The Dominion. MONDAY, MAY 24, 1909. THE GERMAN WAY.

Dominion, Volume 2, Issue 515, 24 May 1909, Page 4

The Dominion. MONDAY, MAY 24, 1909. THE GERMAN WAY.

The main obstacle which has to be oni countorod by thoso who arc anxious that Britain's sea-power shall be incontestabJy supremo is a sincere bolicf by some I in high quarters that Germany is a peaeoloving nation, averse to warliko bohavi- [ our, and keenly distressed by tho, "sus- | picious" temper of Britain. Even the J evidences of Germany's aggressivo aci tivity which were revealed during the I groat Naval Debate left this belief unshaken. Since the debate took place, however, an event has occurred, which has received little notice in this country, of a kind that should open the eyes of even tho most besotted believer in Germany's good intentions. Towards the end of ■ March, the sorious position created by Scrvta's warlike attitude towards Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia's unwillingness to recognise tho annexation, was relieved by the news that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had notified the German Amb'assador at St. Petersburg that if Austria were to ask the Russian Government to recognise the' annexation, it would do so. It was not until after the matter had thus been settled that the world loarnod how tho thing had been done. The story is an astonishing one, and is a grimly ironical commentary upon the constant professions of Austria and Germany that tboy havo a passion for gentleness, and especially upon the Austrian Emperor's declaration, reported last week, that "all the Powers had recontly been united in a sincere endeavour to maintain peace." On March 25 last, wo now know, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg requested the Russian Foreign Minister to recognise the annexation of the provinces, and it was intimated that a refusal would be treated as an act of hostility to Austria, and therefore* to Austria's ally, Germany. At the same time it wan mado known to Russia, apparently through an autograph lettrr from the Emperor of Germany to tho Tsar, that a German army was massed on thn Polish frontier, and would move forward at a word. Russia, which had been refusing to recogniso. the annexation except is concert with

Europe, asked for time to consult Franco and Britain. Tho reply was that if Russia degired to yield, she must yield at once. Tho Russian. Government yielded.

That is the sinister story in its barest J details, and although it has been officially by the German press, nobody in Europe doubts that Russia was pent to her'knoes by tho "mailed fist" of Germany. The lessons to Europe generally, and to Britain in particular, are of the greatest importance. What gives the greatest significance to Germany's- action is tho fact that it is a reversal of Germany's traditional policy. As ■ the Spectator reminds us, the first German Emperor, when he lay dying, sent for his grandson, the present Emperor, and charged, him on no account to quarrel with Russia, It was, indeed, one of the cardinal points of Bismarck's policy that Germany should be careful to keep Russia's friendship. That policy has been followed consistently for the last twenty years, and up till the very moment when she received tho German ultimatum Russia had ha reason to believe that her powerful neighbour was not still a friendly Power. The momentous and unscrupulous change of policy was, of courEC, only after; full consideration,' and the only possible explanation of Germany's action is contained in a fact of tho utmost importance to. Great Britain. Germany, in fact, decided that it was worth tho eternal enmity of. the great Slav Power—there is abundant evidence that ■Russia as a whole feels too deeply humiliated ever to forgive or forget—to bind Austria-Hungary to herself in something more than ordinary alliance. As the Spectator points cut; Germany and Austria must honcofortlr be considered, from the naval as from any other point of view, as ono: "This means that in the event of war wo could not even temporarily abandon the Mediterranean, but must keep there a fleet sufficiently strong to seal ..up the Austro-Hungarian fleet if it remained in harbour, or to destroy it if it camo out. Otherwise Malta, Egypt, and Cyprus, and the whole of tho British shipping that passes through the Mediterranean, would bo at Austria's mercy." It is only two or three days ago that we learned.from the cables that one of tho ■leading Berlin papers has been taunting Britain with inability to. kepp command in the. Mediterranean. A striking aspect of Germany's sudden blow at Russia is tho secrecy with wliich the arrangements were carried out.. Thoii. <"as not a word said in the Reichstag upon Russia's attitudo, not a. word in the press to indi cato that Russia's to recognise Austria's annexation of the provinces Germany/any concern. The troops wore massed .on tho frontier with complete secrecy and silence. The blow was completely unexpected. ■ This affair-"onc' of the most sinister and significant episodes in modern history," as it has been called-should dispel any lingering inclination in British minds to regard Germany as a much misunderstood lover of honourable peace and plain dealing, It w'il- also assist British people to a complete distrust of the German preps, which was unquestionably assisting the Government's plane by saying nothing to' provoke ill-feeling 'in Russia, ■when it might have been expected, if it were ,a free press, to say a good many angry... things about Russia's obstinacy. The, Gorman, press-is still what.it was in Bismarck's time, a branch of the .German Foreign Office. In' Herr Busch's Bismarck : Some Secret Pages of His Histonj i there ~are many remarkable examples of; the way in which the press was used for diplomatic, purposes.:-.' For example, Buscn writes, on a date in'lß7o five months before • the Franco-Prussian war: "Read over to the Minister, at his request, an article which he ordered yesterday and for'which ho gavo mo tho leading ideas. It was to bo dated from Paris, and published in tho Eolnische tetlung. , Bismarok approved of the article, but doaired it to be recast, on account of its stylo. , "No Frenchman," ne pointed out, "thinks in such logical and well-ordered fashion, yet the letter is.supposed to be written*by a Frenchman, .It must contain'more gossip, and you must pass more lightly from point to point." Finally Bismarck wrote most of_ the letter himself. Again, Bismarok wished to attack the Hanoverian nobles Buscii quotes a conversation, in which LiSMARCK dictated a letter, which was supposed to come from a very blunt Old Prussian v noblo, and which was to be printed in tho: Kreuzzeitung, making false charges and innuondoes against the Hanoverians. On April 29, 1888, the Berliner Bucrsen Zeilung printed a paragraph to the effect that it was in a position to-state that Bismarck was "most indignant at tho notorious article in tho brenzboten slandering the Empress Victoria. Yet, as BesoH's diary shows, the <?renzbotens articlo was dictatod by Bismarck himself. These are a few of many such oxaraples of the Bismarckian method, and that method still governs German policy. Cautious Englishmen have; always distrusted .German press opinions. It would be folly to read them with any less reserve' now, or to' accept without doubt any future assurances of Germany s love of peace.