DEFENCE NOTES.

Dominion, Volume 3, Issue 832, 30 July 1910, Page 10

DEFENCE NOTES.

THE BULL'S-EYE CONTROVERSY. "MANNLICHER-CARCANO" REPLIES TO "ROBIN HOOD." [By Echelon.] "Robin Hood's" article in defence of fixed bull's-eye target shooting, which appeared in last week's notes, has drawn from. "Maunlichcr-Carcano" (a wellknown Now Zealand military officer) a lengthy reply. He writes: —

"In your introductory remarks dealing with the letter by 'Robin Hood' on tho question of bull's-eye versus service rifleshooting, you invito discussion from those interested in musketry training. 'Robin' Hood's' arguments may bo sound by the man who is concerned with rifle meetings, trophy shooting, and tho training of the individual in the primary stages of musketry; but he has not touched on tho question of collective efficiency, nor on battle training in musketry, to which so much importance is now attached by all the leading military nations of the world. Experience has taught them to discard the bull's-eye, and the conditions of shooting as suggested by 'Robin Hood,' excepting for the elementary training of recruits. "Tho rille is for military purposes; it is natural, therefore, that the military authorities should frame musketry regulations suited to military requirements. "Extraordinary Statements." "'Robin Hood' says: 'Some^ of the utterances and actions of. military men with regard to shooting make'one wonder whether they have over fired a rifle.' Again he says: 'It is clear to one who has made a study of the art that they have never taken into consideration the limitations of the weapon.' These seem to mo to be extraordinary statements, and 1 cannot think they have been made by one who has had much experience of ■ soldiering under military officers who :have studied tho art of musketry, fired their rifles, and understood their limitations. It is somewhat presumptive, to say tho least, for 'Robin Hood' to base his criticism of military men on tho conditions for the Gordon Highlanders' match, which he quotes as 'a sample of military wisdom,' 'drawn up by the officers of the Gordon Highlanders.' He suggests further that half a dozen men lying down quietly and firing deliberately at 1100 yards would do. as much damage in a given time as a whole regiment of snap-shoot-ers.' I disagree with him entirely if he refers to battlefield conditions, where range-finding, fire control, and fire direction are vitally important factors in de-ciding-the fire effect. If he refers to the condition existing on a riile range, where . distances are \ known to the inch, and tho target is a bull's-eye, I would still consider his estimate highly exaggerated. No battle was ever yet won by the attackers remaining at 1100 yards. The advance over ground from point' to point is a service condition which should be provided for, ■ and this no doubt infl.ii.* enced those officers who drafted the' 'Gordon Highlanders'' conditions. I grant that the 'advance in .attack' match, and many other, so-called 'service matches' is a huge farce as compared to battle conditions from the fact that the ground is generally as level as a lawn, tho grass cut, the distances practically known to a yard, and tho targets are far more visible than' is the case on active service. How to Win a 'Service' Match. "Tho New Zealandcr's'- win in tho Gordon Highlanders' Hatch is neither a proof that they would have accounted for more hits uniler battle conditions than .the Australians, nor that, military men who desiro to reform musketry training are wrong. There is something more than good shooting wanted to win the above match. A little cunning and prearranged scheming goes a long way, for while the franiers of the rules intended them to approach service conditions, as previously explained, the limitations of the range make it a fiasco as regards its training for .battle. The teams knowthe ranges, know where their targets are, and also know that the target will appear in one of two known positions. A, cunning team is therefore able to arrange, for each half of the squad to have its sights previously set ior one of the possible conditions, and such factors as farecontrol and fire-direction are a mere sham.

" "Robin Hood's' reference to Major Richardson's challengo does not even further prove .his argument. I have never, heard or read of the suggestion that men who' were not very good shots could defeat ■ 'bull's-eye trained men,' who were also picked shots, in matches such as the Gordon Highlanders' Match, the Kolapore. Cup, and the China Cup, all of wnich are fired on ranges where the distances are practically known, and tho conditions such as a team can rehearse as a preparatory training. But the experience of great wars have proved—l speak of wars dating from 1866, sinco the Austro-German campaign in that year was the first in which men fired- in a prone position—that a picked 'bull's-eye' trained shot, who on the range has, as 'Robin Hood' says, 'to exercise every possible care and all his judgment,' is not the superior of an average shot in.battle and that those armies have been victorious ■ whose musketry training has been carried out on sound lines, and whoso aim has been to attain a high standard of efficiency in field practices rather than individual skill at bull's-eyo shooting. The Bull's-eye in Musketry Training. ."I personally consider that bull's-eye shooting should be relegated, to its proper position in musketry training, i.e., for tho the training of individuals—the first stage of training in any branch ofmilitary work. Individual training in musketry is a parallel to recruit training in an infantry or cavalry regiment. How - could a regiment manoeuvre. if squadron training did'not follow the recruit drill, and regimental training. follow that of squadron or company training? No'amount' of recruit training will alone fit a regiment for war any more than:.individual training in shootfng at a bull's-eyo will fit a battalion for war if the company commanders have not exercised their commands in field practices, and trained their officers, N.C.O.'s, ■ and men in. the use .of ground, .concealment, entrenching, fire-control, fire-direc-tion, and firc-disciplinc, quickly pointing out indistinct targets; changing fire from one to the other; estimating distances; range finding, etc., nearly all of which arc matters never touched upon in the form of training 'Robin Hood* would suggest in opposition to those practical men, the officers, of the Gordon Highlanders." "I am, as 'Robin Hood' states, 'one of those reformers,' but my views have, 'not arisen from ignorance of the rifle and the work necessary to make a shot.' I am, or was, a very good shot. "I have studied the rifle in practice and theory; know something of the effect of wind on a bullet, of tho variation in the ballistic co-efficient of a bullet, duo to heat, barometric pressure, and the effect .of variations in kappa and sigma; the effect of lubrication, heating of the barrel and cartridge, as well as something about .'the variations caused in ballistics duo to manufacturing defects in the rifle itself. I have been a member of a rifle club as well as having personally trained men in musketry and how to' become good shots. Nor have I any. 'jealousy of the successful pot-hunter,' though I must 'confess with regret my opinion that many of the trophies given by business men for shooting.purposes are given in ignorance as to the good derived by tho Forces generally by trophy shooting as carried out by a. large number of companies. I merely mention the foregoing facts, not to 'blow 'my own trumpet,' but to show that all reformers are not as 'Robin Hood' imagines, 'ignorant of tho riile.'

Tho Variations of the Rifle. " 'Robin lloodV statement, 'if tho riflo as issued were taken by a good shot to aity range, and fired at point blank distance as sighted, it is questionable who-' ther the bullet would hit a haystack, let alone a' man,' shows his ignorance of the tests through which the- rifle passes before issue, and is an extreme exaggeration. The last-joined recruit is aware that every riflo varies, and that for bull's-eye shooting its error witlra normal thermometer (Gfldeg.) and barometer (30deg.) should be known' to the filer at every range. lie further states that 'it takes something like a'million bullets-to kill a man in active 'Warfare,' is also an exaggeration. It took 5000 bullets to kill a mau in the

American Civil War. The British had been largely trained at 'bull's-eye,' while the Boer had been trained in the field against natural moving objects. The worst shooting in battle was perhaps that of the Moroccan soldiers, who, in 1907, attacked Raisuli, and 65 of his bandits in trenches, and fired eighty thousand cartridges, eight hundred Maxim projectiles, and one hundred and twenty shells without hitting a man. As they do In Germany. "I agreed with 'Eobin Hood' that the basis of our musketry training should he' hulls-eye shooting, but while he desires nearly all the allowance of ammunition to be fared at bull's-eye targets, I <do not, and in support of my argument will quote other authorities:— "The German Army, admitted to be the nnest in the world, only fires a verv small percentage of ammunition at bnll's-ovo targets, although such targets are recognised as an absolute necessity for the individual training of recruits. At such practices on the range it is possible to watch each individual shot, and mark if tor guidance. Such practice trains him to be careful and conscientious when firing a round. Herein (according to the Oerman authorities) lies the true value and the complete aud undeniable justification of practice on a range at 'fixed targets at known distances. "With Tegard to held practices (and it in this form of practice I would urge New Zealand riflemen to place on a higher pedestal than it stands at present) the Germans are very thorough. It is laid down by" Ihem as an axiom that musketry training is only carried out on right lines when the"troops are able to accomplish anything that war may demand of them, and when they are not compelled to unlearn on the battlefield anything they have been tanght in peace. _"I heard'it said by a well-known officer in New Zealand quite- recently that he had frequently seen officers carrying out range practices, and showing remarkable skill in hitting bull's-eyes, who knew practically nothing of fire control, fire direction, or the tactical musketry training of the companies they commanded. Surely if this is the case our musketry training requires something more than "Eobin Hood' would give us." Tho Germans saythat musketry cannot be separated from battle training; service conditions must' be considered first.'. It'is not sufficient to give individual soldiers a thorough training—all subordinate' leaders must also be methodically trained in the direction and control of fire, and. all ranks in a company must be.taught to work together for the common good.'" . ,[For reasons of space the latter portion of "Mannlicher-C'arcano's" letter—and a very interesting portion—have had to be held over. It will appear at a later date. I may state that this portion adduces no fresh argument, so that its subsequent publication, though supporting what preceded it, will not, necessarily prejudice Hood's" position. "Eobin" and his friends may reply to "MannlicherCarcano," if. they desire to do so, in next week's notes.—"Echelon/']