THE BRITISH ARMY CONDEMNED.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 949, 17 October 1910, Page 7

THE BRITISH ARMY CONDEMNED.

GERMAN EXPERT VIEW,

GOOD MATERIAL WASTED BY POOR

LEADERSHIP. AN UNSPARING CRITIC. i -—; — 1 By Telcirrp-ph—Press Association—Copyrieht. (Rec. October 16, 5.5 p.m.) Berlin, October 15. Colonel Gadke, the well-known German military writer, in an article in tho "Berliner Tageblatt" on the" recent British Army manoeuvres, expresses the conviction that tho British Army wall not compare with the French, German, Austrian, or Japanese. On its present training it is not,' he declares, fit' for conflict with a Continental army, and Great Britain is not to be placed among the first-class military Powers. ~. Tho British raw material Colonel Gadke considers to be eminently good,; and need yield to no; other in the world. . Tho weakness of the Army in his eyes is that the commanders have no idea of handling troops-in masses', and . the generals have' adopted unsound tacr tics.; ,'.-J GERMAN STYLE AND OURS. . A CRITICAL COMPARISON. [Br Gyro.] Fairly and squarely this represents the Continental view of English military ideas. Colonel'Gadke, who saw the Japanese way as representative of the ''BecTagblatt," knows his subject, and he. himself is known as a very fair' military analyst who never allows mere national prejudice to run away with him. At this end of' the ..world our only mean 6 of comparing ■ the : military knowledge of' British officers' with that of Continental commanders is by their writings on the art of war. Of our own war literaturerand it is f from .war. literature that .our officers must derive the largest part of their (training—very : little 'can'.'be said : by way of commendation/; Hamley's "Operations of War" has. long been laughed at in !Gernaany as his. conclusions' are' based on quite' a number of fundamental errors. Colonel Henderson's "Science of War''—a.-text book muoh in -'''vogue "at present—is astray; in-a number, (if places, ■especially on the .chapter on -stratescy. The..Best English work. ever published on military art (Home's "Precis of Modern -Tactics").- was held /by Continentals to be only pound on'events up to 1870, and, in-any .case, it is now . out of print. Evidence of .the same want of erasp of, the subject is. furnished by the analysis' of recent wars appearing in spell military publications as the "United Service' Magazine" and the . "Journal of' the Royal United -Service Institution." .In thesd the writers, frequently wander all round a tactical or strategic problem and, from internal evidence in their articles,- fail to see even' the point which' may happen to -bo at issue. . Set Fashions in Tactics. The Continental view, is. that English' officers, having, no literature of their own' from which to gather; inspiration, limit .themselves, to: a slavish , and meohanieal copy of f 'some particular, commander.; A 1 fashion is set-wuich' no one ever presumes to depart from; .unless the experience -of actual war, gives'-it. a set-back. Thus, among, British officers lat present there is praotiially 'one..' set-pattern in . tactics -where = large masses of troops are.: engaged, vizi, to manoeuvre, so as to cause the enemy to 6tretch. and, prolong his line, and then endeavour, to break his. oeutre. This pattern was set by, Lord Roberts either, at Abraham's. Kraal or. Poplar's-Grove, and it has been blindly copied, withput variation.ever'since. Eri-, denoe of its'paramount hold on the English . military :, mind at present is abundantly shown by some, of the tactical conclusions drawn by Sir lam Hnmilton: in his "Staff Officers' Scrap Book," 'notably the pdr-' tiori' relating. to '.the Russian dispositions at the Battle of the Sha-ho. . , :

In relation .to this Continental writers point out that English, copyists miss the very point which . niade Lord, Roberts',a: successful commander, viz.,'his "wonderful resource, and great' variety, of methods both in'manoeuvring'and, .fighting: They state that to. seize'on any one battle, and to make it a pattern for all, is a complete negation-of the very, causes of Lord Roberts's success. . . ■ Wars in Our Own Timo.

■ Some of the German writers also" oxpress the view tlxrit while , the military literature of. England'is defective, her popular war literature is pernicious, They point out that, in . English ware ;of recent date, the national-effort which bad ultimately to-be put;out .was' always found to be very much greater than the English national expectation as to what' would be . required; before that;: war began. Thus the expectation at T the begin-, ning of the Soudan War, was. . :that'.. it could'be. settled in a short time, whereas in .reality it,required' many years and; the presence of- troops specially trained and "stiffened up" for the work in hand. In the Tirah campaign the first expectation was that a few'■ battalions and oatteries would prove sufficient, whereas .two whole divisions were ultimately needed. ■ In the case of the Boer War the first army corps was expected to be ample, but a- standing field force of a quarter of, a million had, : to be employed; In such phenomena asl these the Gorman theorists'trace the effect of English popular war literature which forms, the'gjiide to .the nation at large,' and which has given the nation an exalted opinion pf English' military prowess—an opinion (they state) which is hot justified by events. • Moltke on England.' • ; The claim of England to have ranked at any time as a great military power his also been analysed, notably by' Moltke. I'his commander ' said: ■ ; . ; The English, derive- their ...idea -of:' . . military, greatness from their wars ' against Napoleon;, They do not perceive, that, their successes on .the battlefield were only subordinate to the contemporaneous successes of armed_ Europe, and they ■ were, due-to the pitting of line against column. But the English were only in conflict on land with' the ■ French after 1807, when the French columns had (owing, to the deterioration-■ of tile'. French armies) become largo columns of divisions, and the line would not have . .. been nearly so successful had it had to meet the mobile French doublecompnn.v columns which wore in vogue' in 1796.-' Moreover, the... English, ' having used, the line formation so successfully, in defence, failed to, perceive, , even nearly half .• a century later, that it was unsuitable for attack. At the Alma the English attacked in line, with the Tesult thatthere was' indescribable confusion' in making., their . assault, and . their' , blunder was .only: equalled by " tho blunder of the Russians, who' (being on tho defensive in which they should . havo been formed in line) were actually formed in column. It seems -, that when the English . have once ■ adopted a_ set pattern in war, they , follow it blindly and mechanically, to tho exclusion of others. Where England is all Wrong. Perhaps the peculiar nature of English fixed ideas is best illustrated by our conception of the relative chances of the attack and the defence with modern rifles. Every improvement in firearms produces a powerful impression in the minds of men that the tactical defensivo gains thereby,, and that further improvements will ultimately make it invincible. This is what the Germans call "a demonstration founded on tho naturo of tho arm," and sinco the publication o£ Scherlf's "Theory of Mocfern Infantry" (1873), all: such demonstrations have been held by. Continentals to be wrong. The view held in Germany, Japan, France, and Austria is, that the attack has gained immensely over the defence by modern weapons, and that all that is wanted to give it a complete and marked ascendancy, is a further improvement in artillery fuses. Tho contrary view is hold in 'England, and this difference of'viewpoint naturally produces a marked difference in methods of hand-ling-troops in England as compared with tho methods of the other nations of Europe.