TRAFALGAR DAY.

Dominion, Volume 3, Issue 643, 21 October 1909, Page 8

TRAFALGAR DAY.

THE MYTHS OF HISTORY. ' . AND THEIK EFFECT ON OS. .. • ■ [By Grno.] The following - makes rather steep, uphill reading,'and the writer begins with the initial handicap'.bf knowing that;an.article of serious intent.-which runs' counter to .the- ideas of'the dav can only appeal, if it appeals at all, to a .very'small section o'f thoughtful section, perhaps, tint still small.. ' - Some time ago two rather remariable articles bv -Dr. Borghetti, touching the decadence ot England, appeared in-The Dominion, and whethor we accept the doctor's conclusions in toto, or aooept .any o£. there, -.this much remains: That anyone who has followed up any line of research bearing on the qnestion-comparativfl sociology, for instance,. or the study . of * nat is sometimes called "the 6cientihc side, of war will, if ha has the patriotic lastmot, (asi 1 trust we all ihave) and much to trouble him. Erom what 13 known' as-"the popular .point of view," the subject is inconceivably difhcult to handle in a newspaper articlo, because British histories are so full of omissions, fallacies, second-class adaptations, suppressions, base immediacies and subterfuges that everything has to be explained ab initio, and explanations are always tedious: Still,-these explanations should be faced, for our national attitude towards Uie important question of war is extensively influenced by onr conception ot war as derived from our . poor history books, and theso conceptions are, almost everywhere, fundamentally this is one of: the strange statements irhich seem to require explanation. "History is the product either ol eye-witnesses, or of those who have access to hrst-class evidence. And we bavo to loot very closely and snspicibu% at the - testimony of- eye-witnesses. Hore, for example, is an occurrence in Lambton Quay. Six honest citizens have seen, it, and all

ire sub-poenacd. In Court thoy giro contralictory evidence., Indeed tho experienced nagistrate (if six witnesses came. intoConrt mtf.ail swore the saine'thing) would suspect :ollabpration of testimony, and the magistrate voold bo right.. I'or all of us havo a terrible ind deadly habit of colouring objective facts rith our' subjective states. Thus tfe : may look jii at a simple football match at Athletic Park)''.where'-.the. issues , seem to' be. perfectly jlain^and''yet depart with' ;an opinion of that ; iiatch': totally at variance 1 with everyone "else, vho-lias seen it.; And, of. course, all hands are noro or-less right. .Also 1 more or'less wrohg. i.nd this' : is, briefly/stated,' the reiason and a-use of all the football arguments which one lears about the., street; on Saturday night.' Referring ".this" ' fatal,-, difference" bi",' . opinion to "histor.'; I. have before mo a. gilt-edgsd ictavo ' voluqe bearing .-, . the :-'.nrti«o4t»U, heading; ! r ßritish. Soldiers—How ■: they foughtbled; and - , fell,'' I turned i it- ujy'and 'astened'at'last on "the chapter headed ,(6till n'music-hall fashion) "Majuba: The Story of I' Blunder." The'blunder is, of course, supposed to bo that of Sir George Colley, and, ndeed, the author expressly states: "The British -soldiers,? as usual, fought • like lions, but, being badly led by poor-Colley, they'had ultimately' to etc., : 'etc., 'etc." "Unfortunately.: for this'.' thesis, a■' friend' 1 of Sir .George C6U,ey's— Sir William Butler—took ; steps; to"-haye the Majuba mountain'surveyed, took steps'to find mdende' of what ; exactly happened;:(from" the pitiless objective: point of yiew), and left his rosearch in print iu a book entitled: "George Pomery-Colley." Anyone who sits dtfwn to that book with a calm, cold head will readily see that one of. the. strongest positions ever "taken up:by any general wa.* nullified by the inferior juaUV- of the' British- troops engaged. These troops included the Gordon Highlanders. ;■ It:''.will; "perhaps simplify matters, : if; it 'is stated .at onco that the war literature of all a'atioos, except' Germany, is," in the'main; only i.-.travesty of the events-of which it professes to treat; .'rPom Krieee" is-tho.last word.'said m tho abstract,:and' tne6retio'side of war, and it-was. said 1 by a Prussian officer named Clausewitz more, than eighty . years ago. Until, some better ; book., .written,it stands, oven 'in the yiew- of better class- of English officers, is "tho. testing-book by 'which all general questions relating- to '.w.af/miist stand or'fall.On the -historic ' side of .war only ' three works that are .reasonably perfect. are in. existenoe. Those ire: .The. Official British 'History! of the Boer War .(not. tho...inferior history - published-' by tho London "Times"), "Battles and Leaders of [ho American Civil War,", and tho official acidrihVof the Franco-Prussian "War.: .It.is -probable/judging by the matter "which passes unjontriidicted'.'every.: day; and "the English, magazines; and' daily.,-press" that; not one. in' 1,000,000 Gn'clishmen"have: ever .and perhaps not one in 500,000 have ever ■ heard of them;-.:;yst}.they.-. Are'.probably. only'.'guides whereby a treasonably'correct national' attitude towards war .could-be acquired. ' Our':,own 1 "attitude" seems',' to ' :b"e m^x.';detwn^ed/te?a^wml^.v r o{-.;-' books ranging-from second-class' to -worse than tenth-class.-..-.On the (Napoleonic. .wars, -from which our. general:"idea of;-military, greatness, is drawn,

we have, :first«of all,one third-class work or Waterloo, ■ written by; M. Honssaye, who, 'by the way, was a' foreigner, and a very good work- (of very. limited ranges however) written by Sir Evelyn-Wood ("The Cavalry at Waterloo")- Then come . av. number of. fourth-class productions snch as Napier and Alison, thee some tenth-class' compilations snch'. as O'Connrii Morris, Kose, Kielland, and 'others. ; Lastly, and too " far down the list to be assigned t class .at, all,' comes." that, trnly, pcrnicions- and terribk publication: "Deeds that Won the Em pire." It would not be worth' mentioning if il wero- not 60 oxtonsively read, and, indeed (af the Hon. T. Mackenzie well knows), it was at one fame forced on,some of the New Zealand schools as a supplementary reader. ; . Allied to : onr nistonans are our vandeville war-correspondents. I have always thought il a great pity that our , district commandei (Colonel Baucliop) did not, during the Boei War, place one of these celebrities under arresi for a rather serious offence, as, I believe, hi once ' had the opportunity of doing. I car remember the time ..when this: man s opinioi was quoted as • the be-nll and end-all of wai by numbers of those fierce but short-sightec people who corresponded with the daily press over tlie signature . of "Britisher." Concerning him, it can only be. said at once thai his knowledge qf war was something like ; an ■ average .'motorman's knowledge of ' electricity He know when and how' to ;turn, certain handles, bnt he.could not toll how the electric enorgy coming from the wires, was.-,transformed, first into magnetic energy, and thon into'work Beyond this, he was an <exci«dj»ff great fabn' : cafcor.- Hp. "devised" hie battle plans iarid battfa accounts.to shit tliq vaudeville tastes "of the public,. which ho knew, he had to catct for, and, for many years; he was (consequently) tfco foremost correspondent in *11 tha world.

He subsequently wait to Manchuria, and performed prodigies of valour (in . his own lino). In the (lays of tension in that war ho solemnly declared that ho had seen "tho battleship Yashima, safolv at her anchorage at Togo's secret baso." But'we know now (although it vpas long kept quiot) that the Yoshima was •sunk many N months previously, and, as for "Togo's' secret he wM .nover there/" Indeed, some Jajraiieio officers fouiid him roaming about a Chinese''! lodginghouse.'in Manchuria. No doubt he asked" to, bo led: immediately "into tho. presence of the 'Chief ■of tho Genera) Japanese Staff, in order that he. might .teach tho' Ja.paneso generals ~ how to beat, the Enssians. Tho Japanese sent lnm home, which was probably the best place.for hira. . This kind of • discourse might go on interminably. As far at it has gone, in this article it is merely assertion/ and,' though in- this young colony, violent. assertion seems to carry more weight-than propositions of logic, how> ovar well-proven the latter- may be, still mere assertion, unless it happens to- strike the right track by, a fluke, ■ is a ■ thing whieh should be met by no other, argument except a blow on the nose. I-.propose, therefore, now to crystallise, some of tho foregoing by particular reference ,to Trafalgar, which is a topic .m season. 1 But here everything has to be commenced ab initio. What the popular ideas of the,part played.by an admiral, in a naval action, are one cannot even vaguely-surmise.' Perhaps he. "waves a bloody sword over a battte6oarred .deck, sotting a good .example to. his men," or perhaps he doesn't., At: all events, whatever the vaudeville notions convoyed by current literature may be', the chief fact is this:. An admiral's duty' inthe'visible: or suspected presence .of an enemy is'to select the mothod.of approach, and—to closS .on his enemy at an advantageous compass bearing. "We know, by reference to such-authentic information as we havo (and it is very' scanty) that Togo,'when the, Baltic Fleet became visible to him at;'a : distance'of' 18,000 yards in the Strait of Tsu-shima, was heading west m a rather rough sea in single lino ahead. Rozhdestvensky was approaching him in double , column on- a course which-was nearly north-east. If the effective firf of 12-inch guns had extended to 18,000 yards . Togo would have beijun the action thore and then, buti wishing his fire (when it really did begin) to cause the initial and irrevocable idam'age which, it did cause, he had to face the'immediate problem of twice putting his helm over to starboard at the right time!.- If it had .been done too soon he would have commenced the action out of ; effective range, while if he' had delayed too late; / lie •would in all'probability have been rammed. On the,other hand, Eozhaestvensky (an: otherwise able admiral, who was probably sick of his fleet-and it? , personnel) approached Togo, in double column, bow to broadside. That is- the very worst approach that an admiral' can make, for it enabled Togo to perform: : the deadly: and subtle operation: known as: "cross-, ing . -the T/' : arid,-'-; K) use the ' Japanese admiral's own - woHs; "the battle was really i over, in the first ,81: minutes." , . • 'This has miichf reference to -Trafalgar, for (see'; diagram:';lV ;Nelson-: is ; universally represented by the shallow historians of the day (including Captain :Mahany as Approaching.' Villeneuve in double, coliimn-line. -ahead," bow, to broadside, just 'as,.Bozhdestvensky approached Togo..at Tsushima;:. If it wcr.e' true,. Nelson must'havo' made one of the-worst approaches known to -history;. 'He made tile self-same pi-oadh'as Eozhaestvensky.; ' ' : • The .wholo thing.ywas.-exposed in-MOS-or;An-, miral' Cplbmb.- whp pointed -out'that tno alleged approach made by. Nelson ivds not only unsound, but that it was entirely "contrary to the ; memorandum"issued by Nelson- to his captains twelve days before, tho'battle. According to that memorandum—and it relates to the only naval battle in which Nelson ever had a chance to manoeuvre—the "order-of was to be "the order of battle," and the ships were'to,."bear up,- together" : to effect the . apr. proach. - Of'course snip 3 cannot '."bear.'up together," and "bear up in succession m one and I the .same, battle,", and. so', the -reader .may. please .himself, about-diagram I,,,which-is tho approach made by. the or, diagram 2,. which is the' approach.- designed by' Nelson in his memorandum of October 9. (1805). ... ' Tho whole'thing turns on the interpretation of the famous signal (Admiralty Code, No. 76): "When lying, to, or:sailing by ,the wind,, to bear up or sail largo on the courso set by the admiral orv that pointed but by signal. When the .Victory made that signal early on the morning of Trafalgar it doubtless meant to have reference to - 'Nelson , s. memorandum of October 9; and diagram 8 shows how AdmiTal Colomb thinks that the British fleet turned towards Villeneuve, not . /'in (as ,10.

diagram -1); but "all together" (as in diagram 2.. The diff«rente:,in- tHe' positioit 7 '.'.of' 'the Trench flqet, 'as shown in diagram' 3,; from 'that 'shown in" diagrams. 1' and.'2-.is' explained by the fact'that'ot'B;3oa.iri. Villeneuve made the •Reneral'.- signal:, to "Wear, all' together -and form line of battle' on the port taqk. ' Diagrams 1 and 2 showsi.tho. Franco-Spanish fleet formed on the port tack .having reversed from'the position shown in diagram 3, when Villeneuve was on the starboard. teck,:heading'.S.'W... The question is, whether 'Nelwn' approached his enemy -in'-f^uble..column,';bow: w broadside, .as invdiaipam. 1, -or! in lines „of bearing :a's shown in diagram 2.'. There, i3.no.means:pf determining th? : matter now, for.- only one ship jn' the fleet; logged,^.all the Signals : made by the Victory, arid''.'.one' of, ..the entries.: in. her- ldg was entered- exTdneonsly- iq.' the general ' excitement whenthe. British ..ships were" closing. onVilleneave. The'log of ..the Victory (if it was. ever.', written .up oh the day.of. the .battle), was lost, but that:' perhaps, does not matter..nqw. : "What really seems, to matter'is: that'the nation did not .snspeot, the historic moonshinfl : of the approach "6hqwn in diagram 1 J nntil ' 'Admiral Colomb .' questioned it m 1895."' 'If kelson did makv such an'approachthe. inference .must, be that, after drawing up a memorandum': on i October > 9 to ; suit "alf states of-ths .wind,: he completely parted with his wits, on Ootober-21, and dul exactly what he did :not -want to do. . That is,";.however; toe steep: a; proposition to. believe. , -