The Dominion. SATURDAY, JUNE 4, 1910. LOGIC IN POLITICS.

Dominion, Volume 3, Issue 834, 4 June 1910, Page 4

The Dominion. SATURDAY, JUNE 4, 1910. LOGIC IN POLITICS.

One of the most important flacts in modern politics—so .far as "the; different nations of the Empire arc concerned—is the gradual spreading through Liberalism of a now spirit that is not only not an extension of Liberalism, but a negation of its principles. We refer, of course, to the spirit of trust in the beneficence of State action and of hatred for the free exchange and individual fiecdom that were the basis of the old Liberalism. In some parts of tho Empire the heresy has driven out the original doctrine altogether while retaining the old name, and, wh<*re this has happened, the causes are easily seen. In Great Britain the heresy has pot gone very far as yet, although it is gathering , momentum every clay, and the causes are difficult to find, for the movement is assisted by some great minds —men whose faith, until yesterday, as it were, was almost above reproach by so orthodox a Liberal as, say, Lord Kosebery. Though difficult to discover, the falling away of Gladstonian Liberals like Lord Morlry and Mit. Asquith from the ancient faith is not altogether past explanation.- It is duo to the conflict between sentiment and logic— a conflict that everyone feels in himsolf who cares enough for truth to keep himseli under examination, and that in the majority of cases ends in the triumph of sentiment. Just as often as not that is the best way in which the conflict can end when it is a matter between one individual and another. But it is another question when there hangs upon the issue the character of a nation's government. In New Zealand the vast majority of those who call themselves Liberals are not Liberals at all, but State Socialists, and logic in politics is therefore a thing with which they have nothing to do and which they do not think of and do not understand. In Great Britain the caso is otherwise, and the violent conflict between the immutable principles of Liberalism, principles as immutable as the law of gravity, and the latest tendencies of Liberal politics is causiug thoughtful men and newspapers to give attention to the question, how far logic can be evaded in the making of laws.' ■ "Logically, of course, we ought to do so and so" is one of the commonest of phrases, as if logic were a system of thought not binding upon men pledged to tho pursuit of truth. And it is the commonest of apologies in tho mouths of English Liberal statemen. • Nobody denies that much of tho recent legislation in Britain is flatly opposed in principle to true Liberal policy, and that parts of it involve the repudiation of the principle that in respect of other issues is firmly adhered to. British Liberalism, that is to say, is no longer logical. It denies on the fiscal platform what it aflirms in its "social reform" programme, just as our own Government, through its Prime Minister, defends, when tho talk is of monopolies, that very principle of free exchange which it denies when it is a question of land, of industry, or of tariffs. The London Spectator, practically alone amongst British newspapers, and Lord Uosebery and Mr. Harold Cox, most eminently amongst a dwindling minority of British Liberals, cling fast to the blind of logic in the maze of politics. In a recent article the Spectator diseussod "l.he limitations of logic," hut what, it really treats is the effect of limitud daU. Valid reasoning,

it is pointed out, is "almost an essential condition of arriving at tho trnth," and this fact has led many poople astray: It is a common fallacy to assume that an essential condition of a thing is necessarily the thing itself. It has been held, for instance, thai, because happiness is an essential condition of goodness, happiness is the same _ thing as goodness. . . . So, too, it is wrong to assume, because truth can only be arrived at by a process of valid inference, that valid inference is all that is necessary for the discovery of truth. ... It i≤ essential that before taking a single step in an argument we should be certain that the truo facts are- at our disposal. The principal thing, and tho thing tho neglect of which is at the root of the want of logic and the inconsistency in principles in Mr. Asquith's policy, is the verifying of the premises. In his essay on Mr. Gladstone's book on Church and State Macatjlay showed that the more correctly Mr. Gladstone reasoned the more widely he erred, and, when at last his good sense and good nature , recoiled from the -practical inferences of his theory, he was "reduced sometimes to take refuge in arguments inconsistent with his fundamental doctrines." That is exactly the case with many of the best men to-day who believe they are Liberals. They feel tho inconsistency, but, instead of going back to the beginning to see if the premises are unsound, they doubt instead whether logic is a safe guide. They are helped to this error by' their hearts. The mother principle of British Liberalism, from which is born the policy of Free-trade, denies, amongst other things, the granting of non-contributory old age pensions and the fixing of wages by law. It is little wonder that the modern Liberal, sick at heart at the poverty and unhappiness he sees about him, finds it difficult to believe that he should remain true to his creed. Fixing his eyes on the things at hand, and forgetting that the immediate and visible gains of State action may be paid'for very heavily by the slow-working forces of human nature and of logic, he casts logic aside in despair, but not without a haunting sense of danger, a flash of fear that ho has erred. In their hearts the Gladstonian Lib-,-orals, and even they are not Liberals whom Mill or Bentham would have accepted, wholly without reserve, must know that when they cease to be guided by their heads they are committing a sin against the State, which they believe cannot be truly served excepting through Liberalism. They salve their conscience, it must bo supposed, with the hope that in departing from the straight ' lino they have only taken a cast that will enable the old faith to go. forward on the old track with greater strength and'surety in ,a later day. Yet, by abandoning for even a moment the course dictated by logic, statesmen who believe in Liberal principles do great injury to their cause: they allow the advocates of State action to point a damning linger at their inconsistency. Even in New Zealand we havo had this fact exemplified. The opponents of State action as forbidden by true Liberal doctrine will very often allow essential and. fundamental wisdom to many invasions by the State of functions exercisable wisely only by the individual, and they can find no reply to the taunts of the State Socialists. Just so even as thoughtful a writer as Hβ. F. W. Headi.ey, in his new book, Darwinism and Modern Civilisation, in which he attacks the Socialistic principle, finds himself in difficulties when he comes to .suggesting a remedy for some of the apparent vices of individualism. Ho admits with regret, for example, that the State, if it cannot control railroad monopolies, should purchase and work them. The Nation was quick to say, with Radical delight, that "in his , efforts to secure true individualism, effective competition, one sees him driven by sheer logic deeper and deeper into the very mass of constructive Socialism which he seeks to shun." Of course this shows only that Mr. Headley has not the courage of his logic, just as h« does not verify his premises, for he apparently does not dream of inquiring whether the true waste caused by the absolutely, unproductive section of the "idle rich" is great or small. He assumes it to be great: if he stopped to think he would find it negligible, and would be relieved of the necessity for doing his logic, the violence of advocating class taxation. To remain logical does indeed require courage, and that is why logic is so vilely maltreated by politicians everywhere. For ourselves,, wo have little hope that matters will ever be otherwise, but it is only by strict reasoning from valid premises that truth can invariably ue arrived at, in politics or in anything else.