MILITARY NOTES.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1019, 7 January 1911, Page 12

MILITARY NOTES.

[Edited Bt Echelon.] INFANTRY FIRE IN WAR, A REVIEW OF A GERMAX TREATISE. Those of my Teaders who followed the rcccnt controversy which was conduclcd in this column on the subject of the bull's-eye and service target shooting will remember that each Side made frequent reference to the value claimed fur this or that particular kind of musketry practico ns a training for war. Since the close of the controversy I have been looking for something which would serve to illuminate certain aspects of tho question, the importance of which was not sufficiently stressed at the time, and from a recent issue of R.P.M.L ("Recent Publications of Military Interest"), I have extracted a most interesting and critical precis of "Tho Tactical and Moral Importance of the Depth of Dispersion of the Cone of Infantry Fire in War" (Major Von Immanuel, Battalion Commander, 158 th (Lorraine) Infantry Regiment), which is deserving of reproduction. : Says tho writer: — "Tho now musketry regulations for the German infantry which have recently appeared afford us an occasion for turning our attention to tho appreciation of infantry fire under service conditions. Here wc are met by a question of which sufficient account is not. taken either in peace training or in estimating the resufts of field tiring in pcaco Though it is a true saying that the effect of fire in war is only a very small fraction of that obtained under peace conditions, still it is an' axiom that the bettor the firo control, the i steadier the men and-the stricter their ! fire discipline, the greater will bo the ef- ! feet of lire in battle. From this fundamental statement wo must deduce the requirements which peace training should fulfil. A rifle which is equal to modern requirements certainly assures us that the flatness of the trajectory and the ever-increasing depth of the beaten zone will compensato tu a certain extent for tho errors of the firers, and that at the more important battle Tanges, that is to say, at the so-called close and medium I ranges (up to 1300 yards), the character- I istics of the riHe will produco some re- 1 suit provided tho performances of the fuors are moderately satisfactory.. It is well known that, particularly in Russia," ; the opinion has for some timo been held j that the natural depth of dispersion of i fire of"a rifle wi<h a very flat-trajectory must give'sufficiently satisfactory results if the fire commanders succeed in finding tho correct elevatiDn, and if tho men bring their rifles in to the shoulder horizontally, and pointing in the required direction, witli tho sights correctly adjusted. It has even been believed, on this hypothesis, that it was' possible to do away with firing at field targets on the classification, ranges as a preliminary to field firing, since more reliance was placed <;pon the rifle than upon tho man who handled it. The lessons of the war of jri77-78 appeared to corroborate this conclusion, and to give force to the old saying that the soldier who, under the influence of battle, brought his Tifle to tho shoulder and "fired with his sights correctly adjusted was efficient, even if ho did not aim at any particular target. . "The lessons of the most recent wars have shown that this 'distribution of fire' was fundamentally fallacious. It is true that battle firo which shakes the nerves will show results, even when the troops are efficient, which involuntarily recall this 'distribution of fire* theory. But is it not a great error to take sucli results as the starting point for peaco training? Certainly it is. They must rather bo combated by reasoning, training, and habit, so that they have as little influence as possible in battle. Musketry training will then have as its object the manipulation, of a rifie which is technically perfect by'men- who are physically and morally traindd to mako tho,greatest possible uso rifle hy its ®W does nothing, -but it is trained intelligence and steady .work which show how the rifle is to be used effectually/ Freiherr von Lichtenstern adds that 'the existence of the cOile of fire" should have 'no meaning to tho" men, but only to' the fire commander.' The absolute determination of tho man, which must never- allow him to fail to hit a definite target with every round, at every distance for which elevation is ordered, even in the loudest roar of battle and under the. depressing influence of ever-present danger,- is the only antidote to that nervous, uncontrolled and unaimed fire which,' in battle, is the mark of wavering troops. That is the funda--mental truth- to which the question may be reduced.

"The German musketry regulations are' based on these principles: anil maintain them in tho latest edition. The regulations take no account of figures which, Jthough they , mako a fine. show under peaco conditions, are unreliable as. a criterion of results under the strain of active service. It is shown that the extent of tho depth of dispersion is affected, not only by the quality of the rifle and of the ammunition,-but even more by other influences. Besides the effect of weather (light and direction of wind) and the technical conditions which affect shooting (visability of target, number of Tifles, duration of fire, rato of fire, range, nature of target, facilities for observation), by far tiie most important considerations are fire-control and the performance of the firers. These performances depend upon the degree of musketry training and of self control, and upon the moral and physical'condition, of the men, that is to say, on those fundamental attributes without which success is impossible. The best rifle is useless in the hands of unsteady and unreliable troops. The musketry regulations take all these considerations into account, and show us how steadfast trcops capable of enduring the effoct of fire must be trained, and led, and how. such training and leading conduco to the security both of leaders and" men. It is added that, in field firing under peace conditions, a much greater, number of ;hits is nearly always obtained than would be the case in corresponding conditions in war. 'These points must be thoroughly, explained both to leaders and men, in order that false inferences as to fire effect may not be dr^wn.'

"What, we would ask, does the experience of actual fighting teach as to the effect of -the depth of dispersion ? All armies at the present day "have accepted the. principles - of. training and insriictiou which the German Musketry Regulations advocate, with certain natural exceptions as to details, such as descriptions of fire and choice ti: elevation. Aimed fire is therefore everywhere the basis of fire in peace, for the object of musketry regulations is to make tho necessity. for'the careful aiming of cach t shot an instinct both with the leader" and the man. But the conditions aro altered under the. disturbing influences of battle." In actual battle it will happen that a portion of ,ti:emen, let us hope the larger portion, will preservo their self-control and fire steadily. \ They will, as the. regulations direct, consider the target quietly and intelligently before each shot, aim and nress the .trigger correctly and husband their ammunition, that is to say, they will only .fire when a target or a portion of a position is clear enough to be recognised. But let us not deceive ourselves. The remaining portion, under the disturbing influences of the hail of fire rained upon them by rifles, machine-guns, and artillery, of tho roar of battle, of the groans of the wounded, 1 and of the sight of tho will be seized by. no small degree of excitement, and will lose their nerve and steadiness. These men will forgot everything that they have learnt in peace. In brief, they cannot be depended upon to deliver a steady, well-aimed firej they will badly, there will be no question of aiming, and the result will be a volume of unaimed fire. This will result in firing high and in waste of ammunition, that is to say, tho dentil of the oone of fire will be unduly increased. The results of this upon the effect of the fire as a wholo are evident. The steadier tho troops aro, the higher their morale, tho better their fire discipline and selfcontrol, tho ■ greater the influence of the lenders and of the intelligent men, the better will such troons shoot, and tho more will tho effect of their fire approximate to that obtained under peaco conditions. The writer, at the conclusion of his article, sums up his ideas of the tactical and moral importance of the cone of dispersion of infantry fire in war, aud of the value of long range fire, as follows:— "(1) AVith good firo control a cone of dispersion which is as concentrated as possible is tho surest guarantee of success. The size of this cone is a testi-

mony to the instruction, graining, nerve, and self-control of .-the troops, and is* therefore the mark of their moral value. "(2) This fact touches the fundamental principles of the training of the troops. It shows us the road which peace instruction and training must follow, i.e., 'strengthening of hand, nerve; and heart • against the disturbing "influences, of the battlefield. This process must bo founded iiuon the spirit and devotion of the troops, and, above all, supported by strict arid thorough discipline and trained instinct. The, qualities produced by such . training, taken together, give us the assurance that battle will bring with it 110 surprises and, disappointments, or, at any rate, no exceptional surpris:s and disappointments in regard to the anticipations which we have formed in the quiet and orderly school of peace training. • "(3) We must certainly take into account the long range .fire, which results from unsteady • and nervous men firing too high, both. as regards the effect our own fire and as regards the effect which tiie enemy's fire will-have upon tho organisation of the rear of our line of battle. ■ - > "(l) There is no doubt that such fire ■will cause losses, and we must therefore adopt measures to reduce these losses to a minimum. But "the chief means of overcoming the physical and moral effect of such losses lies in the steadiness and the quality of the troops. Only .good troops will come through these first impressions without loss of efficiency,, and will' look upon this long range fixe -as 'wasp bites' which are not of much account. IToral force, discipline based on training, and firm conviction of the cessity for self-sacrifice are the surest guarantees of success." .