The Dominion. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1911. MOROCCO AND WAR POSSIBILITIES.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1222, 2 September 1911, Page 4

The Dominion. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1911. MOROCCO AND WAR POSSIBILITIES.

Owing no doubt to the strikes in Britain the position of affairs in relation to Morocco has had scant attention of late With the cessation, temporary or otherwise, of the strik-es, the matter is likely to force it-self to the front once more. We should like to be able to say that during the interval that has elapsed since wc last wrote on this subject tho outlook has sensibly improved. We cannot. On the contrary, the few items of information that have been allowed to leak out are anything but reassuring. Of the items of recent news, one of the latest calls for first consideration. Wc arc told that the French Ministry has approved of the French Premier's instructions to their Ambassador in Berlin, in regard to territorial compensation in the Congo for Germany in exchange for absolute recognition of French rights in Morocco. It would be difficult to count the number of meanings that can be deduced from these few words. In themselves, then, the words arc curiously and absolutely inconclusive. They mean nothing, save to those who, being behind the sccncs, know everything. But if they arc considered in the light of an earlier cable, which told us that the German press attributes ■ iia apparently unexpected firmness shown by France to the support that she is_ receiving from Great Britain, then it may well be that the minimum of Germany's demands and the maximum of France's concessions are still, as is hinted to-day, far apart. The most ominous sign of all, however, undoubtedly is the action taken by Lloyd's in further advancing the rates on war risks. Lloyd's is a corporation of very shrewd men. Tncy arc far too shrewd to raiso rates to create and profit by a scare, because they know well that a rise in rates is as certain to be followed by an immediate contraction in the volume of business. It is, however, essential to their business that when international trouble looms largo they should have the very best and latest "inside" knowledge of the position from day to day. Wc cannot doubt that they have it, and that tlic sudden and heavy rise in rates is an indication of the situation, and is commercially justified by the immediate outlook. If further evidence is needed that the world's pcacc has been in real danger ever since the Germans landed at Agidir, and still is, it is to be found in the published fact that our chief arsenals at Home arc being guarded day and night by a largely increased armed force. Many people will say that a conference o£ tho interested Powers is the obvious remedy for the present strained situation. A conference to be satisfactory must be firmly limited to lirst causes, and must refuse recognition of any subsequent events as creating any new Tights. Germany's most serious excuse for landing an armed force was that France had broken tho terms of tho Contention of Algeciras. Therefore, the first, and possibly in the event the only, issue for a conference should be for Germany to prove her case. If she fails she must back down —or fight without cxcuse or justification. If she succecds, then she has established a case for the tearing up of the old Convention, and the not light task of framing a new one, that will be reasonably fair to all parties, and which, from the English point of view, will prevent Germany from securing the best harbour on tho Morocco coast and a, footing in Morocco. Any conference that does not start on the basis here outlined seemS to us to bo merely a puttingoff of the evil day to a day when our pre-Drcadnoughts, having bccomc obsolete, our Navy will be barely, if at all, stronger than ths German Navy. A pcace that can only be preserved by giving way, wholly or in'part, to each new act of German bluster and aggression, is considerably more costly than war, for each successful "grab" of territory and harbours by Germany will increase her opportunities of harrassing our commcrce.