NATIONAL DEFENCE.

Dominion, Volume 2, Issue 535, 16 June 1909, Page 6

NATIONAL DEFENCE.

One of iho real advantages which should accrue to Now Zealand from tho coming Defence Conference in London may bo a truer understanding of the nature of the problem of Imperial defence. At present most of our politicians do not even realise what kind of a problem Sir Joseph Ward is going Home to discuss, and, we hope, to study. Tho Prime Minister will be quite rightly authorised to speak of New Zealand's desire and. ability to assume hor proper share of responsibility for the defence of the Empire, but, as pointed out yesterday, he has no suggestibn to offer from tho people or Parliament, and no definite policy of local defence to put forward with the weight of public opinion behind it. In regard to the Imperial defenco problem as a whole, his part should be mainly that of an inquirer and a listener. At present he and many others seem to .be obsessed by the. common idea thas all that New Zealand or the Empire has to do is to provide warships and trained men in such numbers that Germany, or any other Power or probable combination of Powers, will bo afraid to attack us. Those who hold this charmingly simple view are generally willing to admit that, if one nation adds more Dreadnoughts to its navy, another will <io likewise, and the first must reply with a N further effort in the same diroction. ' The logical consequence of this inadequate view of tho defence problem is some such "policy" as was lately sketched by an English political humorist —"One man, one Dreadnought I For how can any Britisher feel safe until his country is surrounded by. Dreadnoughts, ' like tho sausages round' the Christmas turkey'/" Tho race in armaments, with just such a ridiculous and impossible goal as its only logical termination, is certainly going on. But this is only one aspect of the defcnco problem. 'It is an aspoct as terrible as it is ridiculous. It accounts for, even if it does not fully justify, that striking sentence in which Lord Rosebery, speaking at the Imperial Press Conference last Saturday week, suggested that the unprecedented warlike preparations of to-day might lead Europe back to barbarism or might cause a catastrophe at which working men would cry, "Wo will have no more of this madness and foolery whioh is grinding us to powder." But this competition,' which would otherwise be ruinous, has its checks and mitigations. Definite international agreement for the limitation of armaments has not yet been, and perhaps never will be, reached, but it was only the other day that tho cables were telling us of inquiries and assurances that had passed betweon Britain and Germany in regard to naval building programmes. Negotiations like these tend to check the increase of warlike preparations, but they also add to the intellectual difficulties of tho defcnco problem. The British Ministers, on receiving any suet-assurance from Germany, are bound to ask themselves what different interpretations might under altered circumstances be placed upon it; what prospective changes in international relations might oause Germany, to belie it; what developments in her internal politics might force her to, disregard it; what her financial possibilities are; what economic changes might paralyse or vivify her;' how her rulers may change in personnel or policy; what action on the part of Britain might justify Germany in repudiating her assurance; what troubles may arise in the Far East, in the Balkans, in South America, in Morocco, in any part of tho world? - In'preparing its Naval Estimates—nay, in taking tho smallest step in naval or in military policy—the British Cabinet needs to have in view the politics, the economic condition, the financial resources, the diplomacy, tho human nature, not only of Germany, but of every; other country. It must estimate the worth and permancncy of every alliance, treaty, or international understanding—open or suspected. It has to guess what the Tsar and the Kaiser will say to each other when they meet at Abo or elsowhere, and whether tho latest aeroplane will fly. All these questions and more the framers of an Imperial defence policy must answer, or they must take the risk, and compel tho Empire and tho world to take the risk, which comes of their inability to do so. Misunderstandings, mistakes, imperfectly controlled am. hitionsi, have forced the nations into the race for the possession of the biggest battalions, but the abiding object of all responsible statosmanahw ie not an over-

whelming supremacy, but a balance ,of power, an equilibrium, delicate and difficult to maintain. The task is one for which only a few men, even in England, the ncrvc-centrc of the Empire, are —wo will not pay fully equipped—but able to attempt with some hope of an outcome not greatly . disastrous. When Sin Joseph Ward mt< ts some of these men and listens to tljorri, he may learn much. He may learn that an impulsive and showy demonstration may have its uses, but that a sound and definite policy is in the long run a more valuable' contribution to the national weal.