A CINDERELLA STATE.

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1248, 3 October 1911, Page 5

A CINDERELLA STATE.

TURKEY'S ATTEMPTS TO BORROW. A LESSON IN EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY. When the Young Turks came into power there was not a sixpence in tho Treasury. To restore order, to secure the country from external dangers, and to find means for developing the resources of tho country, money was a pressing necessity. Recourse, therefore (states Sir Adam Block in his anuual report on the Turkish finances) had naturally to bo made to borrowing. When everything had to l>6 created afresh, and before the results of-better administration could bo felt, it was impossible for Turkey to becomo self-supporting. Better administration nnd the development of tho resources of tho country so as to establish an equilibrium in tho Budget were results which could not'be realised without money. The European Money Markets fully understood the situation, and money was at first found without difficulty. Last year Turkey set out to borrow something in the neighbourhood of ten millions sterling, in order to put her army and fleet on a better footing. She first approached Franco, tho sourcfc from which most of the Turkish loans in tho past had been obtained. France, however, made a single stipulation which proved so serious a hindrance to the negotiations that they ultimately fell through. This proviso was that a French official should be appointed to share in advising the Porto in financial affairs. Young Turkey had placed a higher rating than this on its financial standing among the nations, and declined Djavid Jiey, tho Turkish Minister i'or Finance at the time, then turned to Germany for aid. Tho Austro-Germnn banks oflered. instead of a real loan, an advance of .£0,000,000 at C per cent., for a term of six months only—a term so short that Turkey must of necessity secure another loan, which in the end would cost her far more than an original long-term Icon from France, the interest on which would have been only 1 per cent. Jjjavid licy soon found himself negotiating with financial institutions not of the highest class. Unsuccessful with these,, lie fell book on Sir llrnosr C'ns?»l nnd tho National Hank; but tho British Government stepped iii ami vetoed tlio nromised loan by that institution. Nothing remained but to accept, the assistance promised him bv some German financial institutions, the net result being that in lieu of 11.000,000 Turkish pounds (a Turkish pound is worth alraut 18s.1 which V'onntr Turkev would have received from the Ottoman Bank, she received from her German friends only 8.381.000 Turkish Bounds—a were enough lesson at the hands of French diplomacy even for tho snlf-conh'dont new regime at Constantinonla.

Tho "Spectator," in a recent article on Turkish finance, said: "That tho expenditure of the Toung Turk Uovernnient is out of proportion to tho resources of the country is admitted by nil competent observers. But even bo, thero are of course degrees of disproportion; and thero aro financial mistakes which can bo remedied just as there are financial mistakes which cannot. Three weeks ago, in discussing the political situation in Turkey, we quoted irom an .article in a French review- which mado ii very gloomy survey of Turkish finance. The writer spoke of the habit of contracting loans which had grown like tho drug habit. 'Die Government, he declared, renders no adequate accounts; no ono can say exactly how the recent loans have been expended, and the same thing is true of tho indemnity paid by Austria-Hun-gary after Bosnia and Herzegovina, were annexed, and of tho largo sum of money to have been discovered at Yildiz Kiosk. "Wo have ourselves for some lime mistrusted the excessivß expenditure on tho Army and Navy. Kir Adam Block does not "deny that this expenditure is unjustifiable. After retailing tho cost of the Army and Navy, he. says: " '1 fear that every friend of Turkey must feel disappointed with these figures, as the expenditure is excessive under existing financial conditions. Tho military and naval expenses represent 33 per cent of Hie total expenditure, and if tho extraordinary expenditure is taken into account the proportion is 39 per cent. Leaving the Great Powers aside, the expenditure in Greece in 1009. as far as 1 am able to. get the figures, for tho army nnd navy combined, was 21 per cent.; in Bulgaria it was 23 per cent.; in Servia 26 per cont.; and--in Roumania 13 per cent.' "Uo finds, however, excuses for this enormous expenditure of 39 per cent.:— 'Tho general-feeling in Turkey was that the moment was critical, and it was believed that with this outlay tho country would be secure and the Government better able to proceed with tho peaceful development of its resources. Although not productive expenditure properly so-called, military and naval expenditure may sometimes be considered as indispensable. The Minister of Finance, who, like eiinilar Ministers in other countries, was harassed by the demands made upon him by tho Departments of War and Marine, huil to give way.'" TURKEY'S HANDICAP. THE LAWS OF NEUTRALITY. BLOCKED BOTH ON LAND AND SEA. Turkey, in her contest with Italy labours under a double handicap—the inferioritv of her navy, and lier inability to tend her troops into Italy overland. On land she would be a formidable opponent for her «nemy, but without a violation of neutrality there seems no chance whatever of tin , two armies meeting. The rule? of warfare as observed by the Powers of Europe impose strict obligations on neutral.States which do not wish to bo drawn into a contest. If Turkey, for instance, wore lucky enough to have sufficient money to buy, say, _u South American Dreadnought or two, fit to smash the best ships in tho Italian fleet, no South American State could sell the Dreadnoughts without, in effect, becoming Turkey's ally and laying itself open to reprisals by Italy. Nor could Turkey march nor troops overland to Italy through Austria-Hungary, unless either that Power joined with, her against Italy or sho was prciwral to fight both Italy and Austria-Hungaj-y. Tho duties of 'belligerent States to neutrals may-bo summarised as follows:— 1. To refrain from carrying on hostilities within neutral territory. 2. To abstain from making on neutral territory direct preparations for acts of hostility. 3. To obey all reasonable regulations made by neutral States for tho protection ot then neutrality. 4. To make reparation to any State whose neutrality they may have Violated. The duties of a neutral Stato to a belligerent State are principally:— 1. Not to give aimed assistanco to either belligerent or grant to one privileges denied to the other. 2. Not to supply belligerents with money or instruments of warfare. 3. Not to allow belligerents to send troops through its territory or levy soldiers therein. i. Not to suffer belligerent agents or its own subjects to fit out armed expeditions within its dominions, or increase therein tho warlike force of any belligerent ship or expedition. h. Not to permit its subjects to enter the military or naval servico of tho belligerents, or accept letters of marquo from either of them. G. To make reparation to any bolligeient who may have been seriously and specifically injured by failure on its part to perform its neutral duties. THE POWERS THAT GOVERN TURKEY. THE COMMITTEE AND THE JEWS. PRO-GERMAN INFLUENCE. Tho mysterious Secret Committee of Union and Progress which brought about ths Turkish revolution three years ago is still the power behind the throne in Turkey. Tho Committee in its three parts— at Constantinople, at Saloniki, and at Monastir—rules the Parliament and rules tho Cabinet. Ministers are important only in so far as they speak for tho Committee. Thero is not an autocracy—that danger lias disappeared; but thero is an almost absolute authority exercised by an uns?en almost unknown, and wholly incalculable body. Tliis has been tho case all along since the Revolution of July,. 1908; Kiamil Pasha, the Grand Vizier and Prime Minister, fell in tho spring of 1909 because he would not obey the unseen Committee. Now it still remains as the real power behind the Sultan (who is an amiable nonentity) and tho Ministry. Martial law still obtains in Constantinople, writes Sir William Eamsay in the "Manchester Guardian," (hough it is exercised so gently that the mere foreigner would never observe it, and it certainly is not an evil, so far as public appearance shows. But this governing Committee is not in harmony with Moslem sentiment either in Turkey or beyond Turkey, though it has learned in tho reactionary movement of April, 1909, that it must respect that sentiment nnd keep it placated. The Committee, in this dangerous position, cannot afford to indulge too far in internal quarrels, and yet, the dissensions within are acute. It lias been alleged that behind tho Committee there is again somo secret force which is using it as its instrument. This force is supposed by many to bo the power of the Jews. That the Jews, aro at least a power of enormous importance in Turkey has long been said by everybody. It is a liighly unpopular power, and' it hides itself; Djavid Bey, the lato Minister of Financo, was the only Jew in openly declared authority, and lie belongs to the nominally Moslem sect of Jews, the Diinme. "What truth there may be in this suggestion of an ultima to moving cause," continues Sir William Ramsay, "I am unable to say. The Ministry and the Government have always as y*t "opposed the schemes for settling colonies of Jews in any part o fthe Empire, both the Zionist, movement and the plans of tho 'Association Israelite' for the purchase of loud in Anatolia. This cause, if it is a real one, as many people say, both Turks and foreign observers, is working for some far more remote end than such simple things as colonies. Shrewd observers are found who declare that this hidden Jewish power is working for some more ambitious purpose, a game in wliich a srrcat Moslem army forms a mere pawn to bo played as occasion requires and sacrificed as occasion requires. At present it is wholly pro-German; the press, which is violently anti-English, is controlled by Jewish influence, and written sometimes by .lews; but no one can believe that tho Jewish prime force (assuming it to exiM) is Geniianonhil. Accordingly, it is i'lvolved in tins theory that the Germans also aro a mere pawn in the Jewish game. Is all this a fantastic dream, or is them some truth in it? Ido not venture to express or to liold any opinion." .