The Dominion. SATURDAY, JULY 24, 1909. THE LORDS AND THE COMMONS.

Dominion, Volume 2, Issue 568, 24 July 1909, Page 4

The Dominion. SATURDAY, JULY 24, 1909. THE LORDS AND THE COMMONS.

Thb speeches of Me. Ohttechiil and Mr. Asquith in reply to Loed Lansdowne's threat of ,drastic action by. the Lords when the Finance Bill comes up for the concurrence of the Upper House have, not assisted to make the future of the measure very clear. ■; Me. Chuechill, it iwill be remembered, declared that the Government would not tolerate any interference by the Lords, ,and his '.w.ords have been construed into a warning that the mutilation of rejection of the Bill by the Peers will be immediately followed by a (dissolution. , He, has explained to Me. Asquitji, and Mr. Asquith has explained to the House of Commons, that nothing was said about an "immediate dissolution"Mr. ; Chuechill had "only attempted to convey, the fact that any conflict between the two Houses must ultimately be settled by the country." It is clear from this and earlier statements by the Pe'ime Minister that-the Government's attitude is for the present, ~ and will for some time remain, subject to tac-' tical considerations. On the other hand it is quite certain that the Opposition attitude will be similarly determined. Me.' Balfoue may. consider that a dissolution following upon the. rejection of a 'Budget 'which penalises, property may not.'be to his advantage.; 1 He may prefer .wait, : for the alienation from the Government of the less Radical of the Liberals, and go to the country later on. Not much is to be gained, therefore, by discussing the position of; the House of Lords so far as it is concerned with the quarrel between the two great parties in the Commons, it is possible—so we can now see from Me.' Asquith's hedging attitude, although it seemed' incredible • d few days ago—that the Lords may reject or amend 'the Budget',without immediately affecting the course of political events. Tho Government, may swallow the affront for the time being.

■ But the purely party aspect of the situation is . of ; less -real- importance, and i of less general interest, than the constitutional questions which aro. . now raised,., ;in an acute, form. There is nothing in the Statutes which can be held to disqualify the Peers from revising or destroying.any which has been passed by the Commons. Wc do not say that there is' nothing in the Constitution prohibitory .'or ■'■restrictive of the Peers'; authority,- for the simple reason that there- is'no such'thing,: properly speaking, as a, British Constitution. AVhat we call the Constitution is the ■ modus operandi sanctioned by centuries of development. The Kino, 1 for ex: ample, can veto any, law ho chooses, but as Mr. Herbert Samuel has pointed out; the exercise of the Royal veto would be deemed unconstitutional by everybody; The uonsutusion is ; simply usage. And the doctrine .that the Lords cannot' amend

—although, of oourse, they-' may ' "lay aside," and refuseto consider—a Finance Bill is of very ancient origin. For three centuries, prior to 1671 tW/ Com-, mons,' as is pointed out in May's Parliamentary Practice, had claimed the. right to include the Peers in the taxation levied on the King's subjects, and in the mentioned they,; passed a resolution that "the rate or tax ought not to be altered by the Lords." In 1678, they further resolved.

"That all aids and supplies, and aids to his Majesty in Parliament, are .the sole gift of the Commons; and all Bills for the granting of such.aids and supplies ough4 to begin wit'll' the Commons; mid that it .is'the undoubted •. and. Sole; right- of- the. • Commons to direct,; limit, and appoint, in such Bills the ends, purposes, considerations, i conditions, limitationsj and qualifications of suoh grants, ■which .ought aot to' bo changed or'altered by. tho Ilouso of Lords."

It is from this'resolution, that, the Commons claim their unrestricted ■ authority over money Bills. The curious thing is that the Lords, while fchey may not alter a word in the Bill, may, reject it altogether without violating anything but the composure of the Government. The latter right, we believe,: has never been disputed on. any ground save-the ground of propriety. ' The present is not/a time, however, when ithe people of Britain are inclined to have (Parliamentary questions affecting national interests decided by reference- solely to constitutional ; technicalities, especially when those technicalities are really eccentricities, rooted in unreason. and absurdity. Everybody will welcome some reformation based ; on clear and intelligible principles—the Lords no less than the Commons and the people. Everybody whose opinion is worth anything is in: favour of bi-cameral Legislatures/But the principle of bi-cameralism disappears when one of the Houses is either impotent or. all-powerful. . As matters stand the .Government can- secure that every one of its policy proposals that creates charges shall be cither swallowed, whole or wholly rejected by the Lords. The ,Lords are denied the right.of adjusting the details./ They.are confronted with a choice, between .two equally unpalatable For example, the Lords may favour the principle of a certain new. tax i-in a Bill passed by the Commons, but may wish to raise or lower the rate. But they cannot do so. They must either acquiesco in wha,t they consider, a faulty levy, or say that there shall be no levy at all. On the whole, as the Statute Books bear witness, the present system works well. It at any rate secures that the have the best kind of sanction. " But crises like the present one are constantly liable to arise, and to engonder public heat, with all its injuries to sound political development. The Peers are likely t<i admit the'right of the Commons to fix tkS rate of masting taxes, but' every aaw

kind of tux involves n new political principle, and it is absurd Unit tho Lords, whoso right of revision Ims novor boon Boriotisly challenged, should ho debarred from expressing any opinion of their own upon such new principles as can bo covered by a monoy clause. The, prnsonfc Finance Bill is a collection of proposals Socialistic or sonii-Socialistic in ' principle, and it certainly seems ridiculous that, while there is an Upper llouso, that' House should be powerless to decide which of these proposals should be passed into law and which should be rejected. In our opinion, it will be an evil day for Britain when the Upper House—whether it be the House of Lords as wo now know .it,' or an assembly constructed on somo new pattern—is deprived of. its' power to check, the Commons when they appear to be running against the public interest. The Government always has the remedy of going to the country, and placing tho matter in dispute beyond all doubt. •