DEFENCE NOTES.

Dominion, Volume 3, Issue 906, 27 August 1910, Page 12

DEFENCE NOTES.

[Edited Br "Echelon.] THE BULL'S-EYE BATTLE, ANOTHER "RICHMOND". IN TEE FIELD. The writer of the letter subjoined assails the "mere rifleman" with all his might. He' wishes it, however, to be stated that he is not p. "military, man," and has little patience for gold stars and red tabs. He had ten years rifle shooting experience, was a member of a volunteer company, and (for the only year he was in it) was the holder of its challenge belt. His study of military affairs has, however, been extensive. Here is the letter-.— Gyro writes:—Your correspondent, "Kobin Hood," is entrenched behind such mountains pj Ignorance that it is difficult to reach him, and the satisfaction would not bo great; it would only be th& poor comfort of shooting a pigeon with a cannon. On tho main point "Mannlichor Carcanq" has already killed him, and all that is required o£ him now is to lie down and be dead. Unfortunately, he probably has not the sense to do-that, for the children of darkness aro always more tenacious-of existence than the childern of light, and ithe only thing to do with him seems to be to go on and kill him some more. Or else take our hats off to him. For, when a New Zealand rifleman starts out. lo be a Moltke, uhe spectacle presented is certainly daring. Point 1: "Mesopotamia. ,, "Where did this "Robin Hood" get his foundation for the statement that the German armies won by strategy in 1870? Internal evidence iu Ills writing shows that he has only a glimmering of -what "strategy" means, and' uses it like that dear old word "mesopotamia," so beloved of tho old women of a time not long gone. As a matter of fact, the German leaders never saw anything in the war against Prance, excent plain butchery, and that was why iloltke issued his two famous memoranda-one Jrom Mannheim and one from Pont-a-Mousson, in August, 1870—stilting that:'"Wo are everywhere so tactically superior, and especially in the (collective" practices), that the business of commanders is not to manoeuvre for position, but march straight to the sound ol the firing. Ever) concentration for, battle must inevitably result in a massacre of Frenchmen." The writer, after fifteen years' study of German military literature, saw German soldiers practising the assault on u position. It would not have mattered much whether that position had been defended by an army of Kallingers, Hardings, and Kobin Hoods, or merely lined with" dolls from a toy-shop. Under the hail of covering and protecting fire which was brought to bear on the position, tho assault (go'ing forward through an intervening dip.in the ground), was as secure as if each man had been sheathed in triple steel. Tho defenders—whether marksmen or dummies—could never have lifted .their heads to "draw n bead." "Kobin Hood," who, despite his protest to the contrary, started out with tho idea of tho importance' of individual sharp-shooting,- but (under the assault of "Slannlicher-Carcano") swiftly changed his ground, probably does not yet realise what a terrible thing in battle is a great mass of u'naimed (though not unranged *nd undirected) fire. Point 2: A Bitter Pill. Anyway, the merits of trained individualism as against trained collectivism, were tested at' Gravelotte. Yon-Man-stein's corps, assaulting the centre of tho French, position, were opposed by the bull's-eye men, pot-hunters, and other geniuses of in .the French army, und, fighting from 12 (noon) till 7.30 p.m., lost 2127- men. A Uttlu further alO>% tho battlefield the Prussian Guard, opposed to the poorest corps in the French army (Canrobert's), but which had had some training in this diabolical business —collective shooting—had, in tho short space of ten minutes, no fewer than 6000 raon struck down. And the range was no point-blank affair. It 'was 1500 yards! Point 3: Moonshine. .Passing that subject; which volumes might be written, we come to a further lump of "Eobin Hood." Does it not strike him that to repeat in cold print such statements as "a million bullets aro needed to kill a man in battle" is extremely childish ? That is a statement that has never ken, and never can be, verified, and it in reasonably ,to bo suspected that the proportion of shots tp hits varies immensely for particular battles. And if he will look at this foolishness" with attention he will perhaps see that we can have no authentic record on tho point. In the Boer War the.English lost so much ammunition on the veldt, which was duly nicked up and fired back at them by the Boers, that the propoitiou of total cartridge issues on cither aide to total shooting is one of those things which can never be brought down in figures. It is the same in other wars. In the' American Civil War a return of the Confederate ammunition issue was never kept, and cannot now be guessed to within millions. In the North the general United . States issues were kept on record, but the vast separate State issues were never checked. Neither were the killed and wounded on either side, for the great array of "driftwood," pigeon-livered soldiers, stragglers, and bounty-jumpers who always ekulked away at the sound of the first cannon made it impossible to say who was genuinely killed and who was merely missing. Same with the French, atinies in 1870. For confirmation of these' statements, "Kobin Hood" may turn up Phisterer's Statistics of the American Civil War, United States Official Records, and tho Official History of tho FrancoPrussian War.

Point 4: Our Dreadful War Literature. This brings us to the question of "authorities" iu general. "Hobm Hood" quotes Conan Doylo and Mai-aton. Presumably he does not know that the , mass of second-class guesswork, rulo of thumb, conjecture, suppressions, adaptations,, and ■subterfuges which mark the works of these and nearly all English popular writers on warfare make their opinions boar about as much relation to war (as it is understood by the best military minds) as. a patent pill pamphlet bears to a regular medical work. These are the gentlemen who bislic-vc Unit improvements in weapons tend to make the tactical defensive impregnable—an idea dear to riflemen and-Boers—whereas the truth (as expounded in Germany and Japan) is that tho mass of fire which can '.be dc-relopedi by magazine rifles by good "collective practices" is discounting tho entrenched sharpshooter moro and more, aud giving an enhanced vnluo to the offensive, as it is understood on tho Continent. 1 pauso before another statement made by "liobin Hood," viz., ttiat the American Civil War was u conflict of "close formations and close ranges." It seems that when your amateur Moltke starts out to prove any ense ho can distort, the facts of any war to 6uit his book. The Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas regiments at Gettysburg were extended to . twenty paces, and hosts of other wide extensions whero the fire fight was waged at over 800 yards could be given, but that is not quite the point! Mathematically it could be expressed by stating, that battle is a conllict of force,,in which the resultant is somo function' of man, rifle, and range, aud poor human nature is the constant to the function. Hides and ranges arc variables as the years go by, but tho effect of them in relation to man is always the same. At some sfa#o of the fire-fight they imposo a limit beyond which humans cannot endure, and that range is not very much greater now- than it was in the time of tho American Civil War. In. absolute distance, somo four hundred yards, perhaps. It is a difficult matter to explain, aud I must leave it with the mention.

Point 5: 0 Poor Riflemen! And now for the main point. I am not sure that I understand what "Robin Hood's" main point really is. Ho certainly did start oft" with an attack on an exorcise designed to encourage collective shooting, though ho seems to have hauled in his horns since, hi Germany no attempt is made to turn soldiers into Bis- , ley champions. We cannot have absolute war, for it is now well understood that war-training must bear some relation to finance, naiil' to make every line soldier a marksman would be too much. Besides, only a comparatively small proportion of men could ever be made

marksmen, however much money was spent m attempting to do so. Whatbermauy expects of her soldiers is that, alter a certain amount of individual training, caeu man e]mll , ]e aMo to loose off" steadily with his sights adjusted to such ranges as are communicated to the shooting lines, and the German arrangements for this constant transmission of range. There is no attempt to "hit heads." But there is the steady, murderous, collective practice, and, under cover of this terrible Acgie, the assault goes forward. There has, in this controversy,. been some vaunt of the greatness of the "practical man," and somo covert sneers at "Hie fireside theorist." Perhaps it may not be out of place' to add that theory is the thought which precedes and underlies' an action, and if a man turns his back on theory it merely means that lie acts without thinking. Often too true. The "practical man", is, no doubt a terrible enough' fellow in his way, but ha is not everything. A motorman who knows how to turn a few handles is a practical enough person, but he is not necessarily an" electrician. Neither is a merit rifleman,, however "practical,? a Moltke. ' ,