WAR.

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1247, 2 October 1911, Page 6

WAR.

People have grown so accustomed to prolonged negotiations in connection with international disputes and disagreements .that the sudden plunge into hostilities between Italy and Turkey will comc as a shock to all who have not given any close attention to what has been going on between the two nations. The aggressive step taken by the Italian Government is not altogether the hasty decision which it may at first sight soem; but its conscquences may be none the less serious on that account. For some time past Italy has been sceldng to extend her interests and

influence iri NorthoVn'• Africa, and siio could liai'dly have chosen a better opportunity ttiaiv the present, so iar as Turkey •ls-'couccrried. . The reasons her' Government give for the sudden determination to proceed''to t-iie extreme of war do not . soiinit, ■very convincing, but this is as olten as not the-'case in such circumstances. Italy wants Tripoli, and tlie only 'method-left to her to secure it—peeing ttiat the Turkish . Government havo refused to lease itr-tyas to pick a quarrel at an opportune time, and she ha-s done so. ./J.'nis'does'not necessarily mean that' grounds for complaint do not exist. Turkish rule is provocative of trouble with other nations having interests which conliict with, or are subject to, Turkish influences. ■ Tho loting Turks have done something to liberalise and improve their methods of government, but up to the present time this has had comparatively small effect on the persecutions by officialdom, and Turkish rule is still a by-word amongst the nations of the world. A sinister feature of the present situation, however, is the idea that Italy has taken advantage o£ the Moroccan situation to further her own ends regarding Northern Africa. Germany's attitude in playing' the part of mediator between Italy and Turkey would seem on the face of_ it to discount the idea that she has 'any other purpose in view than' to strengthen her influence with Turkey; but Italy after all her ally, and the reasons for Germany's diplomatic actions arc not,.always to bo found on the surface. The possibilities underlying the conflict between Italy and Turkey are serious enough in themselves, but it is ratHcr from the complications which may arise out of the struggle that the real danger threatens. The Turkish Government are in a most unhappy position, and it would appear to be quite hopeless for them to expect to make any really effective fight for their • African .possession. • Without a navy worthy the name, it is practically impossible for them to transport troops to Tripoli, and they cannotat the moment strike'any really effective blow at their aggressors. At the outset, therefore, it Would "seem that Italy must succeed in occupying Tripoli. But this, will merely be the beginning of her real troubles. The occupation of a few coastal towns would no doubt have a certain ieffect on trade, but if tho people 'arc really determined to resist Italian domination of the country, and they receive the support of the powerful Moslem sect known «s the Sanusi, which it has been announced wiH be given the Turks, then the Italian Government will probably discover that it lias undertaken a very great task indee'd. Of course, in a war with Turkey the scenc of conflict would not necessarily be confined to Tripoli. With the advantage it possesses through the overwhelming strength of its navy, the Italian Government can harass the Ottoman Empiro along practically the whole length of its coast line; in fact, the first blow in the war seems to have been struck at Prevesa, in Soutli-Westcrn Turkey, where a Turkish gunboat was sunk. To add to the_ troubles of Turkey, it is not unlikely that advantage may be taken of her predicament by those States in the .Balkan Peninsula which resent her op* prcssivc domination, and she may have her attention very fully occu- . pied in more directions than one. The seeming hopelessness of the position of the Turks would indeed appear to point to the possibility of a very early ending of the war. This view, is strengthened by the fact that the Italian Government must be aware of the difficulties which confront it in the way of subduing the (people of Tripoli by force of arms, and may in consequence be willing to fall in with a proposal which will afford some chanco of a peaceful occupation. It may be that Germany has anticipated this situation in the event of_ hostilities occurring, and that the Kaiser will, in his role of mutual friend, be able •to bring about a settlement which, while giving Italy practically all that she requires in the way of t control of Tripoli, will at the same time enable Germany to claim the gratitude of tho Turks for having extricated them from a very awkward situation, without having to suffer the' full ignominy of the complete loss of Tripoli.' With an empty exchequer ancl-an obsolete navy, what else'can the' Turks do but yield on the best terms procurable 1 They may hopo for complications which will embroil other nations, but it .is a forlorn hope. ,