junior rank; and it is, therefore, of no little interest that an. officer of such high rank as General Henderson Should have acquired practical experience of the new art.

Fresh heat and drought records have been made in England during tho. iirst half of August. In the City uf London there were 110.1 hours of sunshine recorded from the Ist to the lGth of the month, as against only 80.8 hours in flic same period of last year. The rainfall figures show that only .<V2in. of rain fell during tho first 1C days of the month. Last year tho quantity was .s!)m. The average maximum temperature for tho same period was 81.8, against GB.-1 last year. On tho East Coast, Claoton averaged over cloven hours sunshine a dav, tho total for tho period being 177.3 "hours. The drought is having disastrous effects all over tho country, and the milk trade has suffered severely.

Many districts in London have been visited by a severe thunderstorm which resulted in a.good deal of damage being done. Scores of houses in South London were flooded. Whilst watching a cricket match near Shepherd's Bush two men were struck by lightning and seriously injured. Firemen at several West End stations were called out to deal with fires caused by lightning. At Bnttersea the main thoroughfares wero rendered im passable by floods. Tho breaking of the drought has brought intense relief to tho farming and horticultural communities, tho heavy downpour of rain being most welcome after tho prolonged spell of fiercely hot weather.

Tho trail of a faint meteor seen on May 2 is reporled by Dr. Max Wolf, the German astronomer, to. havo disappeared instantly, but it appeared to cut'off tho light of a briiht star, nearly four seconds, '^-