The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, JULY 5, 1911. GERMANY THE ENEMY.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1171, 5 July 1911, Page 6

The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, JULY 5, 1911. GERMANY THE ENEMY.

It is not chance, nor the machinations of politicians or gunmakers, that has made the question of British naval policy so largely a question of Britain versus Germany, and, as a consequence, the policy of Germany a matter of live interest to the oversea dependencies of the Empire. Germany really is the only danger to the general peace of the nations. Therefore, although they need not trouble themselves about the details of the very complex tissue of conflicting rights involved, New Zealanders ought to realise some of the aspects of the sudden war-cloud over Morocco arising out of the dispatch of a German gunboat to Agadir. Alone amongst the great Powers, Germany regards war, and the threat of war, as instruments of policy. British statesmen regard war as,something not to be spoken of or thought of excepting as a final settlement of a vital and hrpeless quarrel over life-and-death issues; pnd this is at present the view of the French, the Russians, the Japanese, and the Americans.

Germany, on the other hand, or,

rather, German • statesmen —dominated by the Bismarckian tradition,

and eager to extend and strengthen German inlluencc on the world (an ambition noble in itself)—regard

war or the threat of it as what may

Ibo called a common implement of national toil. This is the only conclusion possible from the events preceding the war of 1870-1, the Algeciras Agreement of 190G, and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1903. it is, moreover, traditional with German Governments to regard war as a solvent of internal troubles. As long ago as June of last year the London Spectator, dealing with this latter point, suggested that we might expect from the extraordinary growth of Socialism in Germany, and the German Government's need to quiet the ferment, that Germany might find some means of provoking international trouble in 1911, an election year. .': This suggestion seems to have been a very far-seeing one. The French advance on jj'ez began a couple of months ago to be made the text of Chauvinistic articles in the German press, which is still very largely under the thumb of the German Chancellor. The most serious fact in the present situation is that whu-h is

pointed, out by the Monwig Post, as recorded in one of to-day''s cable messages/ Germany, the I'osl points out, would not have given orders to the gunboat without calculating all the possibilities. Its action, there-

fore, meant that it felt certain that the German Wavy was "ready for any _ emergency"—and, of course, British intervention may be one of the emergencies. The lesson to Britain is obvious. The, tone of tho German press is tho reverse of pacific, despite its assurances of Germany's honest intentions; and the Rhenish Westphalia Times has said that the dispatch of the gunboat 'may have the effect of the Ems telegram." This is a reminder, not only of the Bismarckian tradition tut of the readiness of Germany to suspend ordinary ethics when diplomacy requires her to do sj. tt-.e ' King of Prussia was at Ems, and Bismarck at Varzin when the discussion arose concerning tho candidature of Peince Leopold of Hohen-zoi-lern for the German Throne, ino Drench Government had provoked Prussia, and Bismarck, seeing a chance of war, left for Berlin to consult Moltke and Boon. On the way he was-informed by telegram of the withdrawal of the Prince's candidature, and, seeing the chance of war gone, he telegraphed his resignation to the King and was summoned to Ems. Ho made some excuses and in the meantime France had asked the King to sign a humiliating letter. On being asked for his advice, Bismarck telegraphed • Signature impossible." The French Ambassador had meanwhile been negotiating with the King, who sent a long telegram to Bismarck of such a kind that on its arrival while Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon were at dinner, they were depressed at the pacific end of their schemes. Bismarck, however, "doctored" the telegram, as he himself afterwards boasted, in such a manner before giving it to the press that the French were maddened at the thought that their ambassador had been insulted. War followed.

In the present case, war is only a possibility at the most. It may even be considered so small a possibility as not to be worth troubling about. But there is one important point not to be overlooked. Although it still holds the Bismarckian view of war as a simple "instrument of policy," the German Government has no Bismarck to use the instrument; and when if only wishes to threaten war it may blunder right into war through going too far to draw back. The lesson of the incident is plain whatever happens, namely, that Germany is a permanent menace to peace. Those who hope that the natural objection of the German citizen to war means anything at all are deluding themselves.. When Russia was in 1908 opposing Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina the German Ambassador one day suddenly demanded from liussia an instant acquiescence in the annexation. The demand was made in such terms that Russia yielded at once. In a fow days it became known that Germany had massed 200,000 troops on

the Russian frontier. Nothing could be more foolish than to shut one's eyes to the meaning of such facts as these. Germany is the enemy— nut the natural or unnatural enemy of Britain, but tlio enemy of security through her conception of the purposes of war and warlike policy.