THE POWELKA CASE.

Dominion, Volume 3, Issue 851, 24 June 1910, Page 4

THE POWELKA CASE.

_ There wag not the slightest pccasion for the Mayor, when replying yesterday to the deputation . that waited upon him to. ascertain whether the Town Hall could be used for a meeting of protest against the sentence on the man Powelka, to express any opinion upon the case. Wo regard it as regrettable that Mi:. Wilford went beyond a bald statement as.to whether the Hall,could be hired or not, for as Mayor it is very especially his business to set the community an example of correct conduct, and as a member of the Bar it is his duty to abstain from anything that might appear like a public criticism' or analysis of a judicial decision of the nature in question. At the same time it is possible to feci that the Mayor acted in good faith, and it must certainly be allowed that if anything could lessen the indiscretion of his lengthy discourse upon Judge Cooper's treatment of tho case it was the excellence of some of the sentiments which he expressed We say some of tho sentiments, because some equally strike us as being injudicious to the last degree. Personally, he said, he "had not the material upon which to form an opinion and so make an emphatic statement." Most people who unite to their respect for the Supreme Court and their concern for its honour an understanding of what is proper in tho official head of the city will feel that no possible circumstances could warrant Mr. Wilford in making any "emphatic statement" in the matter, although nobody would deny him tho right to form any private opinion he might choose. Most lawyers will agree that it is improper that a Supremo Court Judge should be a legitimate subject for public discussion by a member of the Bar, but that is not an aspect of the matter that concerns the public very greatly. Having said so much in condemnation of the _ Mayor's error of judgment, it is proper to give him full credit for the general tenor of his opinion. "Our judiciary," he said, "stands to-day unassailable. No act of corruption or personal prejudice can influence, or has influenced, its decisions. And we must guard it from any suggestion of outside interference in any way.'" Those who have been conducting tho agitation against Judge Cooper may not believe it, but the attitude hero embodied is the attitudo of the majority of the public, for the majority of the public has still a keen appreciation of the necessity for preserving the honour of the judiciary from the defilement that has conic to more than one formerlyhonoured institution. These weflmeaning but misguided people had better get it out of their heads at once that the Government will interfere .with Judge Cooper's decision at their bidding. The tradition

of the British judiciary is one of the few traditions which have been handed on without any weakening, and the cases arc not few in which Judges, in Britain and in the colonies, have made plain the fact that the judiciary regards itself as supreme over all persons and institutions save the Parliament, and as the supreme custodian of popular liberty and order. The AttorneyGeneral, of course, is well aware of this, and has no doubt advised the Government as to the' proper attitude to adopt. % The Supreme Court Bench, however, it is ccrtain, would not fail to make adequate protest if, without its approval, the Executive were to interfere with Judge Cooper's decision.