The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 1911. NATIONAL SERVICE.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1183, 19 July 1911, Page 6

The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 1911. NATIONAL SERVICE.

The landing of the German ( marines at Agadir has raised a very natural question. It is this: Would this apparently uncalled-for intervention, have taken p'lacc if Great Britain had been in a position to render any real military help to Prance'! The answer to it is, of course, uncertain, but it affords room for reviewing Britain's military position to-day. If Great Britain, for instance, were able to land 300,000 trained men cn the flank of a German advancc into France the whole European outlook would be changed. However, the German General Staff knows far better than our own people how impossible it would be to send any appreciable number of trained men to the assistance of France. That the German view is literally correct with its corollary that our military weakness must be a factor in lessening our influence in deciding the question of a great European war may bo deduced from the full reports of the debate on Lord Roberts's motion. We have already made use of figures similar to those quoted in the debate, but wo give them here, because they are of later date. Lord Roberts is not, and never has been, called an alarmist. Ho, is not, and never has been, a "party" man. He has always sat on the "cross-benches" in the House of Lords, save that when making an important spccch h! has sometimes moved to one of the "party" benches for the purpose of being heard more easily. Ho is neither an alarmist, nor a "party" man. He is just "Bobs," the most

adored man in the British Army and the greatest living British authority 011 his subject. He says of Lord llaldane's new system just this:

"Tho same radical defects existed in the neiv, as in t'lio old, organisation, and would never be remedied until officers and men wero given prolonged and practical training. Tho Regular Army hail lieen reduced by over ,10,000 men. Tho special reserve, though available for foreign service, was composed mainly of boys who could not bo depended on to withstand the hardships of war, and, in addition, was somo thousands weaker ill

numerical strength than the old militia. Whilo tho Territorial force was almost as lamentably inefficient in training, and even more hopelessly insufficient in numbers than had been the volunteers . . .

in tho South African war. Lord Ilaldane's ideal deniitndoll !< >-<ftfur conditions.- First was a trained army of seven or eight or liino hundred thousand men, and militraining for boys at, schools. After waiting three years thev had got less than 270,000 men, practically all untrained; tho infantry unable to shoot; the artillery unacquainted with the rudiments of their service, armed with an inferior gun, and dependent on hired horses; the yeomanry with,.at the outside, one horse to every three men."

Ho later gave it as his opinion that we- must lw prepared to meet an invasion of at least 150,000 men, it being easy to convey that number now in considerably fewer ships than would _ have been required for 70,000 men six- years ago. And he wound up by pulverising Lord Haldane's basic theory that the expeditionary forcc could be kept at home for six months after the outbreak of war, to enable the Territorials to reccive some hurried training, instancing tho not improbable ease of serious trouble arising in Egypt and India. His argument on this point has since gained added strength from one of the various reasons given by the German press for tho landing at Agadir, which is, 'and it is not extremely improbable, that Germany desired to be in a position to raise the tribes against Franco when the proper time is deemed to have arrived. The correctness of the figures given by Lord Koberts and others may be gathered from the fact that thoy dominated the debate, and were unchallenged either by Lord Haldane or by any other Government speaker. Lord Roberts was by no means tho only speaker who stated undeniable truths that ought to bo faccd without delay. Loud Milxeu stated what most people will believe to be a sound dictum when he said that "the expeditionary force (of to-day) would not have any serious effeefc in the event of a great Continental war. They ought to have such a forcc as would prevent their military strength being regarded as a negligible quantity." And ho placed his finger on one of the worst defects of the voluntary system, one necessarily caused by its failure, viz., that that system should, but does not, give either the expeditionary force or the Navy freedom from the primary duty of clofcncc of the Home shores. They have now to do what Loud Haldane's much-vaunted system should, but does not, do. Space will not permit us to quote as freely from other speeches as we should like. But some figures furnished by Lord j\liddleton (an ex-Secretary for War), and also unchallenged, are too startling to be. passed over. Ho told the House that out of 265,000 Territorials, 131,0G0 had under two years' service, 83,000 were under 20 years of age, 100,000 did not fire their musketry course last year, 2-1,000 did not attend camp, and there was a shortage of 1500 officers. In the face of these quotations, few people will dissent from Lord Amptiiill's appeal to Lord Haldane to bring about an agreement between political leaders which would ensure national service.

We' (ire inclined to think that Lord Ajipthill's appeal suggests the true line of attack to be adopted by the National Service League, and by all outside its ranks, who love their country. To-day, as for the last ten or twenty years, at least one of the two great political parties is content to wait for the other party to make the first move towards compulsory universal military training and to intend to make that move n big card in the political game. Therefore, to mildly ask the leaders of either party to mate the move is useless. Neither persuasion nor entreaty is of avail, Pressure, strong simultaneous preiEUvo from within

the ranks of each party, pushed even to the extent of a withdrawal of party allegiance, when it is most lucded is the only thing that will produce the desired effect. This pressure the National Service League is in a position to organise as regards both parties, for, although it probably has more supporters un tho Conservative benches than un those opposite, it has many true friends on the latter, and (hey are of the class that will not hesitate to join with pr.rfy opponents in an essentially non-party matter such as the safety of the Empire, and Lord Rorkrts's Bill would probably bo the inevitable minimum of their demands.